近年來，美國日益強化中國作為“系統性競爭對手”的定位，“去中國化”是其戰略目標，“脫鉤”是其重要手段，而“科技脫鉤”是對華“脫鉤”的核心。同時，美國通過“盟友+規則”體系，強化“去中國化”的同盟體系。對華“轉鏈”、“斷鏈”，將“以中國為中心的全球產業鏈供應鏈體系”調整為“以美國為中心的全球產業鏈供應鏈體系”，成為美國對外戰略尤其是對華戰略的首要選項。

另一方面，當下美國貿易政策體現出越來越濃的新重商主義，既想保護國內市場，又想為自己的優勢產業打開國際市場，既想主導構建維護其霸權利益的國際秩序，又想藉機打擊競爭對手。美國貿易政策中的自由主義不斷褪色，保護主義大行其道，貿易政策的進攻性和對抗性不斷增強。從借“國家安全”之名行保護主義之實，到以“供應鏈安全”“技術安全”為由構建排他性的新標準、新規則，美國貿易政策已經超越所謂“公平貿易”，越來越呈現出安全化趨向。甚至可以說，貿易安全化已經完全替代貿易自由化，成為美國貿易政策的核心內容，並服務於其整體國家安全戰略。

可以說，美國加速對華脫鉤、重振自身產業的戰略輪廓逐漸清晰。一方面，延續特朗普對華貿易政策的主基調和做法，甚至加大對華科技打擊力度，對華實施科技戰逐步上升為美國一項國家戰略。拜登政府通過《基礎設施投資法案》《芯片與科學法案》《通脹削減法案》等，試圖以立法手段“釜底抽薪”，倒逼產業迴流。另一方面，緩和與盟友和夥伴國家在特朗普時期的緊張經貿關係，建立新的針對中國的政策協調機制，如美歐貿易和技術委員會（TTC），同時向盟友和夥伴國家推出“印太經濟框架（IPEF）”和“美洲經濟繁榮夥伴關係（APEP）”等，試圖在歐洲、亞洲、美洲三管齊下，通過“友岸外包”“友岸製造”組建供應鏈聯盟，加速供應鏈替代，並與盟友加強出口管制合作，試圖在全球高科技領域對中國建立“隔離牆”。

中國對美國具有相當程度的技術依賴性，而美國對中國也具有相當程度的市場依賴性，但這種相互依賴性正變得越來越脆弱。美國以“權力邏輯”取代“市場邏輯”，以制裁倒逼轉移，嚴重擾亂了全球產業鏈國際分工，破壞全球供應鏈穩定。目前，產業鏈供應鏈顯現出一些“去中國化”苗頭，在美國進口來源地中，中國進口份額從2018年的21.4%降至2021年的17.7%。科爾尼管理諮詢公司用美國自中國進口產品規模（包括香港地區）占亞洲14個低成本經濟體進口規模的比重衡量美國產業鏈“去中國化”程度，發現該指數從特朗普上台之初的66%下降至2021年底的55%，5年間下降了11個百分點，這說明美國對中國產業鏈的依賴程度有所下降。值得關注的是，美國促進制造業迴流戰略可能面臨拐點。2020年以來，受新冠疫情及其他因素的持續影響，雖然美國國內製造業生產總值增長7.3%，但卻比之前更加依賴14個亞洲低成本國家或地區的製造生產。與此同時，該指數在2021年二季度降至50%低點後，由於亞太新興經濟體疫情反覆，導致產業鏈遭受打擊，部分出口訂單又反流至中國，中國對美國出口份額有所回升。（2022年，由於中國國內收緊疫情防控政策，部分出口訂單又轉向東南亞）。

事實證明，美國實施“供應鏈遏華”戰略並尋求供應鏈“去中國化”幾乎不可能實現。幾十年來，全球已經形成對中國產業鏈供應鏈高度依賴的產業分工格局，中國產業鏈供應鏈規模龐大，已成為120多個國家（地區）的最大貿易夥伴，“中國製造”在全球產業鏈供應鏈中佔據重要地位。麥肯錫全球研究院發佈報告顯示，2020年，在全球186個國家和地區中，33個國家的第一大出口目的地是中國，65個國家的第一大進口來源地是中國。從工業製成品出口來看，中國工業製成品出口規模佔全球比重持續提升，2020年達到19.5%，明顯高於美國（5.0%）、德國（9.6%）和日本（4.5%）等製造業大國。

經過多年發展，中國早已深度融入全球產業分工體系，並成為全球貿易網絡中心。根據UN Comtrade數據測算，2020年，中國貿易網絡中心度為98.55，居全球首位，遠高於居第二位的美國（88.41）和第三位德國（86.96）。與此同時，在中美貿易戰以及美國對華脫鉤的大背景下，近幾年中國與亞洲鄰國貿易聯繫還在進一步加深，這意味着中國全球貿易網絡與產業鏈供應鏈核心節點地位依舊突出，中國產業發展所形成的龐大需求將為全球產業鏈供應鏈的發展持續注入強大動力。

產業鏈供應鏈博弈正在成為中美競爭博弈的主戰場，美國對華實施科技戰將呈現長期性、謀劃性和加劇性的發展趨勢。為此，中國必須做好打“持久戰”的戰略準備。但同時，中國仍要堅持全球化下的開放與合作思維，通過擴大制度型開放，充分發揮中國製造業競爭力以及可以定義產品、技術、標準、規則的市場優勢。

In recent years, the United States has reinforced its position that China is a “systemic competitor,” with “de-Sinicization” as its strategic goal. Decoupling has become a prominent element in the U.S. toolbox. Decoupling in the high-tech sector uses stronger alliances and rule-making against China. The “supply chain shift” and “supply chain severing” that aims to diminish a China-centered global industrial and supply chain system in favor of a U.S.-centered one, has become the primary option in U.S. foreign strategy, especially toward China.

At present, U.S. trade policy is increasingly tinged with neo-mercantilism, as it wants to protect the domestic market and open up the international market for its own superior industries at the same time. It also seeks to build an international order to safeguard its hegemonic interests and crack down on its competitors. The liberalism of U.S. trade policy is fading, protectionism is taking hold and an aggressive and confrontational nature is gaining traction. From practicing protectionism in the name of national security to setting exclusive new standards and rules on the grounds of supply chain security and tech security, U.S. trade policy has already departed from so-called fair trade and become increasingly security-driven. It is fair to say that “trade securitization” has completely replaced trade liberalization as the underpinning of U.S. trade policy, in order to serve its overall national security strategy.

The contours of the U.S. strategy are becoming clear: It aims to revive American industries and accelerate decoupling from China. On one hand, it inherits the tenor and approach of Donald Trump's trade policy toward China and further intensifies the crackdown on China's science and technology. The so called sci-tech war against China has been elevated to a U.S. national strategy. President Joe Biden's administration has been promoting reshoring through such legislative means as the Infrastructure Investment Act, the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act. On the other hand, it is trying to ease tensions in its economic and trade relations with allies and partners that started in the Trump era, as part of its efforts to establish new policy coordination mechanisms against China, such as the Trade and Technology Council (TTC), the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and the American Partnership for Economic Prosperity (APEP). All represent attempts to create a “wall” against China in the high-tech sector through a three-pronged approach — namely the formation of supply chain alliances through friend-shoring outsourcing and manufacturing, accelerated supply chain substitution and robust export control cooperation with allies.

China is quite dependent on the U.S. technologically, and likewise for the U.S. on China, but this interdependence is becoming increasingly tenuous. The U.S. has replaced market logic with the logic of power. It uses sanctions to force manufacturing transfers, seriously disrupting the international division of labor in the global industrial arena and rattling global supply chains, which have also shown signs of de-Sinicization. The share of U.S. imports sourced from China declined from 21.4 percent in 2018 to 17.7 percent in 2021.Kearney Management Consultants ran an index calculation comparing U.S. imports from China (including Hong Kong) with U.S. imports from 14 low-cost economies in Asia, to gauge the degree of de-Sinicization. The index has fallen from 66 percent at the start of Trump's presidency to 55 percent by the end of 2021, a decline of 11 percentage points in five years. This represents a decline in U.S. dependence on the Chinese industrial chain.However, it is likely that the U.S. strategy of reshoring may be at an inflection point. Since 2020, because of the pandemic and other factors, U.S. domestic manufacturing output has increased by 7.3 percent, while it has also become more dependent on manufacturing production in 14 low-cost Asian countries or regions. At the same time, after the index fell to 50 percent in the second quarter of 2021, China's share of exports to the U.S. rebounded as the emerging Asia-Pacific economies suffered industrial chain disruptions on the back of a resurgent pandemic, with some export orders reversing back to China. (In 2022, some export orders were diverted back to Southeast Asia, as China tightened its COVID response measures after domestic outbreaks.)

It is clear that the U.S. can hardly be expected to pull off its strategy of supply chain containment and its attempt to de-Sinicize the supply chain. Over the decades, the world has developed an industrial division of labor that is highly dependent on China's supply chain. China's industrial supply chain is so extensive that it is the largest trading partner for more than 120 countries (regions), and “Made in China” permeates the global industrial supply chain.According to a report released by McKinsey Global Institute, in 2020, among 186 countries and regions, 33 had China as their top export destination and 65 had China as their top import source. In terms of exports of manufactured goods, China's share of global exports continues to rise. It reached 19.5 percent in 2020, significantly higher than that of major manufacturing countries such as the United States (5.0 percent), Germany (9.6 percent) and Japan (4.5 percent).

After years of development, China has been deeply integrated into the global industrial division of labor system and has become the center of global trade networks. According to UN Comtrade, China's trade network centrality reached 98.55 in 2020, the highest in the world, with the U.S. trailing at 88.41, a distant second, and Germany in third place at 86.96.In the context of the U.S.-China trade war and the decoupling from China initiated by the U.S., China's trade ties with its Asian neighbors have deepened in recent years, which means that China's global trade network, and its status as a hub of supply and industrial chains remains prominent. Massive demand released by China's industrial development will continue to provide strong impetus for the development of the global supply chain.

Industrial and supply chains have become the main theater of competition between China and the United States. America's technology war against China will be deliberate, intense and long-term. For this reason, China must be strategically prepared for a protracted fight.At the same time, China must maintain an open and cooperative approach to globalization, and press ahead with institutional opening-up to fully leverage China's competitiveness in manufacturing and unlock its advantages in defining products, technologies, standards and rules.