2018年，以平昌冬奧會為契機，朝韓雙邊關係大為改善，迎來了久違的“半島之春”。但隨着2019年朝美河內峰會破裂，朝韓關係大幅倒退，至今仍深陷僵局。

近來，韓國總統文在寅就發展朝韓關係連續發表講話。他先是在4月27日《板門店宣言》簽署三周年之際稱“半島局勢比任何時候都穩定，但當前和平局面尚待鞏固，雙方應基於《板門店宣言》向不可逆轉的永久和平方向邁進，韓朝需要重啟對話的時間點正在臨近”，緊接着又在5月10日發表就任四周年特別演說時強調“未來一年將是實現半島不可逆轉和平的寶貴機會，目前正是將長時間思考付諸行動的重要時刻”。

以上講話讓世人對朝韓關係能否再現2018年的“半島之春”充滿遐想。但目前看，朝韓關係發展仍面臨諸多挑戰與困難，實現關係突破尚需相關各方的政治智慧與不懈的外交努力。

首先，朝美關係及核問題仍是阻礙朝韓關係發展的核心障礙。新年伊始，朝方就提出將本着“以強對強、以善對善”原則同“最大的主要敵人”美國打交道，拜登政府則以“將對朝鮮實施新戰略”予以回應，朝美新一輪較量正式展開。4月30日，拜登政府披露了其對朝政策方向，但未談及具體方案。其方向是既不搞特朗普政府式的“大交易”，也不搞奧巴馬政府式的“戰略忍耐”，而是通過切實可行的外交手段實現朝鮮半島完全無核化。但在朝鮮看來，這只是“換湯不換藥”。它警告，美國若依舊以冷戰視角推行陳舊落後的政策和處理朝美關係的話，不久的將來會面臨難以承受的危機。很明顯，美朝互不信任依然根深蒂固，雙邊關係及核問題短期內恐難有突破。加之，拜登政府又提出朝鮮人權問題，在朝鮮看來這又是美國敵視政策的一部分，只會進一步促其增強核遏制能力。而核問題若得不到解決或取得階段性進展，安理會涉朝決議中的制裁條款就不會放鬆，朝方期待的重啟金剛山觀光、開城工業園區也就無從談起，更不用說韓方對朝開展大規模經濟合作了。

其次，文在寅政府在發展朝韓關係上恐力不從心。文政府自2017年執政以來，積極推行“文在寅的朝鮮半島政策”，謀求構建邁向和平統一的“和平共存”與“共同繁榮”的朝鮮半島。但這一路走來並不順利。隨着拜登政府上台，以及文政府進入執政末期，韓國政府在發展朝韓關係方面臨着不小的內外掣肘。一方面，它深受美國的牽制。2021年3月韓美舉行外長防長“2+2”會談，強調朝鮮核導問題是韓美同盟的首要關切，韓美同意在完全協調一致的對朝戰略框架內解決與半島相關的所有問題。另一方面，它深受國內事務羈絆。2022年韓國將舉行總統選舉。在被譽為“大選前哨戰”的4月7日首爾、釜山市長補選中，執政黨落敗。這給進步陣營敲響了警鐘，若不妥善應對，一年後韓國政壇就得變天。因此，為確保進步陣營繼續執掌政權，在任內剩餘時間裡，文政府恐將下大力氣重點解決以下兩大問題：一是確保新冠疫情可控，恢復並提振經濟；二是搞好黨內團結，整合力量，遏制保守陣營東山再起。

第三，新冠疫情增添了朝韓重啟對話與合作的變數。2018年朝鮮積极參加平昌冬奧會成為朝韓關係改善的重要契機，韓國政府一直積極謀求在東京奧運會再續“半島之春”，進一步推動半島和解合作，促進半島和平。但2021年4月6日朝方以保護運動員免受新冠威脅為由，宣布不參加7月東京奧運會。4月30日朝鮮又向亞足聯通報，將不參加6月在韓國舉行的2022年卡塔爾世界盃亞洲區第2輪預選賽。這恐讓韓國政府欲通過體育交流打破雙邊關係僵局的努力打水漂。

不過，2021年對朝韓意義重大，既是朝韓加入聯合國30周年，也是朝韓簽署《南北和解、互不侵犯、交流與合作協議書》30周年。值此重要年份，儘管雙邊關係發展仍面臨諸多困難，但只要朝韓雙方相互理解、相互尊重，抓住戰略機遇，共同開創和解合作新局面是完全可能的，再現“半島之春”也是可期的。

With the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics in 2018, bilateral relations between the two Koreas improved significantly, ushering in a long-overdue “Peninsula Spring.” But with the breakdown of the 2019 Hanoi summit between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States, inter-Korean relations have regressed significantly and are still at a deep impasse.

Recently, President Moon Jae-in of the Republic of Korea has made successive speeches on the development of inter-Korean relations. On the occasion of the third anniversary of the Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula on April 27, he said:“The situation on the peninsula is more stable than ever, but the current peace situation has yet to be consolidated. Both sides should move toward irreversible and permanent peace based on the Panmunjom Declaration. The point in time when the Republic of Korea and the DPRK need to restart dialogue is approaching.”Shortly afterward, on May 10, when the he delivered a speech on the occasion of his fourth anniversary in office, he emphasized: “The coming year will be a precious opportunity to achieve irreversible peace on the Korean Peninsula, and this is an important time to put long thinking into action.”

All this has made the world wonder whether inter-Korean relations will be able to recreate the peninsula spring of 2018. But for now, relations still face many challenges and difficulties. Achieving a breakthrough in relations requires the political wisdom and the tireless diplomatic efforts of all parties concerned.

First of all, DPRK-U.S. relations and the nuclear issue are still a core obstacle to the development of inter-Korean relations. At the beginning of the new year, the DPRK proposed to deal with its “biggest enemy” — the U.S. — based on the principle of “turning hostile or friendly accordingly,” while the Biden administration responded with “a new strategy toward North Korea.” Thus a new round of competition between the DPRK and the U.S. officially began.On April 30, the Biden administration disclosed the direction of its policy toward the DPRK, but did not talk about specific proposals. It will not use the Trump administration's “grand bargain” or the Obama administration's “strategic patience” approach but would rather use practical diplomatic means to achieve complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.The DPRK does not think this is a substantial change, and it warns that the U.S. will face an unbearable crisis in the near future if it continues to pursue its outdated old-school policies and deal with the DPRK-U.S. relations from the perspective and viewpoint of the Cold War era. Obviously, the mutual distrust between the U.S. and the DPRK is still deep-rooted, so it will be difficult to make a breakthrough in bilateral relations or the nuclear issue in the near future.In addition, the Biden administration has raised the issue of human rights in the DPRK, which in the DPRK's view is part of a hostile policy that will only further prompt the latter to promote nuclear containment. Therefore, if the nuclear issue is not resolved, or progress is not made in stages, the sanctions provisions in the UN Security Council resolution on the DPRK will not be relaxed and the DPRK's expectation of restarting tourism in Geumgangsan and the Kaesong Industrial Complex will not be possible — not to mention large-scale economic cooperation with the DPRK by the ROK.

Second, the Moon Jae-in government may be unable to develop inter-Korean relations as it wishes. Since taking office in 2017, the administration has been actively pursuing the “Moon Jae-in Korean Peninsula policy,” which seeks to build a Korean Peninsula of “peaceful coexistence” and “common prosperity” toward peaceful reunification. But the journey has not been smooth.With the Biden administration in power and the Moon administration in its final year, the ROK government faces considerable internal and external constraints in developing inter-Korean relations.It is first of all constrained by the U.S. In March of this year, the ROK and U.S. foreign ministers and defense ministers held “2+2” talks, stressing that the DPRK nuclear missile issue is the primary concern of the ROK-U.S. alliance and that the ROK and U.S. agreed to resolve all issues related to the peninsula within the framework of a fully coordinated strategy on the DPRK. In addition, the Republic of Korea is tied up in domestic affairs. It will hold a presidential election in 2022. The ruling party lost the April 7 by-elections for mayors of Seoul and Busan, which were described as a bellwether of the general election.This is a wakeup call to the progressive camp that if they do not respond properly, the political scene will change in a year. Therefore, to ensure that the progressive camp remains in power, the remainder of the Moon term is likely to be focused on two major issues: ensuring that the COVID-19 pandemic is under control for reviving the economy, and improving unity within the party to consolidate its strength and stop the conservative camp from rising again.

Third, the pandemic has added to the uncertainty of restarting inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation. The active participation of the DPRK in the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics in 2018 became an important opportunity to improve inter-Korean relations.The ROK government has also been actively seeking to renew the Peninsula Spring at the Tokyo Olympics to further promote reconciliation and cooperation and peace. However, on April 6 the DPRK announced that it would not participate in the Tokyo Olympics in July, saying it had to protect its athletes from the threat of COVID-19. On April 30, the DPRK informed the AFC that it would not participate in the second round of Asian qualifiers for the 2022 FIFA World Cup in the ROK in June. This threatens to derail the ROK's efforts to break the stalemate in bilateral relations through sports exchanges.

This year is significant for the DPRK and the ROK, as it marks the 30th anniversary of both their membership in the United Nations and the signing of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between South and North. In this important year, although bilateral relations yet face many difficulties, as long as the DPRK and the ROK understand and respect each other, it is possible to seize strategic opportunities to create a new phase of reconciliation and cooperation, and the re-emergence of the Peninsula Spring may be expected.