2020年5月28日，美國國務卿邁克爾·蓬皮奧向國會提交了《2020年香港政策法案報告》，它是根據《1992年香港政策法案》的要求以及《2019年香港人權與民主法案》所修訂。作為提交程序的一部分，美國國務卿每年需要證明香港是否在北京的政治令狀下依然保持着充分自治，以確保其可以依據美國法律享有特殊優惠待遇。這一證明源自1984年《中英聯合聲明》中承諾的“高度自治”以及在1997年7月中國收回香港主權時頒佈的該地區迷你憲法——“基本法”確立的“一國兩制”原則。5月28日，國務卿蓬皮奧宣布，他已無法證明香港享有充分的自治來確保其擁有特殊優惠待遇。第二天，美國總統特朗普指示其政府開啟撤銷香港特殊優惠待遇豁免政策的程序，這些豁免政策包括雙邊引渡條約和軍民兩用技術出口管制等。美國的這一決定是對中國全國人民代表大會5月28日起草並通過香港《國家安全法》作出的回應。該法案將禁止任何針對中央政府的叛國、分裂、煽動、顛覆和外國勢力干涉等行為，法案自身是對香港未能根據“基本法”第23條要求進行相關立法的回應（“基本法”是治理香港的迷你憲法）。

鑒於中央政府《國家安全法》的具體內容、通過日期以及（也是最重要的）在香港地區的執行手段等目前還是“已知的未知”，美國國務院的這種做法是極度的反應過度。

根據香港“基本法”確立的“一國兩制”原則，除“有關國防、外交”和“其他按本法規定不屬於香港特別行政區自治範圍的事務”，其他都歸香港特別行政區政府管轄。通情達理的人們會問，當社會治安遭到破壞以至於危害國家根本安全利益時，“基本法”第14條規定的“維護社會治安”究竟是只屬於香港特區政府的管轄範圍，還是中央政府也可以行使共同管轄權。畢竟，避免社會治安遭到破壞是聯邦或中央政府的利益與職責核心所在，雖然維護法律秩序通常屬於州政府或地方政府的管轄權限。這種觀點有先例可循。在俄羅斯訴烏克蘭（2019年4月）一案中，世貿組織爭端解決機構任命的仲裁委員會就裁決，“維護內部法律與社會治安”是影響國家“根本安全利益”的典型職責。同樣，通情達理的人們還會問，中央政府在香港的土地上設置包括情報機構在內的國家安全機構是否超出了“基本法”中確立的中央政府負責“國防和外交事務”的職權範圍。的確有可能如此。另一方面，在《海洋法公約》規定的框架中，美國國務院自己就認為情報搜集活動是“軍事活動”的子集。眾所周知的是，中國人民解放軍已經在該地區派駐了駐守部隊。

但行使與狹義“社會治安”相關的共同管轄權以及在香港的土地上設立基本的國家安全機構是否相當於推翻並終結香港的“高度自治”並不值得商榷。事實絕非如此。香港眼下的社會和經濟制度，包括1984年《中英聯合聲明》中規定的備受珍視的言論自由、集會自由、結社自由、旅行自由、行動自由、職業選擇自由以及宗教信仰自由，都將繼續保持基本完整，並接受香港法律體系的最終裁定。只有當這些自由在香港的土地上被濫用，以至於危及國家主權和安全並挑戰了中央政府的權力及“基本法”的權威時，或是針對內地進行滲透和顛覆活動時，根據新的《國家安全法》，這些很可能越過了中央政府的“紅線”。

美國國務院《2020年香港政策法案報告》另一個令人質疑的特點是它對於“一國兩制”在香港的法律體系內如何體現並實施的解讀問題重重。這在涉及中央政府與香港特區政府關係的憲法問題上尤為顯著。

在美國看來，在“基本法”管轄範圍內涉及香港-內地關係的案例中，北京不應享有排他的司法解釋權。自治的原則規定了香港法院長期建立起來的行使司法解釋、複核政府行為的權力必須得到維護。美國這種司法解釋、複核和宣布無效都屬於地方權力的觀點是錯誤的。當一個地區的司法機關被要求就地方法律是否符合“基本法”進行裁決時（正如香港的上訴法院近期確認的那樣），這些權力的確屬於該地區的司法機關，但當涉及北京-香港關係的憲法權限時，情況就並非如此了。在這種情況下，根據“基本法”，北京的確享有最終解釋權，要求香港法院通過香港終審法院請求全國人民代表大會常務委員會就相關條款作出解釋。此外，當香港法院引用這些條款時，香港法院“有責任”以全國人大常委會的解釋為準。最終，在中央政府與香港特區政府關係的條款上，全國人大常委會享有解釋“基本法”的“普遍而獨立的權力”，而香港法院有責任在進行司法審查時遵循這種解釋。這是法律明文規定的。美國國務院在這方面的錯誤解讀不禁讓人懷疑它究竟對於“一國兩制”原則核心的法律基石問題有何種程度的理解，抑或是完全沒有理解。

特朗普政府的《2020年香港政策法案報告》及其終止確認香港的自治地位正值香港處於一個後回歸時代的關鍵節點。2020年9月，一場具劃時代意義的香港立法委員會選舉即將舉行，這或將見證自香港主權回歸中國後“支持民主”的反對派首次佔據要職。在選舉前（親北京人士依然在立法會享有多數席位時），北京似乎下定決心要通過出台《國家安全法》堵住香港安全與情報漏洞。與此同時，香港依然深陷常年房價高企的泥潭（更不用提流產的逃犯引渡條例），這些問題向來由一小部分一心尋求推動自決議程的少數派主導。香港履行圍繞“基本法”第23條進行國家安全相關立法的承諾，以及達成根據“基本法”第45條和第68條進行“普選”的目標也似乎遙遙無期。美國取消對香港的特殊優惠待遇（主要是為了刁難中國）有可能進一步分裂本已訴求各異的政治勢力，最終導致害人害己。

我們希望，當新一屆美國政府在2021年1月宣誓就職時，它會對彼時已經頒佈的《國家安全法》採取一種精細的解讀，並就此在《2021年香港政策法案報告》中圍繞香港的高度自治地位作出一個更深思熟慮的決定。

On May 28, 2020, U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo submitted the 2020 Hong Kong Policy Act Report to Congress, as required under the Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 and amended by the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019. As part of the submission process, the Secretary of State is required to annually certify whether Hong Kong continues to be sufficiently autonomous from Beijing's political writ to warrant special and differential treatment under U.S. law. This certification stems from the “high degree of autonomy” promised in the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 and the “one country, two systems” principle enshrined in the territory's mini-constitution, the Basic Law, at the time of its reversion to Chinese rule in July 1997. On May 28th, Secretary of State Pompeo announced that he could no longer certify that Hong Kong was sufficiently autonomous to warrant such treatment. The next day, President Trump directed his administration to begin the process of eliminating the territory's special and differential policy exemptions in U.S. law, ranging from the bilateral extradition treaty to export controls on dual-use technologies. The decertification was in response to the China National People's Congress' (NPC) decision on May 28th to draft and thereafter pass a national security law for Hong Kong that will prohibit acts of treason, secession, sedition, subversion, and foreign interference against the central government– itself a response to the territory's failure to bring in such a law as required under Article 23 of the city's Basic Law (the mini-constitution that governs the territory).

The U.S. State Department's decertification is a wildly-over-the-top reaction, given that the specific contents of the central government's national security law, its date of passage, and – most importantly – its means of enforcement on the territory of Hong Kong are all 'known unknowns' at this point of time.

As per the 'one country, two systems' principle enshrined in the Basic Law, all functions except “those relating to defense and foreign affairs” as well as “other matters outside the limits of [Hong Kong's] autonomy” are the preserve of the territory's government. Reasonable people can argue whether the “maintenance of public order”, as enumerated in Article 14 of the Basic Law, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Hong Kong government or is amenable to the central government's concurrent exercise of authority when the breakdown of public order impinges on the state's essential security interests. Averting the breakdown of public order resides, after all, at the heart of a federal or central government's interests and duties – even if maintenance of law and order is typically listed as a state or local right. And there is precedent for such an opinion. In Russia v. Ukraine (April 2019), an arbitral panel constituted under the World Trade Organization's (WTO) dispute settlement system had ruled that “maintenance of law and public order internally” was a quintessential function of the state that impinged on the state's “essential security interests.” Equally, reasonable people can argue whether the local presence of the central government's national security organs, including intelligence agencies, on Hong Kong's soil exceeds the central government's “defense and foreign affairs” remit enshrined in the Basic Law. It could well be the case. On the other hand, the U.S. State Department itself considers intelligence gathering activities as a sub-set of “military activities”, insofar as its engagement with the provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention is concerned. And as is well known, the Chinese People's Liberation Army is already garrisoned on the territory.

What is not debatable however is whether a narrow 'public order'-related exercise of concurrent jurisdiction and potential skeletal presence of national security organs on Hong Kong's soil amounts to an overturning and end of the territory's “high degree of autonomy”. It most unequivocally does not. Hong Kong's current social and economic systems, including its cherished freedoms of speech, assembly, association, travel, movement, occupational choices and religious beliefs, as outlined by the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984, will continue to remain substantially intact and subject to final adjudication in the territory's court system. Only to the extent that such freedoms are abused on Hong Kong soil in a manner that endangers national sovereignty and security, challenges the power of the central government and the authority of the Basic Law, or conducts acts of infiltration and sabotage against the mainland, will they likely cross the central government's 'red-lines' in this new national security law.

An equally questionable feature of the U.S. State Department's 2020 Hong Kong Policy Act Report is its problematic understanding of how 'one country, two systems' is lived and practiced within the Hong Kong court system. This is particularly the case in instances that constitutionally concern central government-Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) relations.

In the U.S.' view, in cases concerning Hong Kong-mainland relations that come under the jurisdiction of the Basic Law, Beijing should not enjoy the exclusive power of judicial interpretation. Principles of autonomy dictate that the long-established practice of Hong Kong courts exercising the power of interpretation to adjudicate laws and review government actions must be upheld. This U.S. view of local power of judicial interpretation, review and invalidation is erroneous. While such power is indeed vested in the territory's courts when called on to adjudicate local laws' compliance with the Basic Law (as the territory's Court of Appeal has also recently affirmed), this is most certainly not the case in instances that fall within the constitutional purview of Beijing-Hong Kong relations. In such cases, Beijing does enjoy definitive power of interpretation under the Basic Law, requiring Hong Kong's courts to seek an interpretation of the relevant provisions from the National People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) through the territory's Court of Final Appeal. Furthermore, Hong Kong courts, when applying these provisions locally, are “under a duty to follow” the interpretation laid down by the National People's Congress Standing Committee. At the end of the day, the NPCSC enjoys “general and free-standing power” to interpret the Basic Law insofar as the relationship between the central authorities and the Hong Kong region is concerned, and the territory's courts are duty-bound to follow this lead during the course of judicial review. This is settled law. The U.S. State Department's defective interpretation in this regard begs the question thereupon as to how well it grasps – and does not grasp – the foundational pillars of law that reside at the heart of the “one country, two systems” principle.

The Trump Administration's 2020 Hong Kong Policy Act Report and its decertification of Hong Kong's autonomous status comes at a critical juncture in the territory's post-Handover history. In September 2020, a potentially landmark Legislative Council of Hong Kong (LegCo) election is due to be held, which could witness the opposition 'pro-democracy' forces occupying the Treasury bench for the first time since Hong Kong's reversion to Chinese rule. In advance of the election (and while its supporters still enjoy a working majority in the LegCo), Beijing appears determined to apply its national security scalpel to plug the territory's security and intelligence gaps. Hong Kong, meanwhile, remains weighed down by frustrations related to its perennial housing woes (not to mention the botched attempt to pass a fugitives law), which has been commandeered by a narrow minority bent on pushing their self-determination agenda. And a local version of fulfilling Article 23's promise of a national security law as well as Articles 45 and 68's goal of 'ultimate universal suffrage' appear no closer to realization. The U.S. hammer blow of decertification and elimination of Hong Kong's special policy exemptions in U.S. law (primarily in a bid to spite China) has the potential in this combustive mix to scatter the disparate political pieces even further to the detriment of all.

Hopefully, when a new administration assumes office in January 2021, it will undertake a nuanced review of the by-then promulgated national security law and arrive at a more considered decision on Hong Kong's substantially autonomous status in its 2021 Hong Kong Policy Act Report.