點擊閱讀最新一期《中美聚焦文摘》第31期

美蘇冷戰結束後，世界出現和平發展潮流，但朝鮮半島卻冷戰猶存，至今仍是東亞和全球的一個安全熱點。其主要問題包括南北分裂、美韓與朝鮮長期敵對、朝鮮發展核武以及由此帶來的一次又一次核危機。這些問題給半島及東北亞帶來了嚴重的軍事安全風險。

1992年首次朝核危機爆發以來，有關方曾與朝舉行雙邊、四方、六方等多種形式的對話談判，但都以失敗告終，形成了“危機-對話-達成協議-協議失效-危機”的惡性循環。朝核及半島問題對話失敗的根本原因是，美朝雙方極度缺乏互信，有關方對半島無核化的定義和實現無核化並建立和平機制的路線圖、時間表分歧巨大，朝鮮對“利比亞模式”高度警惕。

與此前多次出現的高度緊張相比，近兩年來的半島形勢相對平靜，但所存在的諸多問題一個也未解決，形勢令人擔憂。

首先，在2019年美朝河內對話無果而終、特別是2020全球疫情暴發後，雖然“雙暫停”在半島仍得以維持，但半島無核化對話已全部停止。拜登政府上台後表示願與朝鮮無條件恢復對話的建議，以及5月份出台的對朝新政策，均受到朝鮮公開批評。朝方領導人聲稱，如果美國不徹底改變對朝敵視政策，朝鮮決不會再與美國進行對話。

其次，已跨越核門檻的朝鮮仍在繼續發展核力量，力爭獲得類似印巴事實核國家的地位。2018年朝鮮曾提出實行新的戰略路線，但2020年金正恩又重提並進路線，在今年1月的勞動黨八大上，他更公開宣示了朝鮮未來繼續發展核武的宏大規劃。在此情況下，國際上已越來越多地出現一種疑問：朝鮮還有可能棄核嗎？

第三，到目前為止，朝鮮仍保持了國內政治的基本穩定，但經濟發展面臨嚴重困難。國內經濟體制失靈及遭受嚴厲國際制裁，是朝鮮經濟困難的主要原因。此外，2020全球疫情的暴發及國內嚴重的自然災害，更加劇了朝鮮的經濟困難。

第四，半島、東北亞繼續籠罩在核擴散、軍事對峙與軍備競賽的陰影下。今年5月美國允許韓國發展中導，8月美韓繼續進行針對朝鮮的聯合軍演，9月朝韓接連進行新型彈道導彈試射。這種態勢如不改變，朝鮮將可能進行新的核導試驗，韓日將進一步擴充軍備，朝鮮擁核的多米諾骨牌效益也將日益顯露出來。

第五，9月底南北關係出現了一絲緩和跡象。朝鮮宣布恢復與韓國的溝通聯絡，並稱願在一定條件下與韓國就發表終戰宣言進行商討。但韓國發表終戰宣言的建議卻受到美國冷遇，南北恢復對話仍困難重重。

第六，中美關係的嚴重惡化使雙方在半島問題上的合作意願受到很大削弱。解決朝核問題不是當前中美各自的優先事項。

總之，如果目前半島的僵持狀況不能改變，新的危機遲早還會發生。為避免半島再現緊張局勢，中美應發揮大國擔當，努力縮小分歧，爭取早日重啟半島無核化合作。對此筆者有以下六點建議：

一、中美應通過高層對話共同宣示解決半島問題是兩國的重要合作領域，而非競爭、對抗領域。為此，美國必須改變一方面尋求與中國開展半島合作，同時又在諸多領域實施對華打壓的錯誤做法。

二、中美應共同推動有關各方在堅持“雙暫停”前提下重啟半島無核化對話，特別是支持南北雙方首先重啟對話、緩和關係。半島統一最終將由南北雙方以和平方式自主實現。

三、中美應就新形勢下實現半島無核化的基本政策達成共識。這些政策包括：

堅持實現半島無核化的目標不動搖；

堅持通過和平對話而非訴諸武力解決朝核問題；

平衡解決有關各方的合理安全關切，推動實現半島無核化與建立半島和平機制雙軌並進；

實行“一攬子、分階段、同步走”的方針。

四、中美朝韓四方應首先為結束半島戰爭狀態做出重大努力，並應共同提出實現半島無核化的路線圖。四方會談應逐步發展為六方會談。

五、堅持發揮聯合國安理會在解決朝核半島問題上的重要作用。一項當務之急是探討如何執行安理會對朝制裁的可逆條款問題，這可能成為重啟半島對話的一把鑰匙。

六、在實現半島無核化的過程中，中美兩國須努力維護雙方戰略穩定，包括危機管控。

Click to read the November issue of China-US Focus Digest

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a trend of peace and development in the world. However, the negative effects have lingered on the Korean Peninsula, which remains a security hotspot for East Asia and the world. The peninsula continues to suffer from the North-South split, the long-standing hostility between the DPRK on one side and the United States and the Republic of Korea on the other, and by the DPRK's nuclear weapons program and the resulting nuclear crises. These problems have brought serious military security risks to the peninsula and more broadly to northeastern Asia.

Since the first nuclear crisis in 1992, the parties concerned have held various dialogues and negotiations with the DPRK, including bilateral, four-party and six-party versions, all of which ended in failure and formed a vicious circle of crisis-dialogue-agreement-failure-crisis. At the heart of the failure are the extreme lack of mutual trust between the U.S. and the DPRK, the great divergence in the definition of peninsular denuclearization, the road map and timetable for denuclearization and a peace mechanism and the high vigilance of the DPRK against the so-called Libya model.

Compared with the high tensions that occurred repeatedly before, the situation on the peninsula has been relatively calm in the past two years. However, none of the many problems have been solved, which is worrying.

First, although “double suspensions” have been maintained on the peninsula since the fruitless Hanoi summit in 2019, denuclearization dialogues have all been stopped, especially since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Biden administration's proposal to resume dialogue unconditionally and its new policy announced in May were publicly criticized by the DPRK. The Korean leader vowed to never engage in dialogue with the U.S. again unless the latter completely abandons its hostility.

Second, the DPRK, which already crossed the nuclear threshold, continues to develop its nuclear forces and strives for a de facto nuclear power status similar to that of India and Pakistan. It proposed a new strategic line in 2018. In 2020, however, Kim Jong-un revived the parallel development policy, which combined the economy with a nuclear program. At the eighth KWP congress in January, he announced an ambitious plan for a nuclear future. In this context, a growing voice in the world has been asking: is it still possible for the DPRK to abandon its nuclear program?

Third, the DPRK has so far maintained its basic political stability, but its economic development faces serious difficulties. Failure of the domestic economic system and severe international sanctions are the main causes. The COVID-19 pandemic and severe natural disasters have only made things worse.

Fourth, the peninsula and Northeast Asia remain under the shadow of nuclear proliferation, military confrontation and an arms race. In May, the U.S. gave the green light to the ROK to develop its missiles; in August, the two conducted joint military exercises targeting the DPRK; and in September, the North and the South both conducted new ballistic missile test launches. If this situation does not change, the DPRK may well conduct new nuclear and missile tests and the ROK and Japan may further expand their arms. This is the domino effect of DPRK's nuclear ambition.

Fifth, there were some signs of a thaw in North-South relations at the end of September. The DPRK announced the resumption of communication with the South, and expressed its readiness to discuss, under certain conditions, a declaration to end the state of war. But the ROK's proposal for an end-of-war declaration did not get a warm response from the U.S., and the resumption of North-South dialogue remains fraught.

Sixth, the serious deterioration of China-U.S. relations has greatly weakened the willingness of the big powers to cooperate on issues related to the peninsula. Addressing the nuclear issue is not a current priority for either country.

In short, if the current stalemate is not changed, a new crisis will arise sooner or later. To avoid the recurrence of tensions on the peninsula, China and the U.S. should play their part as major powers, narrow their differences and work for an early resumption of cooperation on peninsula denuclearization. Here are my ideas on how:

1. China and the U.S. should jointly declare through a high-level dialogue that the settlement of the peninsula issue is an important area of cooperation, not competition or confrontation. To this end, the U.S. must stop suppressing China in many different areas as it seeks China's support on the peninsula.

2. China and the U.S. should jointly push for the resumption of bilateral dialogue on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula under the precondition of upholding the two suspensions. They should give special support to the resumption of North-South dialogue to relax and develop their relations. Unification of the peninsula should eventually be achieved by the DPRK and ROK independently and peacefully.

3. China and the U.S. should agree on the basic policies for denuclearization of the peninsula. These include:

• Adhering to the goal of denuclearization without wavering;

• Resolving the nuclear issue through peaceful dialogue rather than resorting to the use of force;

• Addressing the legitimate security concerns of all parties in a balanced manner and promoting in parallel denuclearization and a peace mechanism;

• Handling the matter with a packaged solution to be implemented in phases and with simultaneous actions.

4. China, the U.S., the DPRK and the ROK should first make major efforts to end the state of war on the peninsula and jointly put forward a road map for the denuclearization of the peninsula. The four-party talks should be gradually developed into six-parties.

5. The important role of the UN Security Council in resolving nuclear issues should always be respected and used. A priority is to explore how to implement the reversible provisions of UN sanctions, which could be a key to restarting dialogue on the peninsula.

6. In the process of denuclearization, China and the U.S. must work hard to safeguard the strategic stability between them, including crisis stability.