雙邊投資協議（BIT）可能是習近平主席訪問美國時的一個重要議題，在全球兩大經濟體持續討論該協議之際，值得關注的是，國家安全考慮會給外國投資造成多大影響。BIT目的之一就是擴大雙方投資領域，同時確保對等待遇和保護。

不少國家都以擔心國家安全為由阻撓某些外國投資。大多數監管者都有一份限制或禁止外國投資的行業清單。儘管在不同國家，關於“國家安全”的定義不盡相同，但有一個普遍傾向，就是確保關鍵的戰略部門掌握在本國手中，要麼國有，要麼由本國私營企業控股。經濟領域中的關鍵行業如果被外國控制，可能削弱一個國家的經濟主權，限制其規劃未來的能力，並可能在與控制這些行業的國家產生衝突時置本國於危險境地。

不過，固然這些限制有其合理、合法的價值，但也存在被濫用的傾向，尤其是政府可以通過擴大限制措施的適用範圍或隨意解釋，來限制更有效率和競爭力的外國企業進入。當越來越多經濟領域開始對外資開放，政府應當警惕這種國家安全審查（NSR）的濫用，因為這可能阻止外國投資進入他們打算大力發展的重要領域，如基礎設施和能源行業。因此，需要在國家安全和維護有活力的利於外國投資進入的經濟之間找到平衡。

由於美國和中國的經濟和政治利益不斷增長，其國家安全擔憂也與日俱增。它們各自管理外國投資的法律框架，以及基於同樣理由的國家安全審查都反映出這一點。美國2007年的外國投資和國家安全法（FINSA）包含明確的國家安全審查條款，而中國2015年外國投資法草案（FIL草案）同樣如此。雖然FIL最終通過的情況還有待觀察，但比較中美兩國國家安全審查條款如何執行頗有必要。

FINSA：強大且已經過考驗

FINSA補充修正了1950年美國國防產品法中第721條相關規定，以強化國家安全審查。它增加了諸多新定義，例如“受管轄交易”、“外國政府控制的交易”、“國家安全”、“關鍵基礎設施”、“關鍵技術”投資等等，所有這些都被納入了國家安全審查範疇，並規定由財政部領銜的跨部門機構美國外國投資委員會（CFIUS）負責這一審查。FINSA詳細規定了審查和調查程序、審查的考慮因素以及如何監控並減輕受管轄交易對國家安全的威脅。最後，該法還規定了總統在國家安全審查方面的職權，同時給予國會更大的監管發言權。

根據FINSA規定，美國總統可以擱置或阻止可能危害美國國家安全的受管轄交易（第6條）。在執行方面，美國總統可以命令總檢察長採取適當補救措施，例如在聯邦地方法院提訴要求撤資（第6條）。不過，只有在滿足以下條件時才能採取這些措施：“a）有可信的證據令總統相信，有控制權的外國利益主體可能採取危害美國國家安全的行為；b）當出現這種情況時，總統認為，除本條款和國際緊急經濟權力法之外的法律條款無法為總統提供恰當和足夠權力來保護國家安全（第6條）。” FINSA還增加了國會在審查過程中的監管職能。該法規定，美國外國投資委員會“在任何一名國會議員的要求下……應就本條款已經認定的、或符合緩釋協議及附加條件的交易，儘快提供簡報，根據信息敏感程度，如有必要則以保密方式提供（第7條）”。而在中國的FIL草案中，國家主席和全國人大並不參與國家安全審查。

FINSA還管轄外國控制的對有跨州業務的美國公司的併購。交易方、美國總統及CFIUS均可提起審查動議。該法還規定了一長串審查過程中的考慮因素，包括是否影響國防或國家安全、武器擴散、能源、其他關鍵資源和材料。在這些考慮因素中，還有一個兜底條款，即只要總統和CFIUS認為合適就可以啟動審查。如果相關方在提交的材料中遺漏了重要信息或提交了錯誤和誤導性信息，該法還允許對已經審查過的交易進行再次審查。如果相關方違反了緩釋協議或附加條件，該法同樣允許進行再次審查。FINSA提供為期30天的國家安全審查，根據結果還可啟動為期45天的國家安全調查。受管轄交易可就國家安全威脅達成緩釋協議或附加條件，為了更好地執行，該法還設立了一個監管、追蹤和強制執行機制。

中國的FIL草案：堅實而全面

中國的外國投資法草案（FIL草案）第四章專門規定了國家安全審查。草案規定，成立一個由國務院發展改革部門和外國投資主管部門共同參加的聯席會議負責實施審查。FINSA規定了總統和國會在審查中的角色，而FIL草案規定的審查主體僅是國務院的下屬部門。在適用範圍方面，FINSA和FIL的覆蓋面均很全面，不過FINSA可能更加廣泛，因為它可以對任何導致美國跨州業務被外國控制的交易進行審查。FIL草案規定了外國投資者需提交的審查申請材料清單，而FINSA則沒有明確規定。FIL並沒有界定“國家安全”的定義，但審視安全審查的考慮因素則可發現，這一概念覆蓋範圍很廣。雖然FINSA的考慮因素清單更長，但兩者有很多共同項，例如對國家安全的影響、敏感及兩用物項、關鍵基礎設施、國家安全相關技術、對能源、食品和其他資源的需求，以及投資是否受外國政府控制。FIL還列舉了對信息和網絡安全的影響、對經濟穩定的影響、對公共秩序的影響等等。由此可見，“國家安全”這一概念相當廣泛。

在誰可以啟動安全審查方面，中國的法律草案比FINSA走得更遠。除了交易雙方以及政府相關部門之外，貿易協會和企業協會也可以提請相關審查，聯席會議在收到請求後將予以評估。與FINSA類似，FIL規定，如果在第一次審查時當事人隱瞞有關情況或提供虛假材料，或者違反了審查決定所附的限制性條件，對已審查過的交易可以再次審查。和FINSA一樣，FIL也有兩個審查階段：為期30天的一般審查階段，以及視一般審查結果而定的為期60天的特別審查階段。在審查結束之後，如果不危害國家安全的話，聯席會議將批准交易，否則將否決交易，或附條件批准，即需採取相關措施消除對國家安全可能產生的危害。該草案還規定，外國投資者可以在審查決定作出前提出附加限制性條件的建議。FIL還規定，可以在審查期間採取臨時性強制措施。

FIL草案規定外國投資者有配合調查的義務，而FINSA則沒有明確規定。如果外國投資者未能履行商定的附加條件，草案還規定了外國投資者應承擔的法律責任，包括可能的罰款。法律還規定，對於外國投資者未提交國家安全審查而實施投資，由此所造成的損失，政府不負任何責任。

更審慎實施國家安全審查

中國起草一部統一的外國投資法彰顯了該國通過必要改革來吸引更多外國投資的誠摯興趣和意願。同時，也反映出包括國有企業在內的本土公司更有信心在國內市場與外國公司展開競爭。此外，隨着中國公司擴張海外業務，並更積極地進行海外併購，中國需要進一步放鬆國內市場對外國投資的限制，向外資開放更多領域，因為中國企業在海外也會受到同等對待。

目前，美國對中國的投資遠遠超過中國對美國的投資，但隨着“走向全球”或“走出去”戰略的實施，越來越多的中國企業將在投資美國。中國企業似乎已經吸取了中海油收購優尼科失敗的經驗教訓。對美國能源、金融、食品等領域的一系列成功股權收購，顯示了中國企業在熟悉美國法律體系方面正變得越來越熟練和自信。這些案例鼓勵並啟發中國在國內採取相應措施來確保對等和公平。不過，在雙方互不信任情緒加劇的大背景下，濫用或誤用國家安全審查來阻止外國投資的風險依然存在。濫用國家安全審查來武斷地判定合法的商業交易，只會招致對方國家採取類似的反制措施，從而造成惡性循環，有損外國投資。就這一點來說，兩國應採取切實措施確保實施國家安全審查的透明度和連續性。

As the world's two largest economies continue discussing a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), which could be a key potential talking point during the upcoming visit of President Xi Jinping to the U.S. in October, it is noteworthy to consider how national security considerations may impact the entry of foreign investments. One of the goals of the BIT is to expand the frontiers for investments for both contracting parties, as well as ensure reciprocal treatment and protection.

National security concerns have been used by several states to bar certain types of foreign investments. Most jurisdictions maintain a list of sectors wherein foreign investments are prohibited or restricted. While the definition and extent of “national security” may vary across states, there is a general inclination towards keeping key strategic sectors within domestic control, whether through actual state ownership or through ownership by local private companies. Foreign control over important sectors of the economy may erode a state's economic sovereignty, limit its capacity to plan for its future, and put it in peril in times of tensions or conflict with the foreign party who assumes such economic control.

However, while such restrictions surely have their valid and legitimate merits, they are also prone to abuse, as states can expand its application or interpretation to constitute protectionist measures to favor local homegrown companies over more efficient and competitive foreign firms. As more and more sectors are being opened up to foreign capital, states also have to guard against the unchecked exercise of national security reviews (NSR), as this may discourage the much needed international participation in certain key sectors they intend to boost or develop, such as infrastructure and energy. Thus, there is a need to balance national security with the maintenance of a vibrant economy conducive to the entry of foreign investment.

As the economic and political interests of the U.S. and China continue to grow, so do their national security concerns. The evolution of their legal frameworks governing the regulation of foreign investments and review of the same on grounds of national security reflect this. The 2007 U.S. Foreign Investment and National Security Act (FINSA) contains salient national security review provisions. On the part of China, the 2015 Draft PRC Foreign Investment Law (FIL) also has the same. While it remains to be seen when the Draft PRC FIL will finally be passed into law, it is worthwhile to consider how its national security review (NSR) provisions fares when compared to that of FINSA's.

FINSA: Robust and tested

FINSA had amended relevant provisions of Sec 721 of the U.S. Defense Production Act of 1950 to enhance national security review. It inserted new definitions such as “covered transactions,” “foreign government-controlled transaction,” and “national security,” as well as “critical infrastructure” and “critical technology” investments – all areas subject to national security review. It also established the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), an inter-agency body headed by the Secretary of Treasury, which undertakes the review. FINSA laid out the review and investigation process, the considerations for review, and the mitigation and monitoring of the threat to national security posed by the covered transaction. Finally, it also outlined actions that the President can undertake in relation to NSR, as well as the increased oversight role given to Congress.

Under FINSA, the U.S. President may suspend or prohibit any covered transaction that threatens to impair U.S. national security (Sec 6). In relation to enforcement, the President may also direct the Attorney General to seek appropriate relief, including divestment relief in U.S. district courts (Sec 6). However, such actions can only be exercised under the following circumstances: “a) there is credible evidence that leads the President to believe that the foreign interest exercising control might take action that threatens to impair the national security; and b) provisions of law, other than this section and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, do not, in the judgment of the President, provide adequate and appropriate authority for the President to protect the national security in the matter before the President” (Sec 6). FINSA also increased the oversight function of Congress in the review process. The Law states that CFIUS shall “upon request from any Member of Congress … promptly provide briefings on a covered transaction for which all action has concluded under this section, or on compliance with a mitigation agreement or condition imposed with respect to such transaction, on a classified basis, if deemed necessary by the sensitivity of the information” (Sec 7). This involvement of the President and Congress is not present in the national security review provided for in China's Draft FIL.

FINSA covers proposed and pending M&A or takeover transactions, which would result to foreign control of a local entity engaged in U.S. interstate commerce. The review can be initiated by parties to the transaction, or unilaterally by the President or CFIUS. The Law provides a long list of considerations for the review process, including those that affect the country's military defense/security, weapons proliferation, energy, and other critical resources and materials. There is also a catch-all phrase included in the considerations, leaving the option for the President or CFIUS to undertake review as they deem appropriate. The Law also allows a repeat review of transactions already reviewed should it be found that false or misleading information or important information were omitted by the parties. Re-review can also be done if there is a breach of the mitigation agreement or condition. FINSA provides for a 30-day national security review which depending on the result can trigger a 45-day national security investigation. Mitigation agreement and imposition of conditions may be made to address the threat posed to national security of a covered transaction and a monitoring, tracking, and enforcement mechanism has been put in place to facilitate this.

Draft PRC FIL: Sound and comprehensive

Chapter 4 of China's Draft Foreign Investment Law (FIL) deals with national security review of foreign investments. It establishes a Joint Conference composed of reform and development authorities and foreign investment regulatory authorities under the State Council, which would undertake such review. While FINSA specified the role of the President and Congress in the review, Draft FIL only mentioned authorities under the State Council. In terms of scope of application, both FINSA and FIL can be considered broad enough, but FINSA arguably is more expansive, since it can look into transactions involving foreign control of any person engaged in interstate commerce in the U.S. The Draft Law provided a list of the application materials to be submitted by a foreign investor, which was not explicitly stated in FINSA. FIL did not come up with a definition of “national security,” but browsing through the factors to be reviewed would reveal that the concept covers a wide range of aspects. While FINSA has a longer list, there are many similar items, such as impact on national security, sensitive and dual-use assets, key infrastructure, China's position on national security-related technologies, and demand for energy, food, and other resources and control from a foreign government. FIL lists the impacts on information and network security, economic stability, and public order, among others, making the notion of “national security” very comprehensive.

The Law goes beyond FINSA in terms of the actors that can initiate the review. More than the parties to the transactions and concerned government authorities, it also allows trade associations and enterprises to propose for such review, which the Joint Committee would then receive and evaluate. Similar to FINSA, FIL also provides for a re-review of previously reviewed transactions if some vital information were withheld by parties during the first review, or if parties violated restrictive conditions applied based on the review decision made. Like FINSA, FIL also has 2 review phases – the 30-day general review phase and, depending on its outcome, the 60-day special review. After the review has been done, the Joint Conference can either approve the transaction since it poses no danger to national security, disapprove the same, or provide conditional approval meaning that certain actions have to be done to eliminate the danger posed by the transaction. The Law allows the foreign investor to propose restrictive conditions before the review decision is reached. FIL also provides for provisional and compulsory measures that can be exercised while the review is ongoing.

The draft FIL creates an obligation to cooperate on the part of foreign investors—something not expressly stated in FINSA. It outlines the legal liability of foreign investors for failure to implement the agreed conditions, which could come in the form of fines. The Law also states that government will not be responsible for losses sustained by the foreign investor for failure to apply for national security review.

Towards a prudential exercise of NSR

China's drafting of a consolidated Foreign Investment Law may signal the country's sincere interest and willingness to continue undertaking the necessary reforms to further attract foreign capital. At the same time, it may also suggest the emerging confidence and capacity of local companies, including state-owned enterprises, to compete with their foreign counterparts in the domestic market. In addition, as Chinese companies expand their global footprint and actively engage in outbound mergers and acquisitions, they may need to relax restrictions to foreign investments at home and open more sectors for foreign capital, so that Chinese firms will receive similar treatment abroad.

At the present, the U.S. has more investments in China than the other way around, but in line with the “Go Global” or “Go Out” policy, more and more Chinese companies are expected to invest in the U.S. in the future. Chinese firms seem to have learned lessons from such setbacks as the botched CNOOC-UNOCAL transaction. A string of successful equity acquisitions across sectors from energy, finance and food, among others, demonstrate the growing sophistication and confidence of Chinese firms in navigating the U.S. legal landscape. These cases are encouraging and may inspire China to adopt similar measures at home in keeping with reciprocity and fairness. However, the threat of abusing or misusing NSR to block foreign investments especially in a climate of tension or mistrust still lingers. Subjecting a legitimate commercial deal to arbitrary and abusive exercises of NSR may only invite a similar action by the affected state, thus creating a potential spiral adverse to foreign investments. As such, both states should make genuine efforts to ensure transparency and consistency in the application of NSR.