As is common for newly inaugurated leaders, U.S. President Donald Trump sought to show his resolve through a series of bold initiatives. In the Middle East, however, each of his initiatives ultimately inflicted greater harm on the United States than on its adversaries. Driven by personal vanity and short-term political considerations, Trump never articulated a coherent or systematic regional strategy nor demonstrated the strategic determination necessary for sustained engagement. Instead, he treated diplomacy as a form of high-stakes gambling. To date, none of these gambits have yielded success, while several have actually undermined the long-term strategic interests of the United States.
On Feb. 4, during a meeting at the White House with Israeli Prime Minister Banjamin Netanyahu, Trump advanced the notion of “emptying Gaza” and “taking over Gaza” — the first of his destabilizing initiatives. He proposed the mass relocation of Gaza's 2 million Palestinians abroad, a measure more extreme than those advocated even by Israel's far-right parties. As Itamar Ben-Gvir, leader of Israel's most hard-line nationalist faction, observed, Trump's proposal went beyond his own: “I encourage voluntary migration, but he wants to remove all Palestinians from Gaza.”Although this plan was ultimately abandoned because of its impracticality, its negative repercussions were tangible. It emboldened Israel's right wing, and the government subsequently rejected a temporary cease-fire and formulated plans for the full occupation of Gaza City. Escalation and protraction of the conflict thus became unavoidable — outcomes manifestly inconsistent with U.S. strategic interests. The longer the war persists, the more isolated Israel becomes, and the greater the political costs Washington must incur to shield it.More recently, elements of Israel's right wing have pressed for the annexation of the West Bank, framing this as retaliation against the recognition of Palestinian statehood by the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Australia and other states. According to reports, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio privately indicated that Washington would not oppose annexation. Should such measures be implemented, not only would the two-state solution become unattainable but the Abraham Accords promoted by Washington would also collapse.
On March 15, the United States launched extensive air and naval operations against Yemen's Houthi forces, ostensibly to safeguard freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. This constituted Trump's second major initiative. Yet, since December, the Houthis have refrained from attacking vessels with ties to Israel transiting the Red Sea, rendering Washington's rationale unconvincing. After nearly two months of what observers described as “the most intense naval combat since the Second World War,” the United States had made negligible gains. It expended approximately $3 billion, lost two F/A-18 Super Hornet fighter aircraft valued at $67 million each and seven Predator drones valued at $30 million each.Facing diminishing prospects of success, Trump abruptly announced on May 6 that the United States had reached a cease-fire arrangement with the Houthis. Yet, in early July, the Houthis sank two vessels in the Red Sea within a single week, as Washington largely refrained from direct response. The safeguarding of maritime freedom has served as a cornerstone of U.S. global strategy since World War II. That this principle could be so visibly undermined by a comparatively limited non-state actor such as the Houthis underscores the fragility of Trump's approach.
On May 12, Trump visited Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates to solicit exceptionally large investment commitments for the United States — his third such initiative. While Washington appeared on the surface to reap substantial gains, in fact Trump was again outmaneuvered. The administration claimed to have secured $3.6 trillion in investment pledges, a figure that is effectively impossible to realize. By contrast, the Gulf states obtained concrete concessions: The United States agreed to sell Saudi Arabia air-to-air missiles valued at $3.5 billion and is considering the sale of F-35 fighter jets. It will relax semiconductor controls by simplifying export restrictions and will consider bilateral chip agreements with each of the three states. It will cease pressuring Saudi Arabia to normalize relations with Israel. And it agreed in principle to a civil nuclear cooperation framework with Saudi Arabia that would, in effect, address the question of uranium enrichment.In pursuit of largely notional investment, Trump has compromised long-standing U.S. red lines across a range of major security issues. For the United States, security — not economic gain — has historically been paramount in the Middle East. Trump inverted those priorities.
On May 13, Trump announced that he “will be ordering the cessation of sanctions against Syria in order to give them a chance at greatness,” thereby launching his fourth major policy initiative. The United States subsequently aligned itself openly with Turkiye and Syria's new governing authorities, endorsing the creation of a centralized unitary state, rejecting federalism and demanding the disarmament of Kurdish forces. Israel, however, opposes a centralized and unified Syrian regime. Militarily, it has supported Syria's Druze community, and normatively it has expressed support for Syrian Kurds. Large-scale intercommunal violence erupted in Syria in March and July, reviving the risk of civil war.In response, Trump proved unable to restrain Israel or to manage Turkiye, and no progress was achieved toward domestic reconciliation in Syria. Should Syria relapse into civil war, Iranian and Russian influence would almost certainly return — an outcome Washington least desires.
On June 23, the United States launched military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities — Trump's fifth major initiative. This may be the only Middle East action of his tenure that can be framed as a “success”: the United States significantly degraded Iran's nuclear infrastructure without triggering a large-scale war. Nevertheless, airstrikes merely delay Iran's nuclear development and do not resolve the underlying nuclear problem.The Iranian nuclear dossier had been a controllable and manageable issue: Iran maintained a condition of nuclear latency without crossing the weapons threshold, thereby avoiding military retaliation while preserving bargaining leverage with the United States and Israel. This time, despite not crossing the threshold, Iran was subjected to U.S.-Israeli military action, narrowing Tehran's future options. Iran may now face a binary choice between fully abandoning nuclear activities and decisively pursuing nuclear weapons — both entailing heightened, potentially uncontrollable risks. The United States offered no political pathway to accompany the strikes. It simply “hit and left.”
Additionally, on Sept. 9, Israel conducted an airstrike on the leadership office of Hamas in Doha. Trump failed to prevent the action beforehand. Accounts diverge regarding the sequence of events, but the outcomes suggest only three possibilities: (1) the United States was unaware in advance because Israel did not inform Washington or did so too late for an American response; (2) the United States was informed but lacked the capacity to restrain Israel; or (3) the United States was informed and tacitly signaled approval. In all scenarios, the implications for the United States are adverse. Cease-fire talks over Gaza halted; U.S. credibility among allies suffered; and the prospect of Saudi-Israeli normalization became even more remote. These outcomes run counter to stated U.S. preferences, yet Washington proved unable to alter Israel's course and was instead led by it.
In the broader context of America's strategic retrenchment in the Middle East, Washington aims to preserve its influence without committing substantial resources, a posture that demands deft diplomatic balance — something Trump conspicuously lacks. It is therefore unsurprising that the United States has emerged as the principal loser.
