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| Photo: The Economist cover |
It is increasingly apparent that the U.S.-dominated international system that has been in place since the end of World War II is undergoing a profound and somewhat chaotic transformation. The ultimate outcome of that process of change, however, remains unclear. One possibility is the creation of a new “concert of great powers.” Such a system would likely resemble the original concert that emerged in Europe after the Napoleonic wars to better manage the political and security affairs of that continent.
A current version of the concert system would be even more challenging than the original, because it would need to be implemented on a global basis. Moreover, it would have to recognize and respect spheres of influence by multiple great powers as an organizing concept. Finally, there would need to be a collegial process for containing and managing disputes among the leading powers. Given all of those challenges, it would hardly be a perfect system, but would more accurately reflect the growing economic and diplomatic multi-polarity of today's world.
Unfortunately, the conduct of the United States is making such a relatively benign outcome less likely than it would be otherwise. Worse, the most probable alternative is an international system far less amenable to America's best interests: a diverse, hostile international coalition directed against the United States.
There have been multiple, intensifying signs of such behavior in recent years. Some of those episodes reflect fundamental economic and diplomatic developments taking place in a changing international system. Other shifts, though, have been the direct result of clumsy and arrogant policies that U.S. leaders have pursued. Growing anger and pushback has become especially pronounced since Donald Trump regained the U.S. presidency in January 2025, but ominous signs of resentment at Washington's global dominance already were evident during Joe Biden's administration.
The reaction of major powers in other regions to the U.S.-led drive to impose sanctions on Russia to retaliate for Moscow's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine was especially revealing. Biden administration policymakers clearly expected the rest of the world to follow Washington's lead on policy toward Russia. They appeared to assume that the response would be similar to the international community's willingness to embrace the U.S. position with respect to Iraq, both during the Persian Gulf crisis in 1990-91 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
The actual response this time was very different, and it stunned U.S. officials. Except for the members of NATO and longstanding U.S. security clients in East Asia, there was no flood of support for the Biden administration's position.
Several major powers, including India, the People's Republic of China (PRC), Brazil, and Indonesia, ostentatiously adopted a posture of de facto neutrality with respect to NATO's quarrel with Russia. There was very little receptivity to Washington's call to impose sanctions on Moscow, much less to provide Ukraine with financial and military aid. A deluge of secondary and minor countries throughout the “Global South” embraced a similar posture of neutrality in defiance of U.S. wishes.
The Biden administration's attempts to bully the neutral powers into submission, not only failed, but backfired badly. The increasingly influential BRICS counties, for example, have worked to undermine the previously unchallenged status of the U.S. dollar as the world's reserve currency. There already has been a marked surge in financial transactions conducted in other currencies or baskets of currencies instead of the dollar.
Various actions that the Biden administration took with respect to the Russia-Ukraine war increased the likelihood that the emerging post-U.S hegemonic international system would have a distinct bias against Washington. The initial phase of Donald Trump's second term has greatly boosted that likelihood. Trump's crude, abrasive treatment of other countries made Biden's conduct look like an example of skilled, subtle diplomacy.
His decision to impose higher tariffs on China and many other countries around the world should not have come as a surprise, given his longstanding advocacy of trade protectionism. Some of Washington's other quarrels, including those with traditional European allies, reflect fundamental policy differences on ideological and security issues that have been growing for some time. Major European powers, such as Germany, France, and Turkey, have sought to have greater input into important NATO decisions for decades. Washington's typical response has been dismissive, bordering on contemptuous. However, on most issues, Washington and its European allies were at least on the same page in terms of overall policy.
That is no longer the case. For example, President Trump's attempt to act as a mediator and bring the Russia-Ukraine war to a quick end is very different from the hardline stance taken by NATO's European members of continuing to support Kyiv's maximalist demands. One could well argue that Trump's stance is more prudent and constructive. Nevertheless, his position has antagonized most NATO allies and thereby strengthened another component of the global coalition directed against the United States.
Moreover, some of Trump's actions are needlessly provocative toward other countries by almost any standard. His vow to acquire Greenland from Denmark even if he had to put pressure on Copenhagen, came across as crude bullying as well as a solution in search of a problem. Likewise, his loose talk about the alleged fragility of Canada's unity and Washington's receptivity to admitting some provinces as new U.S. states was gratuitously antagonistic. His threat to re-take control of the Panama Canal and the revival of the threat made during his first term to consider using the U.S. military to combat Mexico's drug cartels have further stoked tensions with those countries.
Even more troubling has been Trump's behavior toward the PRC. Trump and his advisers have seemingly launched a full-scare trade war with China, imposing astronomical tariffs on Chinese goods. Beijing, though, does not appear to be backing down, and the world now faces the prospect of a nasty feud between the countries with the two largest economies. At this point, the United States appears to be receiving the majority of the blame for this unpleasant situation.
Worrisome tensions between Washington and Beijing also seem to be rising with respect to security issues. The United States and the Philippines just staged the largest air and naval military drills in the history of their mutual defense alliance. As one reporter observed, the forces also fairly bristled with missiles aimed at China. Not surprisingly, Beijing is reacting to such conduct with suspicion and hostility.
The United States can and should be one of the leaders in forging a new, more sustainable international system based on cooperation among the principal great powers. Unfortunately, Washington is wasting that opportunity and making itself the principal source of worries and mistrust on the part of those other major powers.
However, the Trump administration still has time to adopt a more subtle, constructive approach. The administration's apparent willingness to accept Moscow's return to the international system and respect a Russian sphere of influence in Eastern Europe is a positive sign. So too, is a willingness to accept a more independent Europe (as long as a strategic divorce can be conducted in an amicable fashion). But the United States also must treat its hemispheric neighbors with greater respect. Even more important, Washington must repair its relations with Iran and the other nations of the Middle East. Most urgent of all, the United States must end its dangerous, counterproductive feud with the PRC. The Trump administration's actions on those fronts will determine whether the United States is the principal architect of a new, more realistic and prudent international system or becomes the main target of a new, more hostile system.
