金正恩和文在寅在邊境的板門店村舉行會晤。

如果我們樂觀看待上周有紀念意義的朝韓峰會的結果，那麼，朝鮮領導人金正恩表現出的積極姿態對朝鮮半島來說是好兆頭。正如金正恩與韓國總統文在寅上周簽訂的協議所表明的，這些舉措說明雙方有望進行持續的多軌對話，更全面地進行南北交流（包括人道主義交往、旅遊、家庭團聚和經濟發展項目，如重啟開城工業園），同時，就無核化的條件與進程、非軍事區一帶的安全與保障進行有序商討，並就最終終止停戰協定和結束朝鮮戰爭展開對話。

朝鮮下一個大的外交步驟是它計劃即將與唐納德·特朗普總統舉行首腦會晤，大概5月或6月在新加坡或蒙古這樣的“中立國家”舉行。長期以來朝鮮一直把美國（不是韓國）當作與它對抗的魔鬼，其核計劃的目標不是韓國，而是美國。朝鮮領導人認為，美國在韓國和半島以外的軍事力量對其政權的存在構成威脅。朝鮮過去幾十年里不斷開發核武器，最終在金正恩領導下掌握了核武器，這在今年年初之前把美朝關係推入了制裁、恫嚇和拒絕對話的泥潭。

金正恩宣布他將停止核試驗，並關閉豐溪里試驗場，從而為即將到來的峰會預設了更加富有成效的基調。雖然中國科學家報告說該試驗場已經坍塌，一些人因此認為這使金正恩提出的停止核試驗打了折扣，但美國網站“北緯38度”的分析家認為，這個試驗場仍然可以使用。金正恩表示願把無核化問題擺上談判桌，他最近還邀請美韓專家記者屆時見證朝鮮核設施的關閉。

金正恩決定會晤外國國家元首，底氣當然是朝鮮的核計劃在他領導下取得了顯而易見的飛速進展。朝鮮自覺有能力坐到談判桌前，正是因為美國了解其武器所具備的能力，包括核武器和已經證明的遠程導彈能力。從金正恩對他的黨和軍隊的講話可以看出，他對核試驗和導彈試驗取得的進展相當志得意滿。這些成就不會因為停止試驗而消失。

不過，停止試驗甚至關閉試驗場並不是永久性的。以往的協議或承諾都曾經被打破，如2012年的“閏日協議”，簽署才幾個星期就成了廢紙。同樣還有上世紀90年代的“框架協議”，雖然這份協議的解體速度慢一些。在奧巴馬和朴槿惠執政期間，朝鮮完全沒有與這些政府展開對話的意向。

儘管我們可以借鑒從前美國與朝鮮談判的經驗，但歷史的比照（例如上面提到的協議）並沒有讓我們有足夠的信息。因為首先，當時朝鮮並不滿足於即有的核能力和軍備；其次，當時地區的政治意願與今天不同。而且金正恩掌權後朝鮮與外界的談判幾乎為零。所以，我們有可能看到朝鮮一種全新的、與金正恩的父親截然不同的外交風格。金正日當權時期，朝鮮外交官力求迫使對方通過提供援助或放鬆制裁，來換取緊張局勢的緩解。而到目前為止金正恩仍相當與世隔絕，並且完全無視制裁努力。

然而，由於朝鮮過去對美韓無核化目標有保留，對相互交往疑心重重，因此認清未來政治進程的艱難是明智的。首先，正如許多朝鮮問題觀察家所指出的，對朝鮮來說“無核化”不僅意味着它要拆除核設施，放棄其武器和導彈系統（按美國的觀點），也意味着美國要從韓國和日本拆除它的核保護傘。但據文在寅總統與金正恩會晤後透露，這一次朝鮮並沒有要求從韓國撤走美軍。這個要求不僅在美國，在韓國許多保守派人士當中也曾經是反覆被提及的關鍵點。

其次，金正日在位時，朝鮮曾試圖在兩個盟友當中挑撥離間，特別是韓國進步派當政期間，因為進步派更願意與朝鮮交往。朝鮮一向擅長觀察對手的政治意願，而文在寅和特朗普都非常渴望朝鮮半島出現改變。不過，朝鮮與韓國之間的舉動有可能最終導致首爾與華盛頓關係緊張。如果特朗普對金正恩在談判中的出價不滿意，或者首腦會晤失敗，朝韓峰會所確定的措施就可能告吹，從而使美韓關係變得緊張起來。

文在寅渴望緩解與北方的緊張，同時增加人道主義交往，上周的協議為實現這些目標提供了路徑。對特朗普來說，他是渴望做成一筆交易。特朗普這個“品牌”的內容之一（來自於他進入白宮前在商界和媒體的傳統）是當“誘心人（closer）”，包括他罵金正恩是“火箭人”，是對全世界的威脅，穿插其間的，是他表示願意運用“交易藝術”來解決這場長達數十年的衝突。

最後，中國有戰略理由支持朝鮮與習近平、文在寅也許還有唐納德·特朗普舉行一連串峰會。正如阿莉絲·埃克曼所指出的，中國一直試圖“在一個後同盟安全框架內重組亞太地區”，而任何使朝鮮半島向著和平穩定邁出的步驟，都會削弱美國在東北亞地區軍事存在的理由。而且短期內，與美國達成包括放鬆制裁或減少軍演的交易，不僅有利於未來朝鮮半島的穩定，也有利於未來中國與朝鮮的經濟交流，這種交流對於北京雖是小買賣，但它卻是中國對平壤施加影響力的一個源頭，最近日益嚴厲的制裁已經讓中國的這種影響力下降。美國應當好好地理解北京在朝鮮半島實現和平的戰略目標，並在與金正恩舉行潛在會晤之前與北京和首爾合作，確保峰會取得可行的成果。

為迎接即將到來的“特金會”，美方談判代表應當注意，倘若華盛頓的政治意願仍然是專註于堅守這個前路漫長的進程，那麼，放低期待並從以往朝鮮的談判行為中汲取教訓，才有可能導致半島的持久改變。

Kim Jong-un and Moon Jae-in meet in the border village of Panmunjom.

If we're optimistic about the outcomes from last week's monumental inter-Korean summit, the positive overtures North Korean leader Kim Jong-un seems to be making bode well for the Korean Peninsula. As indicated by last week's agreement, signed by Kim and South Korean President Moon Jae-in, these moves may spell hope for a sustained multi-track dialogue that looks more holistically at inter-Korean exchanges (including humanitarian exchanges, tourism, family reunions, and economic development projects like restarting the Kaesong Industrial Complex), with parallel, sequenced discussions around the terms and process of possible denuclearization, the safety and security around the DMZ, and talks to finally end the Armistice Agreement and end the Korean War.

The next big diplomatic step for North Korea is its planned summit with President Donald Trump, which may happen in May or June in a “neutral” country like Singapore or Mongolia. North Korea has long seen the United States— not South Korea— as its adversarial bogeyman. The nuclear program is aimed not at South Korea, but the United States, whose military forces in South Korea and off the peninsula are considered a threat to the regime's existence by North Korean leaders. North Korea's continued development of nuclear weapons over the past few decades — finally a credible threat under Kim Jong-un — had, prior to the beginning of this year, driven U.S.-North Korean relations into a quagmire of sanctions, bluster, and refusals to talk.

Kim Jong-un's announcement that he would cease nuclear tests and close the Punggye-ri test site lends more momentum to the upcoming summit. While Chinese scientists have reported the site has collapsed — which some suggest undercuts the value of Kim's offer to stop testing — analysts at 38 North, a U.S.-based site, argue that the site is still viable. Kim has stated that he is willing to put denuclearization on the table, and recently invited experts and journalists from the United States and South Korea to be present when the country shuts down the facility.

Kim's decision to meet with foreign heads-of-state is certainly supported by North Korea's rapid and demonstrable advancement of its nuclear program under his rule. North Korea feels empowered to sit at the negotiating table precisely because the United States understands the extent of its weapons capabilities, including nuclear weapons and a demonstrated long-range missile capability. Looking at Kim Jong-un's statements to his party and military, he seems very confident and satisfied with the progress they've made on both nuclear and missile testing. Those accomplishments don't go away when tests stop.

However, stopping tests and even closing the test site will not be permanent measures. Earlier agreements or promises to denuclearize have been broken, such as the 2012 Leap Day Agreement, which was shattered just a couple of weeks after being signed. The same could be said for the Agreed Framework in the 1990s, though it's unravelling at a slower pace. North Korea could not talk with the Obama and Park administrations.

While we might learn from past experiences of U.S. negotiations with North Korea, historical comparisons (such as the agreements above) don't give us enough information, because 1) North Korea wasn't comfortable with its existing nuclear capability and arsenal, and 2) the regional political will was different then. Moreover, North Korea's negotiations with the outside world have been almost nil under Kim Jong-un, so we could be seeing a North Korean diplomatic style that is drastically different from his father's. Under Kim Jong-il, North Korean diplomats sought to extract aid or sanctions relief in exchange for easing tensions. Kim Jong-un has remained quite isolated until now and has virtually ignored sanctions.

But, because of North Korea's past reticence toward U.S. and ROK goals on denuclearization and its suspicion about exchanges, the political process ahead will be difficult. First, as has been noted by many Korea watchers, “denuclearization” to North Korea means not only dismantling its nuclear facilities and giving up its weapons and missile systems (the U.S. view), but also the removal of the U.S. nuclear umbrella from South Korea and Japan. However, at this time, North Korea is not demanding the removal of U.S. troops from South Korea, according to President Moon after his meeting with Kim Jong-un. This demand has been a sticking point not only with officials in the United States, but also among many conservatives in South Korea.

Second, North Korea, under Kim Jong-il, has historically attempted to play the two allies off against each other, particularly during progressive South Korean administrations, which have tended to be more amenable to engagement with Pyongyang. North Korea has been pretty apt at reading the political will of its adversaries, and both Moon and Trump are eager for change on the Korean peninsula. However, the moves North Korea has made with South Korea may end up causing tension between Seoul and Washington. If Trump is not satisfied with the offers Kim puts on the table — or if the summit falls through — the plans laid out at the inter-Korean summit may unravel, which could strain U.S.-ROK relations.

Moon is eager to ratchet down tensions with the North and increase humanitarian exchanges, and the agreement last week provides a way forward. For his part, Trump is eager to make a deal. Part of Trump's “brand” — drawing from his legacy in business and media prior to entering office — has been as a “closer.” Part of this brand includes his framing of Kim Jong-un as a “rocket man” and a threat to the world, interspersed by Trump's stated willingness to apply his “art of the deal” to the decades-long conflict.

Finally, China has strategic reasons to support North Korea's succession of summits with Xi Jinping, Moon Jae-in, and perhaps Donald Trump. As Alice Ekman points out, China has long been attempting to “reorganize the Asia-Pacific region in a post-alliance security framework,” and any steps toward a stable and peaceful Korean Peninsula undercut U.S. reasons for its military presence in Northeast Asia. Moreover, in the nearer-term, U.S. deals that include sanctions relief or scaling back military exercises bode well not only for peninsular stability, but for China's economic exchanges with North Korea —which are only a small outlet for Beijing, but a source of Chinese leverage over Pyongyang that has been curtailed recently by increasingly strict sanctions. The United States would do well to understand Beijing's strategic goals for peace on the Korean Peninsula, and work with Beijing and Seoul in advance of a potential meeting with Kim Jong-un to ensure viable summit deliverables.

In anticipation of the upcoming Trump-Kim summit, American negotiators should note that being a bit more cautious with expectations and drawing lessons from past Korean negotiating behaviors could lead to lasting change on the peninsula, provided political will in Washington remains focused on sticking with the long process ahead.