2023年7月9日，美國財政部長珍妮特·耶倫在中國北京美國大使館舉行的新聞發佈會上發表講話。路透社/托馬斯·彼得/資料照片

美國財長耶倫的北京之行，推進了中美兩國在經貿領域的“再接觸”進程。雖然此訪期間，中美雙方並沒有就關稅、出口管制等問題達成具體成果，但展現出增強兩國經貿政策團隊常態化溝通的良好意願。這不僅對中美處理各自的經濟挑戰至關重要，也有助於維護全球經濟的穩定性。

耶倫向中方高級官員重申，美國無意阻礙中國的現代化進程，不尋求“脫鉤”，而是實施“去風險”和“多元化”政策，美國希望在應對債務問題、氣候變化等全球性挑戰方面與中國加深合作。相較於“脫鉤”，“去風險”這一表述確實更為溫和，它體現了拜登政府試圖安撫美國的商業界和盟友。“去風險”源自歐盟委員會主席馮德萊恩等歐洲政治人士的說法，他們明確表示，與中國“脫鉤”既不可行、也不可取。

美歐等西方國家到底會採取何種具體行動，以體現“去風險”和“脫鉤”的不同，成為國際輿論的關注點。耶魯大學法學院中國中心主任葛維寶(Paul Gewirtz)教授認為，“去風險”這一概念聽上去模稜兩可，缺乏精確的定義。他擔心圍繞與“國家安全”相關的風險而制定的對華“去風險”政策可能接近於“脫鉤”。英國《金融時報》評論家拉赫曼（Gideon Rachman）稱，對“風險”的定義並不明晰，風險是指中國的 “政治脅迫”還是可能爆發的戰爭，西方國家政府語焉不詳；在“去風險”策略下，西方國家可能不再支持國內企業對華出口，並計劃進一步收緊對華投資限制。

對於跨國公司而言，“去風險”和“脫鉤”這兩者之間可能並無太大區別。路透社對一些西方國家企業高管的採訪結果顯示，為應對西方國家與中國之間日益緊張的地緣政治局勢，多數與中國有業務往來的西方公司忙於制定應急計劃，將在華業務與企業的全球業務進行剝離，推動供應鏈從中國移出。一些西方企業嘗試建立平行供應鏈，即在華生產面向中國市場的產品，在墨西哥等地生產面向美國市場的產品。然而，中國歐盟商會會長、巴斯夫集團全球副總裁伍德克（Joerg Wuttke）表示，為美中市場分別建立兩條供應鏈成本過高，規模較小的企業根本無法承受。

此外，美國等西方國家的風險資本投資者對向中國投資也變得越來越謹慎。標準普爾今年2月發佈的數據顯示，美國私募股權和風險資本2022年對華投資70.2億美元，較2021年的289.2億美元減少76%，為近三年來最低水平。為應對中美日益緊張的對抗關係，硅谷的著名風險投資公司紅杉資本採取分拆策略，將中國子公司剝離為一家獨立公司。拜登政府很可能在近期發佈對華投資限制行政令。這一做法與去年10月拜登政府發佈的“芯片禁令”是相互聯繫與配合的，目標是所謂“去風險”，即防範中國利用高技術損害美國的國家安全利益。對華投資限制的領域聚焦半導體、人工智能、量子計算，未來或會擴大。美國希望日本、德國等盟友也在對華投資限制方面步步跟進。

雖然耶倫強調美國需與中國建立建設性、公平的經濟關係，但拜登政府的很多做法卻並不符合這一表態。美國對華出口管制還在不斷加碼，這對中國民用技術產品的研發以及眾多私營企業的發展帶來沉重打擊。此前，為了滿足拜登政府“芯片禁令”的要求，英偉達等美國芯片企業調降了相關產品的技術性能，以獲取對華出口的許可，比如專供中國市場的A800 圖形處理單元（GPU）處理器。然而，拜登政府有意將這類產品也納入管制範圍，進一步壓縮美國芯片企業與中國之間的商業往來。這種趨勢表明美國政府“去風險”的限度是不確定的，會令企業無所適從，也增大了它們推進對華商業合作的風險。

令人憂心的是，國家安全因素在美國對華經貿政策中的影響力越來越大。4月，美國總統國家安全事務助理傑克·沙利文在布魯金斯學會發表演講，提出拜登政府將基於“新華盛頓共識”制定和實施國際經濟戰略。即便沙利文在演講中再度強調美國對華政策是“去風險”，但在“泛安全化”難以緩解的情況下，美國針對中國的“選擇性脫鉤”態勢仍將加劇。考慮到拜登政府圍繞經濟安全問題與日本、韓國、歐盟等盟友不斷深化政策協調，美國的對華打壓舉措或會加快“多邊化”，其他西方國家在對華經濟合作方面將更為謹慎。比如，日本將於本月實施新修訂的《外匯及外國貿易法》，限制23種芯片製造設備和產品的對華出口。6月，歐盟委員會發佈《經濟安全戰略》文件，提出將實行更加嚴格的投資監管和出口限制。

總之，耶倫雖然在其訪華期間做出積極表態，但中方更為看重拜登政府的實際行動。如果從“脫鉤”到“去風險”僅僅是一種文字遊戲，不僅會損害中美雙方的戰略互信，也會進一步增大商業界的不安和成本，經濟上的“去風險”從長期看或造成中美陷入地緣政治衝突的更大風險。

2023年7月9日，美國財政部長珍妮特·耶倫在中國北京美國大使館舉行的新聞發佈會上發表講話。路透社/托馬斯·彼得/資料照片

U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen's recent trip to Beijing has advanced the economic and trade “re-engagement” process between China and the United States. Although no concrete results were reached on issues such as tariffs and export controls, both sides showed a good-faith intent to enhance regular communication between their economic and trade teams. This is not only vital for China and the U.S. in dealing with their respective economic challenges but good for the stability of the global economy.

Yellen reiterated to senior Chinese officials that the U.S. has no intention of impeding China's modernization process and is not seeking to decouple from the Chinese economy. Rather, it was to “de-risk” and diversify. Meanwhile, the U.S. hopes to deepen cooperation with China in addressing global challenges such as debt and climate change.The concept of de-risking is indeed more moderate than decoupling. It is an attempt by the Biden administration to appease the domestic business community and America's allies. The term "de-risking" was first used by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and other EU politicians, who explicitly stated that decoupling from China is neither feasible nor desirable.

What specific actions the U.S., Europe and other Western countries will take to distinguish de-risking from decoupling has become the focus of international public discourse. Professor Paul Gewirtz, director of the China Center at Yale Law School, argues that the concept of de-risking is ambiguous and lacks precise definition. His concern is that a de-risking policy toward China, based on national security risks, may be little different from decoupling, even though it sounds less harsh.According to Financial Times commentator Gideon Rachman, the definition of risk is unclear, and Western governments are vague about whether their perceived risks refer to “political coercion” by China or the possibility of war. Under a de-risking strategy, Western countries may no longer allow domestic companies' exports to China and could roll out further restrictions on investment in China.

For multinational companies, there may not be much difference between de-risking and decoupling. Reuters interviews with executives of Western companies suggest that in response to growing geopolitical tensions between the West and China, most Western companies with a business presence in China are busy making contingency plans to spin off their China operations and divert their supply chains. Some Western companies are creating parallel supply chains, which means they may produce products for the Chinese market in China, and products for the U.S. market in places like Mexico.However, Joerg Wuttke, president of the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China and global vice president of BASF Group, said the cost of establishing two separate supply chains for the U.S. and Chinese markets are too high for smaller companies to afford.

In addition, venture capitalists in the United States and other Western countries have become increasingly wary about investment in China. Data released by Standard & Poor's in February showed that U.S. private equity and venture capital firms invested $7.02 billion in China in 2022, down 76 percent from $28.92 billion in 2021, the lowest in nearly three years.In response to the heightened confrontation between the U.S. and China, Sequoia Capital, a prominent Silicon Valley venture capital firm, has spun off its Chinese subsidiary as a separate company. And the Biden administration is expected to issue an executive order restricting investment in China. This approach is closely linked to the chip ban issued by the administration in October, with the stated goal of de-risking — or preventing China from using high technology in a way that allegedly harms U.S. national security interests.The restrictions primarily focus on semiconductors, AI and quantum computing and may be further expanded going forward. The U.S. hopes Japan, Germany and other allies will act in lockstep and roll out their own investment restrictions against China.

While Yellen emphasized the need for a constructive and fair economic relationship between the U.S. and China, much of the Biden administration's approach has not been consistent with that statement. U.S. export controls on China have been heightened, dealing a heavy blow to Chinese civilian technology products and many private companies.Not long ago, U.S. chip companies such as Nvidia — in order to meet the Biden administration's "chip ban" requirements — downgraded the technical performance of their products to obtain permission to export to China. Products included the A800 graphics processing unit (GPU) processor, which was designed for the Chinese market alone. However, the Biden administration intends to include such products in the export control umbrella, further depressing the business flow between U.S. chip companies and China. This trend indicates that the boundaries of the U.S. government's de-risking moves are uncertain, which confuses companies and increases their perceived risks in business engagements in China.

In another worrying trend is national security rhetoric, which seems increasingly to drive Washington's economic and trade policy decisions. In April, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said in a speech at the Brookings Institution that the Biden administration would develop and implement an international economic strategy based on the so-called New Washington Consensus.Even though Sullivan stressed in his speech that U.S. policy toward China is about de-risking, not decoupling, there will be some selective decoupling, which will intensify, as it is hard to mitigate the effect of a generalized concept of national security. As the Biden administration deepens its policy coordination with Japan, South Korea, the European Union and other allies, its actions to suppress China will quickly extend to the multilateral realm, making other Western countries wary of economic engagement with China.For instance, Japan will implement the newly revised Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act this month to restrict the export of 23 types of chip manufacturing equipment and products to China. In June, the European Commission released its Economic Security Strategy document, which proposes stricter investment regulation and more export restrictions.

In short, while Secretary Yellen made positive statements during her visit, China will remain focused on the actions of the Biden administration. If decoupling and de-risking amount to a mere game of semantics, it will not only damage the strategic mutual trust between China and the U.S. but also inflame concerns and raise costs for the business community. In the long run, economic de-risking may plunge the two counties into greater peril of geopolitical conflict.

(Translated by Hua Xin)