Since U.S. President Donald Trump began his second term this year, he has vigorously pursued an agenda to reshape international relations. By July, history had reached a pivotal juncture.One path could lead to an East-West confrontation. As Trump's disaffection with Russian President Vladimir Putin grows, the likelihood of additional U.S.-EU secondary sanctions against Russia has risen.The other path points toward a new configuration of major power coordination. As China-U.S. economic and trade negotiations make strides, some speculate that the leaders of China, the U.S., and Russia might meet in Beijing in September.The U.S.-Russia summit in Alaska, the first such meeting in years, also seemed to dispel some of the uncertainty at this critical moment.
Regardless of its outcome, the Alaska Summit reaffirmed the resurgence of major power coordination. Alaska, land the United States acquired from Russia more than a century ago, sits midway between Washington and Moscow. Its selection as the summit venue aptly captured the essence of the meeting: a direct deal between two equally great powers. The warm handshake between the U.S. and Russian presidents evoked the secretive diplomacy of old Europe and heightened the anxiety of America's allies, who feared being sold out.
Although the summit did not yield a formal agreement, it undeniably heralded a new chapter in great power dynamics.On one hand, the U.S. and Russia are poised to engage in a series of high-level meetings in the future. These are expected to gradually clarify and rekindle understandings between the two nations, which could extend beyond a cease-fire in Ukraine to encompass strategic balance, mineral cooperation and Arctic development. They are likely to have a profound impact on great power interactions globally.On the other hand, despite Donald Trump's close interaction with Ukraine, Europe and NATO following the summit, he remains receptive to Europe's concerns. He appears willing to continue arms sales to Europe, provide Ukraine with security assurances short of NATO membership and even keep the option of sanctions against Russia on the table as a negotiating tactic. Thus, the direction in which history will unfold remains uncertain.
Trump covets the Nobel Peace Prize and aspires to attain peace through deal-making. However, the shrinking number of participants in the U.S.-Russia talks, particularly the absence of economic officials such as the U.S. treasury secretary, reveals that in reality it is a challenge to drive strategic realignment through economic deals alone.
Moreover, no great power can establish a new world order by sidestepping institutions and rules. This is precisely the problem the Trump administration has underestimated, and something at which Russia has never been particularly adept. Regional security frameworks, the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and international law concerning territory and warfare will remain subjects of long-term great power competition.
Ball in Europe's court
The Alaska Summit has the greatest implications for Europe. The regional security order that Europe established after World War II, while benefiting from the American security umbrella, is primarily based on two pioneering principles. One is “collective security,” with NATO as the cornerstone; the other is “sovereignty transfer” through the European Community/European Union. The Soviet Union/Russia was not within the scope of this security order.So while the Alaska Summit heralds the resurgence of major power coordination, Europe will by no means voluntarily forsake the hard-earned peace dividends built over the postwar decades. European great powers seasoned by the power game for centuries, will not passively accept arrangements imposed by others.
First, European great powers will proactively engage in major power coordination. Under the new dynamics triggered by Trump, the leaders of Germany and France have already spoken with Vladimir Putin — in November last year and July this year. In the future, it cannot be ruled out that European leaders will have more direct communication with the Russian side. Meanwhile, Europe will insist on linking any Ukrainian territorial concessions with security assurances, security rules and international law.
Second, weakening or even defeating Russia has become an unwavering strategic goal for Europe. European countries will enhance their military strength by boosting arms production and strengthening bilateral and multilateral cooperation. France's 2025 National Strategic Review shows that it is preparing for a large-scale war in Europe before 2030, and some other European countries have moved up their war preparedness timeline to 2027.Last month, in an unprecedented announcement, France and the UK made it clear that they would coordinate their nuclear deterrence capabilities. Germany and the UK, on the other hand, have expanded their defense cooperation through a new friendship treaty. A defense axis consisting of the UK, France and Germany has already taken shape. Since 2022, European military plants have been expanding at a pace three times faster than that of typical peacetime. In response to the heightened military spending, the EU's fiscal rules have undergone significant revisions over the past few months.
Strategic squeeze
Ultimately, caught in the strategic squeeze between the U.S. and Russia, Europe will drive the transformation of NATO and the EU to preserve the security principles enshrined within these alliances. At the NATO summit in the Hague in June, European nations committed to raising defense spending to 5 percent of GDP. And in a notable shift, they also intensified their focus on Indo-Pacific security, seemingly to underscore for the U.S. the enduring value of the transatlantic collective security framework.The EU's “hard border” has become more pronounced since the start of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, highlighting the need for European integration to unlock its internal potential. To this end, the EU will enhance Europe's overall competitiveness and defense production capabilities by dismantling internal market barriers and reinforcing external economic defenses.Moreover, Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union and Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union are increasingly viewed as collective defense clauses. These provisions suggest that the EU has the latent potential to evolve into a mini-NATO capable of addressing emerging security challenges more autonomously.
