尼米茲號航空母艦（CVN 68）、喬辛號導彈巡洋艦（CG 65）、導彈驅逐艦桑普森號（DDG 102）和平克尼號驅逐艦（DDG 91）以及導彈護衛艦魯本·詹姆斯號（FFG 46）在南海編隊作業。尼米茲航母戰鬥群目前正在美國第七艦隊負責區域開展作業。

中美之間的緊張在諸多領域正不斷加劇。關稅對決的開始有可能觸發一場全面的雙邊貿易戰；北京對華盛頓試圖加強與台灣外交和軍事關係的怒氣越來越大；最後，兩個國家對各自的南海政策目標的爭執已經達到令人擔憂的程度。

所有這些爭執都充滿危險，但台灣和南海問題最有可能使雙邊關係惡化，並升級為戰爭。在台灣問題上妥協難以實現，但美國政策的適度改變卻有可能大大緩和南海的緊張局勢。具體來說，華盛頓應該大量減少對抗性的“航行自由”巡邏，不再把北京當成南海地區的破壞性因素甚或是徹頭徹尾的威脅來對待。

美國海軍在西太平洋保持大規模存在的一個長期原因，是暢通無阻的航運對全球經濟健康至關重要。由於擔心商貿流通有可能被中斷，美國政治和經濟領導人幾十年來一直都在這麼做。這是可以理解的。據聯合國貿發會議估計，全球貿易量的80%和貿易額的70%都是靠海運來進行的。

穿越南海的海上航道是極其重要的大動脈。貿發會議的分析顯示，全球海上運輸的1/3要通過這一水域。華盛頓戰略與國際研究中心“中國力量項目”保守估計這一數字為每年3.37萬億美元，但它也承認，其他機構的估計甚至高達5.3萬億美元。戰略與國際研究中心的研究報告強調，這一水域“對中國、台灣、日本和韓國尤為重要，因此這些國家都依賴連接印度洋與南海乃至太平洋的馬六甲海峽”。

美國領導人正日益把中國視為潛在的商業威脅。華盛頓的懷疑來自於中國對南海領土主張的程度和強度。這已經不是什麼新問題了。1947年12月，中華民國政府（蔣介石政權）發行了一張地圖，圖上划出了一行11段線（後減少為9段），把南海80%以上的水域都劃歸給中國。兩年之後推翻了蔣介石並建立中華人民共和國的共產黨政權接受了這一主張。

然而，直到大約十年前，北京的領土野心還只停留在理論上。中國軍事力量不足，甚至無法通過讓人信服的努力來實現其領土主張。但隨着中國經濟和軍事實力的增強，中國領導人開始變得強硬，主張南海絕大部分水域理所應當是中國的領海。北京還在半沉半沒的珊瑚礁周圍地區進行疏浚，把這些珊瑚礁的陸地部分擴展成為成熟的人工島。更讓美國感到不安的是，中國還在這些新的島嶼上大興土木，包括建造簡易軍用機場。雖然中國不是唯一搞此類填海工程的國家（尤其越南也這樣做過），但中國的規劃是規模最大的。

華盛頓斷然反對北京在南海問題上的立場主張。美國官員一再譴責中國建造人工島嶼，特別是興建軍事設施。美國海軍也增加了在南海巡航的頻次，並明確聲稱這是“航行自由巡邏”。這一用語暗示，華盛頓認為，中國不斷增加的存在感，包括中國海軍行動的增多，是對自由航行的潛在威脅。反過來，北京對抵近中國本土的美國侵擾式巡邏表示憤慨，譴責它們是嚴重的挑釁行為。

華盛頓需要重新考慮其在南海的政策。無論是歷史上還是法律上，中國的領土要求都是不合理的，正如國際仲裁法院2016年對菲律賓訴北京一案的裁決。但是，考慮到其自身有大量航運業務要通過南海，中國的確也有強大的動機來保持航路暢通。中國經由這一水域運輸的出口貨物比其他任何國家都多，佔到總通過量的近25％。實際上，中國大約40%的出口都要經過這條海上通道。

中國領導人知道，如果他們擾亂了商貿往來，美國（以及日本、澳大利亞等其他擁有強大海軍力量的國家）也可以輕而易舉地切斷中國產品的運輸。由於中國是出口導向型經濟，因此挑起南海問題將是北京所採取的最愚蠢的政策。中國領導人看來也已經意識到了這一點，他們與東盟成員國合作制定最大限度減少南海爭端的“行為準則”就是明證。

特朗普政府不應該把中國看成對南海商貿的潛在威脅，而應當認識到中國可以成為有助於保持海上通道暢通的好夥伴。人們不要指望北京放棄其領土主張，而這種立場總是具有一定的潛在威脅。中國領導人無疑是希望他們的國家被看成是南海的主導力量，華盛頓想讓北京接受美國在那裡繼續稱霸，這個目標是不可能實現的。而同時，美國也不會甘心接受中國把南海變為其領海的法律訴求。

在可預見的將來達成徹底打破這一僵局的全面解決方案的機會不大。但雙方可以達成有限和解，抑制危險的緊張局勢的加劇。這其中的主要問題是中國對美國海軍的航行自由巡邏感到憤怒。只要北京願意做出正式保證，保證不會採取行動干擾南海的航運，並切實努力打擊現有的威脅——最明顯的就是舉足輕重的馬六甲海峽附近持續不斷的海盜活動，那麼，美國領導人就應當承諾大大減少巡邏的次數，並避免抵近中國建造的人工島。

這種事實上的休戰和暫時妥協無法保證南海的持久和諧，但它會顯著減輕北京和華盛頓之間的外交緊張。也許更重要的是，它可以緩和兩國海軍之間日益加劇的緊張。為了這一潛在成果，華盛頓很值得採取主動，並向北京提出這樣的建議。

The aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN 68), the guided-missile cruiser USS Chosin (CG 65), the guided-missile destroyers USS Sampson (DDG 102) and USS Pinkney (DDG 91), and the guided-missile frigate USS Rentz (FFG 46) operate in formation in the South China Sea. The Nimitz Carrier Strike Group is conducting operations in the U.S. 7th Fleet area of responsibility. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class David Mercil/Released)

Tensions between China and the United States are rising on multiple fronts. The onset of dueling tariffs is threatening to trigger a full-fledged bilateral trade war. Beijing's anger is rising about Washington's growing attempts to upgrade diplomatic and military ties with Taiwan. Finally, the two countries are sparring dangerously over their respective policies and goals in the South China Sea.

All of those disputes are dangerous, but the Taiwan and South China Sea issues hold the most potential for poisoning the bilateral relationship and escalating into war. Compromise regarding Taiwan is inherently elusive, but a modest change in U.S. policy could significantly dampen tensions in the South China Sea. Specifically, Washington needs to dramatically reduce its confrontational “freedom of navigation” patrols and stop treating Beijing as a disruptive element, if not an outright threat, in that region.

One longstanding reason for a large-scale U.S. naval presence in the western Pacific is the importance of unimpeded shipping to the health of the global economy. U.S. political and economic leaders fret about potential disruptions to the flow of commerce and have done so for decades. That is an understandable concern. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimates that 80% of world trade measured by volume and 70% measured by value travels by sea.

The sea lanes transiting the South China Sea are especially crucial arteries. UNCTAD's analysis shows that one-third of global shipping passes through that body of water. A conservative estimate of the annual dollar value by the Center for Strategic and International Studies' China Power Project put the figure at $3.37 trillion, but concedes that other estimates are as high as $5.3 trillion. The CSIS study emphasizes that the waters “are particularly critical for China, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, all of which rely on the Strait of Malacca, which connects the South China Sea and, by extension, the Pacific Ocean with the Indian Ocean.”

U.S. leaders increasingly view China as a potential menace to that commerce. The root of Washington's suspicion is the extent and intensity of Beijing's territorial claims in the South China Sea. It is not a new issue. In December 1947, the government of the Republic of China (Chiang Kai-shek's regime) issued a map delineating an 11-dash line (later reduced to a 9-dash line) that laid claim to more than 80% of the South China Sea. The communist regime that overthrew Chiang two years later and established the People's Republic of China (PRC) subsequently embraced that claim.

Until the past decade or so, though, Beijing's audacious territorial ambition remained little more than theoretical. The PRC lacked the military power to make even a credible effort to enforce its claims. But as China's economic and military power has grown, PRC leaders have become more insistent that most of the South China Sea is rightfully Chinese territorial waters. Beijing also has dredged areas surrounding partially sunken reefs to expand the land areas on those reefs into full-fledged artificial islands. Even more troubling from the U.S. perspective, China has built structures, including military airstrips, on those new islands. Although China is not the only country to pursue such reclamation projects (Vietnam, in particular, also has done so), the PRC's program is the most extensive.

Washington has flatly rejected Beijing's stance regarding the South China Sea. U.S. officials have repeatedly condemned the creation of artificial islands, especially China's building of military installations. The U.S. Navy also has increased the frequency of patrols through the South China Sea and explicitly labeled them 'freedom of navigation patrols.' That term implies that Washington regards China's growing presence, including an increase in PRC naval activities, as a potential threat to free navigation. Beijing, in turn, has reacted angrily to intrusive U.S. patrols so close to the Chinese homeland, condemning them as a serious provocation.

Washington needs to reconsider its policy in the South China Sea. The PRC's territorial claims are not justified by either history or law — as the International Court of Arbitration ruled in 2016 in a case brought by the Philippines against Beijing. But given its own extensive shipping that transits the South China Sea, the PRC also has a powerful incentive to keep the waterway open. The amount of Chinese exports transported through that body of water is larger than that of any other country, accounting for nearly 25% of the overall flow. Indeed, some 40% of China's total exports travel those sea lanes.

PRC leaders know that if they disrupt that commerce, the United States (and other naval powers such as Japan and Australia) could easily choke-off the flow of Chinese products as well. Given its export-driven economy, causing problems in the South China Sea would be an especially foolish policy for Beijing to adopt. Chinese leaders seem to recognize that point, as evidenced by their work with member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to establish a “code of conduct” that could minimize disputes in the South China Sea.

Instead of viewing China as a potential threat to South China Sea commerce, the Trump administration should recognize that the PRC can be a useful partner in helping to keep the sea lanes open. One should not expect Beijing to abandon its territorial claims, and that stance will always have a somewhat menacing potential. Chinese leaders undoubtedly want their country to be recognized as the leading power in the South China Sea; Washington cannot possibly achieve the goal of having Beijing accept continued U.S. hegemony there. At the same time, the United States has no intention of acquiescing in the PRC's legal quest to convert the South China Sea into Chinese territorial waters.

There is little chance of a comprehensive settlement to completely resolve such an impasse in the foreseeable future. But the two sides can reach a more limited accommodation that would reduce the upward trend in dangerous tensions. The main problem is China's anger about the U.S. Navy's freedom of navigation patrols. U.S. leaders should offer to greatly reduce the number of those patrols, and avoid sending them into the vicinity of Chinese-built artificial islands, as long as Beijing is willing to offer formal assurances that it will take no action to disrupt shipping through the South China Sea, and will, in fact, work to combat existing threats, most notably the continued problem of piracy in waters near the vital Strait of Malacca.

Such a de facto truce and modus vivendi would not guarantee lasting harmony regarding the South China Sea. However, it would markedly reduce diplomatic strain between Beijing and Washington — and, perhaps even more importantly, decrease the mounting tensions between the naval forces of the two countries. That potential achievement is well worth Washington taking the initiative and offering such a proposal to Beijing.