During Donald Trump's second term, the world's three major continental powers — China, the United States and the European Union — will engage in their most intense interactions since the end of World War II. The results will shape the global power structure in stages.
Although the current interactions between China, the United States and Europe are a continuation of their previous engagements, new turmoil has been set off by Donald Trump's return to the White House. He is shaking up U.S. domestic affairs along with the world order.
At present, early in the game, Trump's suppression of China seems milder than expected. While he once threatened to impose a 60 percent tariff on Chinese goods, he has only imposed a 10 percent increase so far. Unexpectedly, he invited Chinese President Xi Jinping to attend his inauguration ceremony. But all this is probably part of a broader strategy.
On the other hand, Trump's impact on Europe has been greater than expected. Europe is concerned about being sidelined in the Russia-Ukraine negotiations and about having to provide security guarantees for Ukraine on its own, without U.S. assistance — something Trump hopes to see. Therefore, Europe will have to significantly increase its military spending, exacerbating its already strained financial situation. The recent political turmoil in Germany and France is related to the inability of their political elites to reach a consensus on fiscal matters.
What surprises Europe most is that Trump's disregard for international rules now far exceeds that of his first term. Not only does he refuse to look at the Russia-Ukraine conflict from the perspective of international law but he mirrors Vladimir Putin in some ways — for example, by making territorial claims on the Panama Canal, Greenland and Canada. At the recent Munich Security Conference, a senior U.S. official lectured Europeans on democracy, which aroused strong resentment. In fact, the divergence in values across the Atlantic has reached its highest point since World War II.
At present, China and Europe are taking a wait-and-see approach to Trump. First, the worst-case scenario has not yet materialized: Europe's primary concern is that the United States may immediately cut off aid to Ukraine and then withdraw from NATO, while China fears the outbreak of a full-scale trade war. Second, Trump continues to make a barrage of unorthodox and unsettling statements; third, his words, usually used as negotiating tools, are not necessarily implemented; fourth, domestic complaints against him are starting to emerge, and these will serve as constraints.
Possible China-EU cooperation
In response to Trump's return, China and the European Union have adjusted their policies to build more friendly relations. But their cooperation is limited to certain issues, and strategic cooperation remains elusive. In fact, in the past few years, China-EU relations have reached their lowest point ever — the result of various disruptions. Compared with Trump's first term, starting eight years ago, three new developments have emerged in bilateral relations.
First, because of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, China and Europe find themselves with competing geopolitical interests, which has left a negative stain on relations. Second, China's technological innovation and overcapacity, as well as rising geo-economic risks, mean that the economies of China and Europe no longer naturally complementary. Third, both Europe and China have begun to reflect pessimistic attitudes toward each other's politics, society and economy.
At the end of last year, there were two prevailing views in Europe on the China-U.S.-EU triangle. One, held by the European Commission, argued for uniting with the U.S. to counter China; the other, a more self-centered one, was embraced by France. The two views have become more flexible and have even merged in light of the unexpected transactional nature and unpredictability of Trump.
There are three specific areas of cooperation for China and Europe: geopolitics, economy/trade and global governance. The most pressing geopolitical issue at present is the Russia-Ukraine situation. On this issue, China and Europe share similar concerns: They have certain expectations for the negotiations initiated by Trump, but are worried about being marginalized. However, because the notably wide gap in positions, it is difficult for them to coordinate deeply. Nevertheless, once the negotiations begin, this biggest negative factor in China-Europe relations will be alleviated.In terms of economy and trade, China and Europe have adopted a tacit pattern of behavior: “fighting while talking” and “fighting without breaking up.” This was the case with electric vehicle tariffs in the past year or so and may become the model for them to deal with economic and trade frictions in the future. Of course, the U.S. factor will complicate their economic and trade negotiations. As for global governance, climate change and AI regulation — areas in which Trump has stepped back — cooperation between China and Europe will be inevitable.
Future international order
The transformation of the world order consists of four complex processes:Redistribution of new production power;Formation of a new structure in production relations for capital accumulation;Changes in the relative power of social groups and the formation of new blocs; andChanges in relations between major countries. Interactions between China, the United States and Europe are but one aspect of the broader process of the birth of a new order.
During Trump's second term, a new historic bloc has formed at an accelerated pace domestically — which Silicon Valley's new technology elites have joined. With an authoritarian fist, the Trump administration is promoting “super liberalism,” which is marked by zero regulation. This approach is incompatible with Europe's development model. In response to Trump's pressure, the EU is considering relaxing its green regulations and artificial intelligence rules to focus on improving its competitiveness. In addition, the Trump administration has launched an attack on universal values in politics and economic globalization. Its propositions, reminiscent of the Monroe Doctrine, may split the world into several “big islands.”
In the neoliberal globalization movement that began in the 1980s, both Europe and China have been major beneficiaries, and their systems and operations are deeply embedded in this order. European integration is a “one-way street” process driven by liberalism and multilateralism, while in China, employment and growth still depend on exports. In both Europe and China, some people want to preserve this order, or even its remnants, while others are eager to adapt to the evolving situation and participate in the unscrupulous bargaining process between major powers by integrating regional strength.
New blocs are forming in the United States as well, but these are not solid. Elections will lead to constant fluctuations in domestic politics. As a result, major powers may proceed, but cautiously, taking one step at a time for quite a long time.
