當兩國官方關係凍結或受阻時，二軌外交被認為可以創造改善關係的機會。二軌外交參加者作為非正式、私人的代表，可以更自由地探討對於評估雙方利益、優先順序和首選解決方案來說十分重要的各類問題、事態和選擇。這些討論也許傳遞到官方渠道，被加以研究考慮。希望緩解緊張或尋求制定爭端解決方案的國家，可以選擇使用這種辦法，而它的成果也許會是雙方都接受的下一步方案。二軌外交的結果喜憂參半，但它是一次成功的嘗試，為正式會談議程提供了實用而具體的議題。從這方面看，拉莫斯和傅瑩2016年8月的香港會晤值得稱讚。

2016年8月10日至11日，菲律賓前總統、特使菲德爾·瓦爾德斯·拉莫斯在香港與他的老朋友傅瑩女士（全國人大外事委員會主任委員）和吳世存教授（中國南海研究院院長）友好會晤。

為了改善關係、管控爭議、探索公開合作領域，菲律賓新政府2016年8月派出由前總統拉莫斯率領的代表團，前往香港與中國代表會面。此次非正式會談非常重要的幾個原因是：1）這是仲裁裁決後菲律賓的首個重要舉措，表達出希望與中國接觸的意願；2）菲律賓派出的代表團立場平衡，代表着不同的對華觀點；3）中國代表團由高級別人士組成，他們要麼曾經有相關經驗，要麼仍然與菲律賓保持着關係；4）選擇香港反映了會晤的非正式性，及對會晤期間妥協的希冀；5）關注實際的非爭議性問題，表明雙方有興趣在共同關心和有共同利益的事務上開展工作。

菲方代表團由德高望重的政治家率領，他是建立博鰲論壇的主要支持者之一。其他成員包括得獎記者、前美國廣播公司北京站站長仙沓·羅馬那，他在中國工作和生活了近30年，是菲律賓最重要的中國專家。此外還有拉莫斯時期前旅遊部長、內政和地方政府部長拉斐爾·阿魯南三世，他是“西菲律賓海聯盟”主要召集人，對中國在南海的強硬行動予以直言不諱的批評。中國代表團由全國人大常委會外事委員會主席傅瑩率領，她曾擔任中國駐菲律賓大使（1998-2000年）。另外還有中國南海研究院院長吳士存，他此前多次前往馬尼拉參加學術交流。

會晤後，雙方發表了一份概述7個可合作領域的聯合聲明：1）鼓勵海洋生態保護；2）避免緊張局勢和促進漁業合作；3）緝毒與反走私合作；4）打擊犯罪和反腐合作；5）改善旅遊機會；6）鼓勵貿易和投資便利化；7）鼓勵就共同關心和感興趣的問題進行二軌（通過智庫）交流。這些領域對雙方有着極大共同利益和吸引力，反映了菲中地方上的需要和現狀，它包含雙方都可接受的平台，錨定未來更高層次的合作。聯合聲明所概述的領域不僅可以增加國內支持，還有望對整個地區產生溢出效應。

這些倡議源於國際、地區、雙邊法律協定和國家實踐。南海的海洋保護和漁業合作源於國際海洋法公約（UNCLOS）的若干條款和本地區國家現有的實踐（如中越北部灣漁業合作協定，共同成為中西太平洋漁業委員會等地區漁管機構的成員，2010年的東盟-中國海事協商機製備忘錄，2007年的東盟-中國海上運輸協定）。國際海洋法鼓勵南海這類半封閉海洋的接壤國在保護跨界和高度回遊魚種方面進行合作（第5章第63條1、2，第64條1）。應對非傳統安全挑戰的合作，也與海洋法規定相維繫，例如有關打擊海盜（第5章第100條）、緝毒（第5章第108條）和搜救支援（第5章第98條2）。通過這些合作，可以獲得寶貴經驗，如印尼-馬來西亞-新加坡馬六甲海峽聯合巡航，亞洲地區反海盜及武裝劫船合作協定等。此外，菲律賓和中國也簽有許多雙邊文件（如2007年的關於擴大深化農漁業合作的協議備忘錄，2001年的打擊跨國犯罪合作備忘錄，2001年的打擊販毒合作協議，等等）。這些都可以通過精心籌備去實施或激活。

上月晚些時候，有消息說拉莫斯要訪問北京，但行程無聲無息被取消了。對此可以有多種猜測。也許是日程安排使會晤遇到困難，也許是仔細評估後認為首次行程顯然已達到目標，因此下一步會談可以提升到官方級別。無論如何，拉莫斯和傅瑩8月會晤達成的部分共識，很可能成為計劃中菲律賓總統杜特爾特年底前對中國進行首次國事訪問的談話要點。有意思的是，杜特爾特總統已經任命拉莫斯與傅瑩香港會晤的菲方成員仙沓·羅馬那為菲律賓新任駐華大使。

菲律賓總統羅德里格·杜特爾特10月18號開始至21號對中國進行國事訪問。圖為18日晚杜特爾特抵京，外交部長王毅機場迎接。（來源：中新社）

菲中關係源遠流長，覆蓋面廣泛，有許多互利機會。近幾年，南海問題制約了雙邊關係，但爭端的存在沒有必要阻礙兩國在其他方面發展多方位關係。儘管仍存在巨大障礙，但菲中關係不必被領土和海洋爭端所拘泥和定義。馬來西亞和越南等其他南海沿岸國家的經驗表明，未決爭議沒有必要影響經貿關係的發展擴大，也沒必要波及到政治與安全領域。應該鼓勵各國更好地處理緊張局勢和爭端，避免殃及互利關係。會晤提出的7個倡議涵蓋了廣泛的經濟、環境和非傳統合作領域，雙方可以進一步釋疑，培養對話與合作的習慣。這些領域的成功可以帶動其他方面的合作，讓雙方為未來解決更複雜的問題作好準備。菲律賓與中國是鄰國，衝突對雙方都不利。有必要讓雙方不斷了解彼此的利益和關切，找到改善關係的辦法，加深信任。尤其在關係出現緊張和挑戰時，要保持公開的溝通渠道。落實拉莫斯與傅瑩的建議是朝正確方向邁出的一步，它有助於把象徵性會面的意見轉變為可行的政策建議，推動菲中整體關係積極向前發展。

Track II diplomacy has been credited with creating openings for improving relations when official state-to-state interactions are frozen or constrained. As unofficial and private representatives, Track II participants are freer to discuss and explore various issues, scenarios, and options that are important in assessing the interests, priorities, and preferred solutions of both sides. These discussions may then be passed on to official channels for appropriate scrutiny and consideration. States seeking to relieve tensions or establish resolutions to disputes may resort to this approach and its outcome may shape the next steps that both sides can undertake. Track II diplomacy's results remain mixed, but it takes only one successful attempt to provide concrete and specific agenda items for formal talks. It is within this lens that the Ramos-Fu August 2016 meeting in Hong Kong could be appreciated.

On August 10-11, 2016, Philippine Former President and Special Envoy Fidel V. Ramos met in Hong Kong with his old friends - Madam Fu Ying (Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee of China’s National People’s Congress) and Professor Wu Shicun (President, China’s National Institute for South China Sea Studies) - in a friendly atmosphere.

In an effort to improve relations, manage disputes, and explore areas open for cooperation, the new Philippine (PH) government dispatched a delegation in August 2016 led by former PH President Fidel Ramos to meet with their Chinese counterparts in Hong Kong. The informal meeting is important for several reasons: 1) it was the first major PH step to signal intentions to engage China (PRC) post-arbitration award; 2) PH sent a balanced delegation representing a diverse viewpoints regarding the PRC; 3) The PRC delegation consisted of high level members who had prior experience/continuing linkages with PH; 4) Hong Kong's (HK) choice of venue reflected the informality of the meeting while promoting mid-way compromise, and; 5) focused on pragmatic, non-controversial issues indicating an interest to work on matters of mutual concern and benefit.

PH delegation was led by a respected statesman, who is one of the leading proponents for the establishment of the Boao Forum. Other members include: 1) an award-winning, journalist, and former ABC Beijing Bureau Chief Chito Sta Romana, who worked and lived in China for 3 decades, and who is one of the country's foremost China experts and; 2) former Secretary of Tourism and Interior & Local Government under Ramos Rafael Alunan III, who is a lead convenor of the West Philippine Sea (WPS) Coalition and a vocal critic of China's assertive actions on WPS. PRC delegation; but, on the other hand, was led by Standing Committee and National People's Congress Foreign Affairs Committee Chairperson Fu Ying, who previously served as PRC Ambassador to PH (1998-2000) and; 3) National Institute for South China Sea Studies President Wu Shicun, who has gone to Manila in the past for some academic exchanges.

After the meeting, both sides released a joint statement outlining 7 proposed areas for cooperation: 1) encouraging marine preservation; 2) avoiding tension and promoting fishing cooperation; 3) anti-drug and anti-smuggling cooperation; 4) anti-crime and anti-corruption cooperation; 5) improving tourism opportunities; 6) encouraging trade and investment facilitation; 7) encouraging Track II (via Think Tank) exchanges on relevant issues of mutual concern and interest. These areas enjoy strong shared interest and affinity, reflect local needs and conditions in PH and PRC, and comprise of agreeable platforms from which higher level cooperation in the future can be anchored upon. The areas outlined will not only promote domestic support but hopefully allow for regional spillover.

These proposals can anchor on international, regional and bilateral legal instruments and state practice. Marine preservation and fishery cooperation in SCS can stem from several pertinent Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provisions and existing regional state practice (e.g. PRC-Vietnam Fisheries Cooperation in Beibu/Tonkin Gulf, shared membership in regional fisheries management organization like the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, and the 2010 ASEAN-PRC MoU on Maritime Consultation Mechanism, 2007 ASEAN-China Maritime Transport Agreement). UNCLOS encourages states bordering semi-enclosed seas, like SCS, to cooperate in the conservation of straddling and highly migratory fisheries stocks (Art 63 (1-2) & Art 64 (1) Part V). Cooperation in addressing non-traditional security challenges can also be hinged on salient UNCLOS provisions, such as those pertaining to suppression of maritime piracy (Art 100 Part V), drug trafficking (Art 108 Part V), and search and rescue assistance (Art 98 (2) Part V). From such cooperation, valuable lessons can be drawn, mechanisms like the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Malacca Strait joint patrols, and the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia. Moreover, PH and PRC also signed numerous bilateral instruments (e.g. 2007 MoU on Broadening and Deepening Agriculture and Fisheries Cooperation, 2005 MoU on Maritime Cooperation, 2001 MoU on Cooperation in the Crackdown on Transnational Crimes, 2001 Pact on Cooperation Against Illicit Traffic and Abuse of Narcotic Drugs) that can be elaborated upon for implementation or reactivation.

Late last month, news came out that Ramos will pay a visit to Beijing but the trip was cancelled without notice. Several speculations can be made with respect to this. Scheduling challenges may have posed difficulties for attending the meeting, or it could be that, after careful assessment, it became apparent that the first trip was already able to achieve its aim; therefore, further talks can now be elevated to an official level. Regardless, it is highly likely that some of the consensus agreements proposed in the August Ramos-Fu meeting may shape part of the talking points for the planned first state visit of PH President Rodrigo Duterte to China before the year ends. Interestingly, President Duterte had appointed Mr. Chito Sta Romana, a member of the PH delegation in the Ramos-Fu Hong Kong Meeting, as PH's new ambassador to PRC.

Philipine President Rodrigo Duterte started a state visit to China from Oct. 18 to 21. This is a photo of China's Foreign Minister WANG Yi meeting Duterte at the airport in Oct. 18 evening.（Source: China News Service）

Philippines-China relations has a long history, is broad and comprehensive and offers a lot of opportunities for mutual gain. In recent years, the SCS issue constrain relations, but the presence of such disputes need not prevent the two sides from cultivating other aspects of their multi-faceted relations. Although it remains a big hurdle, PH-PRC relations need not be defined or get fixated to territorial and maritime disputes. The experience of other SCS littoral states, such as Malaysia and Vietnam, demonstrates that the unresolved disputes need not impede the development and expansion of commercial/economic ties and while this may not necessarily spillover to political/security aspect, it may encourage states to better manage tensions/disputes so they would not adversely affect mutually beneficial ties. The 7 proposed items represent the breadth of economic, environmental and non-traditional areas for cooperation that both sides can pursue to address mistrust and develop habits of dialogue and collaboration. Success in these areas may invite cooperation in other dimensions and may prepare both sides in resolving more complicated issues in the future. PH and PRC are neighbors, and conflict will not play in either party's favor. It is imperative for both sides to continue knowing one another's interests and concerns, find ways to improve relations, deepen trust, and maintain open lines of communication especially when relations are being strained/challenged. Implementing the Ramos-Fu proposals is a step in the right direction. It can help translate inputs from the symbolic meeting to actionable policy suggestions that can contribute in building momentum for positive PH-PRC overall relations.