王傑先生於2019年7月9日在香港舉行的“中美經貿關係：現狀與前景”論壇上致詞。

長期以來，美國全國商會（US Chamber of Commerce）一直對密切的中美關係、巨大的雙向商業利益及其所帶來的機遇給予支持，對當前中美關係的現狀與發展趨勢，商會和我們的會員感到十分擔心。我們完全同意中國國際經濟交流中心理事長曾培炎所說的，貿易逆差並不是美中關係的核心挑戰。然而，嚴重的問題仍然存在，正如特朗普政府的“301條款”報告所突出列舉的。自從2010年以來，美國商會在一系列報告中也強調，中國靠補貼及國家干預、強制技術轉讓、盜用知識產權、市場保護等方式實現產業本地化的政策，正給美國企業、工人和美國的競爭力帶來越來越大的風險。

美國商界，無論是美國商會（AmCham）、美中貿易全國委員會還是美國全國商會，在很長一段時期以來一直都警告說，對於一系列領域內的不公平貿易與監管規則和做法，美國及其他發達經濟體都在醞釀反彈，這並不單單是美國人的敘事。

需要說明的是，對於中國近期所採取的，以及傳聞將來準備採取的一些行動，美國商界和全國商會是受到鼓舞的。美國企業能夠並且將繼續發揮中美關係的橋樑作用，這是毫無疑問的。儘管我們的觀點與美國政府“301條款”報告的多數判斷結果是一致的，但是，我們對中國市場的巨大商機仍然非常樂觀。任何一方都承受不起雙向關稅，或者其他使這場衝突擴大的危險舉動。

美國全國商會和我們的成員對關稅的不斷升級感到震驚，並且極其反對。這種做法威脅着稅收管理改革的成效，損害美國的實力和全球經濟，破壞全球貿易框架。你們當中的一些人可能已經知道，幾周前，我們的執行副總裁兼國際事務負責人邁薄倫在全國廣播公司財經頻道（CNBC）談了各種問題，引起了總統的興趣。當然，總統打來電話，反應非常強烈。我提起這些只是想說明，美國全國商會在這些問題上是如何積極表態的。

然而，正如我們今天上午聽艾德溫·福爾納博士所說的，中美商業關係長期以來一直被視為兩國更廣泛關係的壓艙石，但如今卻出現了日趨嚴重的裂痕。在當前形勢下，商界十分擔心，中美之間的利益重疊範圍似乎越來越小。就這個問題，請允許我強調三點。

首先，無論旗號是“中國製造2025”，還是努力實現高質量增長，或者數字化，人們對中國模式的擴張都感到十分擔憂。這種模式已經使全球經濟的某些領域非商品化，並且正在向較高附加值的領域轉移。要知道，對大多數美國公司和工人來說，問題不在於他們必須要與中國競爭，而在於競爭的條件是什麼。

其次，鑒於經濟政策對國家安全利益的影響，雙方對國家安全的擔憂正在迅速加深。最近，特朗普政府採取了考慮已久的措施，來解決中國電信巨頭華為在美國和國際網絡系統扮演重要角色所帶來的國家安全與外交政策問題。從美國企業的角度來看，這些行動應該在貿易談判之外解決，除非這些談判關注的是解決美國貿易代表辦公室“301條款”報告所列述的技術轉讓、知識產權保護、市場准入等核心問題。

與此同時，中國政府在這期間轉而着手深化其正在進行的技術全球化運動，它制定了一份不可靠的美國公司和個人清單，宣布了技術安全管理制度，並提出有可能限制稀土的出口。它還頒佈一系列新的網絡監測措施草案、技術與採購標準、數據安全限制以及隱私標準，這些對美國任何行業的公司在中國市場的貿易和投資都有重大影響。雙方衝突的升級和擴大，又進一步損害了相互信任，增加了兩國企業面臨的風險。

尤其是，中國近期的網絡和數據措施，正在傷害開放市場和改善監管取得突破性進展這一潛在前景，而這一前景本來是可以通過貿易談判實現的，其中包括雲計算市場准入、更自由的數據流動、更自由的全球貿易和跨境服務。

第三，民粹主義是不會消失的。政策制定者們無法跟上技術變革的步伐，而這將加劇而不是緩和民粹主義。即使技術進步擴大了受益者之間的差距——一邊是美國和中國，另一邊是國際社會中的其他國家，也依然如此。例如，普華永道預計，美國和中國將瓜分全球人工智能領域暴利的70%。在中美衝突里，技術起到了推波助瀾的作用。雙方都感到愈發脆弱與焦慮。未來幾年裡，美國任何地方都可能有10%到50%的就業崗位被自動化取代。

要知道，正如福爾納先生所說，早在特朗普當選總統之前，美國對中國態度就已經開始轉變。特朗普卸任後，這個趨勢幾乎肯定還會繼續下去。需要提醒的是，是布殊政府提出的新簽證政策，這被看作是出口管制限制，尤其是專門針對中國，針對在美國的大學裡獲取技術。當時，身為布殊政府副國務卿的羅伯特·佐利克回應了人們對中國在各領域所作所為的擔憂，他在2005年美中關係全國委員會發表有關“負責任的利益攸關方”演講。而正是奧巴馬政府的國防部長阿什·卡特，是他委託國防創新試驗小組（DIUx）撰寫了有關中國投資美國新興技術的報告。是奧巴馬政府的官員們在即將離任時聲稱，美國外資投資委員會的出口管制亟需改革。是奧巴馬政府的貿易代表邁克爾·弗羅曼開始癱瘓WTO的上訴機構，因為美國擔心上訴機構正在削弱WTO處理國家補貼、公共債券等重大問題的能力。

因此我認為，至少就美中關係而言，2016年11月特朗普總統的當選並不是歷史的新起點。我同意福爾納博士另一個關於美國國會情緒變化的觀點，即自從中國加入WTO以來，我從未見過美國國會在對華問題上如此幹勁十足。我的意思不是說，那是一種好現象。兩黨在國會的關注點不是由反貿易、強硬反華的“老衛隊”引導，而是由參眾兩院親貿易、支持商界的議員引導，比如約翰·康寧、馬克·沃納、戴安娜·范斯坦、湯姆·科頓、馬可·盧比奧、克里斯·范·霍倫、德文·努涅斯，等等。

這在過去20年的中美關係里是前所未有的。而拿出解決方案，實行有效的管理，需要雙方都擁有強有力的領導。

中國新的《外商投資法》提供了一個解決問題的機會，一個解決強迫技術轉讓問題的可喜機會。對於美國公司來說，這項新法規的價值並不取決於中方表面的做法，而在於美光、亨茨曼化工和杜邦以及其他類似公司的問題能否迅速得到解決。

更廣泛地說，美國商界擔心，為了在全球化經濟中培育本土冠軍企業，政府在中國這種規模的市場中進行過度干預，而這會不斷助長美國和其他政策制定者的零和以及對抗性反應，因為中國在國內按社會主義方式競爭，在國外按資本主義方式競爭。隨之而來的不確定性和不穩定性，對商業規劃、兩國經濟增長與全球前景都會產生不利的影響。

對於美國全國商會和美國企業來說，放棄努力並接受孤立主義，或者採取推動脫鉤的下下策，都不是辦法。目前迫切需要在商業領域採取建立信任的措施，避免兩國災難性決裂，因為它的後果將是嚴重和持久的，沒有哪個國家的經濟可以幸免於難。中美關係進一步惡化不符合兩國利益，它會侵蝕兩國和各國的增長與就業，使所有國家的蛋糕變小，變得更不安全，更不繁榮。好消息是，雙方已經進行了數月的緊張談判，會談共有十一輪之多，在不到兩年時間內還有不少於八次的高層互訪，以及大量深夜和清晨的電話。萊特希澤大使和劉鶴副總理對雙方彼此的需要都有深刻的理解。他們不是從零開始，而是可以根據100多頁的文本着手工作。對商界來說，談判提供了最好的機會，來解決那些不斷快速侵蝕中美關係基石的嚴重問題。

如果能達成一項全面、高標準、可核查和可執行的協議，就可以為經濟和商業關係在某些方面重建信心與信任奠定基礎。任何成果能否持久，部分取決於關鍵承諾的深度和廣度，但更取決於這些成果的可核查與可執行。雖然一個積極的成果肯定不能解決兩國關係中的所有問題，但強有力的、持久的協議有可能使許多領域的雙贏合作重新凸顯，並有望為抗衡中美關係中的零和一面打下根基。

最後我想說，至關重要的是，我們不能允許兩國的政治阻礙專業的談判者取得進展。未來同樣重要的是，兩國政府要找到前進的路徑，任何一方都不應訴諸關稅這樣的大規模行動，來迫使另一方注意兩國關係中存在的問題。

Mr. Jeremie Waterman made the speech at the ‘U.S.-China Trade & Economic Relations: What Now, What Next’ Forum in Hong Kong on July 9, 2019.

As long-standing supporters of close US-China ties and the vast two-way commercial gains and the opportunities to which they give rise, the US Chamber of Commerce and our members are deeply concerned about the current state and arc of the relationship. We fully agree with CCIEE Chairman Zeng Peiyan that the trade deficit is not a core challenge in the US-China relationship. There are significant challenges, however, as highlighted in the Trump administration's section 301 report. Since 2010, the US Chamber has highlighted in a series of reports the mounting risks to US businesses, workers, and US competitiveness of China's approach to localize industries through subsidies and state intervention, forced technology transfer, misappropriation of intellectual property, and market protectionism.

American business, whether AmCham, the US-China Business Council, or the US Chamber of Commerce, has long warned of a brewing backlash in the United States and other advanced economies against certain unfair trade and regulatory policies and practices across a range of areas. This is not just an American narrative.

To be clear, we in the American business community and at the US Chamber are encouraged by some of the recent actions that have been taken by China, as well as rumored actions that may be taken in the future. Rest assured that American businesses can and will continue to serve as a bridge in this relationship. There remains great optimism about significant commercial opportunities in the China market, notwithstanding our alignment with the majority of the administration's section 301 diagnosis. Neither side can afford two-way tariffs or other actions that are expanding dangerously the scope of this conflict.

The US Chamber and our members are alarmed by and deeply opposed to the escalating tariffs that threaten the benefits of regulatory tax reforms, jeopardize the strength of the US and global economies, and are eviscerating the global trading architecture. And as some of you may be aware, our executive vice president and head of international affairs, Myron Brilliant, speaking on various issues on CNBC a couple weeks ago, provoked the interests of the President. And the President, of course, called in and responded very vehemently, but I only mention that to show how the US Chamber is speaking out vigorously on these issues.

But as we heard from Dr. Edwin Feulner this morning, the commercial relationship, which has long been regarded as the ballast of the broader relationship, has significant and growing cracks. In the current climate, business is quite concerned that there appear to be diminishing circles of overlapping interests between the United States and China. Let me just highlight three points in this regard.

First, there are concerns about the expansion of the China model, which has commoditized certain sectors of the global economy, and which is now migrating into the higher value-added sectors, whether it be under the moniker of Made in China 2025 or efforts to achieve high quality, growth, or digitization. To be clear, for most American companies and workers, the issue is not that they have to compete with China. The issue is what the terms of competition are.

Second, national security concerns regarding the impact of economic policies on national security interests are rapidly accelerating on both sides. Recently, the Trump administration took long considered steps to address the mix of national security and foreign policy concerns posed by the role of Chinese telecom giant Huawei in the US and international networking systems. From the perspective of American business, those actions should be addressed outside of trade talks, unless those talks focus on resolving core concerns on technology transfer, intellectual property protection, and market access outlined in the USTR section 301 report.

Meanwhile, the Chinese government over the same period has moved to deepen its ongoing technology globalization campaign by developing an unreliable list of US firms and individuals, announcing a technology security management system, and proposing potential restrictions on rare Earth exports. It has also released a new barrage of draft cyber inspection measures, technology and procurement standards, data security restrictions, and privacy metrics all with significant trade and investment implications for US companies in its market, regardless of sector. The escalation and broadening of the conflict by both sides is further undermining trust and increasing risk for companies in both countries.

China's recent cyber and data methods in particular are undermining prospects for some of the potential groundbreaking market openings and regulatory improvements, which trade talks could otherwise deliver, including market access for cloud computing, freer data flows, global trade, and cross border services.

Third, populism isn't going away anywhere. The inability of policymakers to keep up with changes in technology will exacerbate, not moderate, populism, even as technology advancements are widening the gap between the beneficiaries – the United States and China on one hand, and the rest of the international system on the other. For example, Price Waterhouse Coopers estimates that the US and China will enjoy a combined 70% of the global windfall of artificial intelligence. Technology is acting as an accelerant in the US-China conflict. Both sides feel increasingly vulnerable and anxious. Anywhere from 10 to 50% of US jobs could be displaced by automation in the coming years.

To be clear, changes in attitude towards China in the United States began to take hold long before President Trump was elected to office, as Mr. Feulner remarked. And they are almost certain to continue after he leaves. As a reminder, it was the Bush administration that advanced new visa and deemed export control restrictions, specifically focused on China and access to technology at US universities. It was then Bush administration Deputy Secretary of State Bob Zoelick who, responding to growing concerns about Chinese behavior across a variety of areas, delivered his “responsible stakeholder” speech before the National Committee on US-China Relations in 2005. It was Obama administration Defense Secretary Ash Carter who commissioned the DIUx (Defense Innovation Unit Experimental) report on China's investments in the US emerging technologies. It was Obama administration officials who argued, as they were leaving office, that CFIUS export controls require urgent reform. And it was Obama administration USTR Michael Froman who began the process of starving the oxygen from the WTO appellate body over concerns that the appellate body was undermining the organization's ability to deal with critical issues, including state subsidies and public bonds.

So what I would say is history did not begin anew in November 2016 when President Trump was elected, at least in terms of US-China relations. To echo another Dr. Feulner point about changing sentiment in the US Congress, I have not seen the US Congress this energized about China, and I don't mean that in a good way, since prior to China's WTO accession. Bipartisan concern in Congress is being led not by an old guard of anti-trade, anti-China hawks, but by pro-trade, pro-business members of Congress in both houses like John Cornyn, Mark Warner, Dianne Feinstein, Tom Cotton, Marco Rubio, Chris Van Hollen, Devin Nunes, and others.

This is unprecedented over the last 20 years of US-China relations. Solutions and effective management will require strong leadership on both sides.

China's new foreign investment law provides an opportunity to address concerns, a welcome opportunity to address concerns about forced technology transfer. The value of a new law for US companies will be defined not by outlying practices, but by whether cases such as Micron, Huntsman Chemical, and DuPont, and others like them, can be quickly resolved.

More broadly, the US business community is concerned that excessive government intervention in a market of China's size, with the aim of creating domestic champions in a globalized economy, will continue to fuel the zero-sum, antibody response by US and other policymakers to China's approach of competing as socialist at home and capitalist abroad. The ensuing uncertainty and instability are bad for business planning, growth in the two economies, and global prospects.

For the US Chamber and American business, giving up and accepting isolationism, or worst yet, pushing for decoupling, is not an option. Confidence building measures in the commercial arena are urgently needed to stave off a catastrophic divorce by our two countries, the fallout of which would be severe, lasting, and leave no country's economy untouched. Further deterioration of relationships is in neither countries interest, as it will erode growth and jobs in both countries and around the world, thereby leaving all with a smaller pie, less security, and less prosperity. The good news is that the two sides have engaged in months of intense negotiations: eleven rounds of talks, no less than eight reciprocal high-level visits in less than two years, and numerous late night and early morning phone calls. Ambassador Lighthizer and Vice Premier Liu He have a keen understanding of the demands of the other. They are not starting from scratch and have well over 100 pages of text from which to work. For business, negotiation provides the best opportunity to address the serious concerns that are continuing to rapidly erode the substrate of US-China relations.

If an agreement could be reached that is comprehensive, high-standard, verifiable, and enforceable, it can provide the basis for rebuilding confidence and trust in certain facets of the economic and commercial relationship. The durability of any outcome will depend in part on the scope and depth of key commitments, but even more so on their verifiability and enforceability. While a positive outcome would surely not address all concerns in the relationship, a strong and enduring agreement has the potential to allow for areas of positive-sum cooperation – and there are many – to return to prominence and hopefully take root to counterbalance the zero-sum aspects of the relationship.

Let me say in closing: it's critical that we do not allow politics on both sides to get in the way of progress made by professional negotiators. And it's equally critical going forward that the two governments find ways to make progress, without either side resorting to large-scale actions, like tariffs, to get the attention of the other that something is wrong in the relationship.