中國承諾向巴基斯坦提供460億美元投資主要是出於兩點考慮。目前，中國的4萬億美元外匯儲備和每天700萬桶的原油進口主要依賴有可能受到競爭對手鉗制的海運。由於相信美國正尋找代理人遏制自己的崛起，中國也在尋找可替代的、不那麼脆弱的貿易新通道。第二點是，中國最終認定，解決巴基斯坦這個動亂但可靠（甚至是可依賴）朋友的問題的最好方法，是投資電力行業和發展基礎設施。作為更宏大的一帶一路戰略的組成部分，中巴經濟走廊是有優先權的，因為它是連接中國和阿拉伯海的唯一路網，與通過海路連接能源豐富的波斯灣市場相比距離縮短了一萬多公里。

中國承諾的投資規模超過了當年的120億美元（相當於2015年的1200億美元）馬歇爾計劃。馬歇爾計劃在二戰後重建了數個歐洲國家。一些正在實施的中國援助項目也已納入中巴經濟走廊計劃。這種大規模的資本注入如果使用得當，很可能改變地區的力量均勢。

中巴經濟走廊預計建設15年，它包括西、中、東部三個通道，連接中國新疆維吾爾自治區的喀什和中國在巴基斯坦修建的瓜達爾深水港，這裡距霍爾木茲海峽僅400公里。全球約20%的石油經由霍爾木茲海峽運輸，其中大部分運往中國。

由於中國強烈要求經濟走廊項目非政治化，巴基斯坦的一個跨黨派會議決定首先開發西部的通道。

早在佩爾韋茲·穆沙拉夫總統當政時期（1999－2008年），有關中巴經濟走廊的事宜就已經被討論過。頗有洞見的中國人勸說巴基斯坦政治領導人跨越黨派界線，並在鮮為人知的地方接觸潛在的中國合作夥伴。

這樣一來，中國領導人不僅自上而下，同時也自下而上地得到中國工業與金融企業對中巴經濟走廊的支持。通過雙方企業家之間的談判，幾乎所有投資都採取了商業貸款的形式。中國自己這種對經濟走廊項目積極、穩健的參與，表明了它對巴基斯坦增長與穩定的堅定承諾。中國對巴基斯坦的影響力將提高，並將傳播得更遠。

巴基斯坦持續不斷的嚴重電力短缺至少使國內生產總值（GDP）損失2%。為此，近340億美元的投資將被用來修建新的發電廠。到2017年至2018年，電力項目將取得前期成果，也就是新增10400兆瓦電量。這將激發巴基斯坦工業與農業的大部分潛在活力，改善普通人的生活。巴基斯坦預計，到中巴經濟走廊建成的2030年，它的GDP有望增長15%。經濟走廊的其餘投資將用於發展光纖網、公路、瓜達爾港和能源供給線。

如果巴基斯坦在吸收外國直接投資方面的表現有所改觀，中巴經濟走廊計劃的巨大投資就能帶來轉型。設計一個無縫機制去實現中巴經濟走廊的抱負，對巴基斯坦來說是一項挑戰。這個項目的實施也有助於提升巴基斯坦極其低下的治理水平。

具備自我毀滅性思維定式的巴基斯坦似乎已經明白，僅靠軍事實力無法阻止印度的力量投射，巴基斯坦還必須擁有經濟實力，才能與印度在地區及更廣範圍不斷增長的影響力競爭。與寡頭式文職領導人相比，巴基斯坦軍方更明白這個新等式的必要性。

由於有巨額投資，中國將更加傾向於保護巴基斯坦的安全利益。同時，由於中巴經濟走廊項目能使巴基斯坦的GDP增長15%，這筆投資將縮小印巴兩國間的經濟差距。南亞區域合作聯盟的其他國家也將不可避免地尋求中國的項目支持和資金，而這些都是印度難以企及的。

中巴經濟走廊的獨特性在於，它只連接中國和巴基斯坦，而且是打通中國到印度洋的最短路線。因此它會成為中國一帶一路構想的一個支點。一帶一路旨在連通亞洲和歐洲大陸的60個國家。為實現這個計劃，中國打算建設一系列網中網，如南方絲綢之路、中亞絲綢之路、21世紀海上絲綢之路以及中巴經濟走廊。

全面投入運營後的瓜達爾港和中巴經濟走廊將通過提供陸路安全，改變中國的海上貿易聯繫模式，減少中國往來馬六甲海峽的貿易量。中國的能源供應將不再輕易受“馬六甲困境”影響。為了保護自己的供應鏈，中國海軍在印度洋的存在將會增多。由於擁有長期關係，加上新的聯盟正在形成，巴基斯坦會很樂意把瓜達爾港設施開放給中國海軍使用。

美國正通過分派印度洋的領導角色來討好印度，這對中國和巴基斯坦來說都是無法接受的。事實上，印度討好那些讓中國戒備重重的大國，只能迫使中巴兩國進一步加強結盟。中巴以瓜達爾港為基礎的海軍戰略夥伴關係，將使印美聯合稱霸印度洋的野心難以實現。

出於對西方的不相信，俄羅斯和中國已經同意建立一個對話機制，將俄羅斯發起的歐亞經濟聯盟（EAEU）與一帶一路相融合。這個協議標誌着俄羅斯不再對中國的一帶一路存有疑慮。而且，從當前的敵對態勢看，巴基斯坦也不會把穿越阿富汗和中亞的陸路連接讓給印度。這就將印度擋在了中亞絲綢之路以外。由於印度遠離俄羅斯，且與美國目標一致，它在自家後院面臨著不信任。這對印度的未來相當不利。而巴基斯坦與域外大國結盟也犯了同樣的錯誤。

中國和巴基斯坦這兩個印度的主要對手之間的經濟合作，給印度帶來雙重困境。中國崛起的經濟現實迫使印度不得不支持各地區的公路連通計劃，如中亞和東亞的項目，以及連接中國、緬甸、孟加拉國和印度的南方絲綢之路。但對巴基斯坦的深惡痛絕，使印度忍不住要反對中巴經濟走廊。莫迪總理5月份訪華時甚至表示，印度反對中巴經濟走廊穿過查謨和克什米爾的有爭議領土。印度的這些偏見不會給兩國帶來和睦。

其實中巴經濟走廊和一帶一路給印度帶來了機遇，一旦對伊朗的制裁解除，伊朗－巴基斯坦－印度天然氣項目就可以復活。它的天然氣管道很可能隨着中巴經濟走廊計劃實施到位與歐亞經濟聯盟的管網連接。加入中國、俄羅斯、伊朗和巴基斯坦的能源供應安排，只會加強區域連通和對手之間的相互依存。這將成為南亞和中亞的經濟橋樑。

中國經濟規模是印度的五倍，雖然印度今年的經濟增長速度可能超過中國，但整體追上中國需要50年以上時間。印度在應對中國戰略崛起的時候應當具有更大靈活性，積极參与中國的一帶一路。這只會有助於創造一個更加和平的世界。

The Chinese commitment to invest US$46 billion into Pakistan is driven by two main considerations. China's current $4 trillion foreign trade and 7 million barrels of daily oil imports are largely dependent upon sea-lanes that can be choked by competing powers. Convinced that the U.S. is seeking surrogates to contain its rise, China is seeking alternate and less vulnerable routes. Second, China has finally decided that its troubled but reliable (even dependent) friend, Pakistan, has problems that can best be handled by investing in its power sector and infrastructure development. In the process, as a part of its larger One Belt, One Road (OBOR) strategy, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) gets a priority because this is the only network that connects China to the Arabian Sea –shortening its maritime distance with the energy rich Persian Gulf market by over 10,000 kilometers.

The extent of China's commitment betters the US$12 billion (estimated to be $120 billion in 2015 dollars) Marshal Plan used to rebuild several European countries after World War II. Some on-going Chinese aided projects are now incorporated into the CPEC. This large infusion of capital, if utilized properly, can potentially change the regional power equation.

The CPEC will be developed in 15 years, along three corridors – western, central and eastern, connecting the two cities – Kashgar in China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region with Pakistan's deep water Chinese-built Gwadar Port, just 400 km from the Straits of Hormuz. Twenty percent of world's oil passes through the Straits, much of it destined for China.

Following a strong Chinese urging to depoliticize the project, an All-Party Conference in Pakistan decided that the western route be developed first.

Elements of the CPEC were already being discussed during the President Pervez Musharraf era (1999-2008). The Chinese, as far sighted as they are, encouraged the Pakistani political leadership across the party lines, to reach out to potential Chinese partners in lesser-known places.

The Chinese leadership therefore, not only built a top-down, but also bottom-up support from Chinese industrial and financial houses, for the CPEC. Almost all the money is in commercial loans, negotiated between respective entrepreneurs. A robust and active participation built by the Chinese state itself underscores China's deep commitment towards Pakistan's growth and stability. Consequently, Chinese influence will increase in Pakistan and will spread beyond.

Since Pakistan continues to face crippling power shortages, which causes at least 2 percent GDP loss, almost $34 billion are to be spent in setting up new power plants. The early harvest power projects will yield 10,400MW of electricity by 2017-18. This will spur much of the latent industrial and agricultural activity, thus improving the lives of ordinary citizens. Pakistan estimates that there will be a 15 percent increase in its GDP by 2030, when the CPEC is due for completion. The rest of the money will be spent on fiber optics links, roads, Gwadar Port, and energy supply lines.

This huge investment can be transformational if Pakistan can improve upon its lackluster performance in FDI absorption. It is a challenge for Pakistan to devise a seamless mechanism to realize the CPEC ambitions. In process it helps improve Pakistan's abysmally poor governance standards too.

Pakistan, locked in a self-destructive parity mindset, seems to have understood that to deter India's power projection, military prowess alone will not do. Pakistan needs an economic muscle to match India's growing clout in the region and afar. Pakistan's military understands the need for this new equation even better than the oligarchic civilian leadership.

Following this major investment, China will be more inclined to protect Pakistan's security interests. And, with projected increase of 15 percent in GDP, this investment will start narrowing the economic gap between India and Pakistan. Other countries in the SAARC region will inevitably look to China for project support and money, which India cannot hope to match.

The CPEC is unique in the sense that it connects China and Pakistan only, and also connects China to the sea through the quickest route. It could be a pivot to China's One Belt, One Road (OBOR) concept that aims to connect 60 countries on the Asia and European land mass. To realize this plan, China intends to build a web of networks such as the Southern Silk Road, the Central Asia Silk Road, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, and the CPEC.

A fully operational Gwadar Port and the CPEC, providing land based security, will shift the pattern of China's maritime trade links and reduce volumes to and from China through the Malacca. China's energy supplies will be less vulnerable to the 'Malacca Dilemma.' To protect its own supply chain, Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean could increase. Given long standing relations and the emerging power blocs, Pakistan will be happy to open Gwadar facilities for China's naval usage.

The U.S. is courting India with the declared purpose of assigning the lead role in the Indian Ocean, which is unacceptable to both China and Pakistan. In fact, India's cozying up to powers that China is suspicious of, compels China and Pakistan to strengthen their alliance further. China-Pakistan strategic naval partnership centered on Gwadar will scuttle the Indo-U.S. ambition of dominating the Indian Ocean.

Consequent to the emerging mistrust with the West, Russia and China have agreed to create a dialogue mechanism to integrate the Russian sponsored Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and OBOR. The agreement marks an end to Russia's hesitation about China's OBOR. Also, in the current state of belligerence, Pakistan is not going to give overland connectivity to India through Afghanistan and Central Asia. This shuts India out of the Central Asian Silk Road. With India distancing from Russia and aligning with the U.S. aims, India faces mistrust in its own backyard – much the same mistake Pakistan made in aligning with the extra regional powers – to the detriment of its own future.

For India, a major economic engagement between two of its adversaries – China and Pakistan – is a double dilemma. The economic reality of rising China compels India to support the various sections of road connectivity, like in Central Asia, East Asia and also connecting China with Myanmar, Bangladesh and India through the Southern Silk Road. Yet, India could not overcome its deep anathema towards Pakistan by objecting to the project, even though on the question of its passage through the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir, during Mr. Modi's China visit in May. These Indian prejudices do not contribute to rapprochement between the two.

There are opportunities for India in the CPEC and in the OBOR. Once sanctions over Iran are lifted, the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas project can be revived. And with the CPEC in place, it is likely that the pipeline will also feed into the EUEA link. Joining an energy supply arrangement with China, Russia, Iran and Pakistan will only reinforce regional connectivity and interdependence amongst adversaries. This could be the economic bridge between South and Central Asia.

The Chinese economy is five times bigger than India's. Even with higher growth rate this year, India will need more than 50 years to catch up. India needs to loosen up while coming to terms with China's strategic rise and engage actively with China in OBOR. This will only help yield a more peaceful world.