近日，美國參議院外交事務委員會以17票贊成、5票反對，表決通過所謂“台灣政策法案”（Taiwan Policy Act）。該法案下一步將由參議院全體大會進行審議。如果後續美國眾議院也提出並通過相應的法案，拜登總統或將該法案正式簽署成法。即便“台灣政策法案”短期內難以在國會過關，相關條款也會被拆分塞入“國防授權法案”等，進而得以執行。

“台灣政策法案”具有重塑美國對台政策的潛在影響，是美國眾議長佩洛西訪台後美國國會議員對中美關係帶來的又一次嚴重衝擊。在俄烏衝突背景下，美國國會出現新一輪的“挺台”潮，一些美國政客將俄烏衝突與台灣問題混為一談，要求拜登行政當局在台灣問題上以“戰略清晰”取代“戰略模糊”，對中國大陸可能採取的“攻台”行動進行威懾。

今年4月，由共和黨籍參議員林賽·格雷厄姆（Lindsey Graham）和民主黨籍參議員鮑勃·梅內德茲（Bob Menendez）共同率領的美國國會代表團訪台。格雷厄姆是參議院預算委員會共和黨首席議員。梅內德茲則是參議院對外關係委員會主席。這兩人都是美國國會的“重磅級議員”，他們後於6月正式提出“台灣政策法案”。該案納入了此前諸多涉台法案如“台灣威懾法案”（Taiwan Deterrence Act）的相關內容，被視為美國國會的“旗艦型挺台法案”。

梅內德茲強調，這項法案將“向北京釋放一個清楚的信息，那就是不要在台灣議題上重蹈普京入侵烏克蘭的覆轍。” 格雷厄姆則稱，這部法案將推動數十年來美台之間軍事和經濟關係最大規模的擴展。可以說，“台灣政策法案”一旦成為法律，將是美國自1979年制定《與台灣關係法》（Taiwan Relations Act）後，美國對台灣政策最為深刻而全面的調整。

“台灣政策法案”的最初版本包括一系列具有嚴重挑釁性的條款，妄圖推動“一中一台”。一是在政治上給台灣當局撐腰打氣。法案要求，終止聯邦政府官員與台灣方面交往的種種設限，將“駐美國台灣經濟文化代表處”更名為“台灣代表處”，同時給予“美國在台協會辦事處處長”職位“代表”（representative）的頭銜，這一職位需經美國參議院的批准，比照“大使”待遇。法案還提出要建立一套制裁製度，以阻止中國大陸官員以及中國大陸的公民和實體，採取針對台灣的“敵對行為”。

二是在安全上為台灣提供更大支持。法案要求修訂《與台灣關係法》中的相關內容，將目前美國向台灣提供武器的範圍從“防禦性”擴大到“有利於威懾人民解放軍侵略行為的武器”。法案要求正式賦予台灣當局“主要非北約盟友”（major Non-NATO ally）的地位，設立“台灣安全協助倡議”，在未來4年提供45億美元的“外國軍事資金援助”，加緊提升台灣地區的“不對稱戰力”，並提升美台在軍事人員交流、防務規劃方面的實質性關係。

三是在經濟上深化美台關係。該法案強調了發展美台經濟合作關係具有極為緊迫的重要性。法案要求進一步完善“美台經濟繁榮夥伴對話”等機制，促進台灣在美國應對供應鏈安全風險以及在印太地區推動自由開放經濟方面發揮更大的作用。法案提出，美國政府應完成與台灣當局圍繞《貿易與投資框架協議》（TIFA）的談判，並將台灣納入拜登政府提出的“印太經濟框架”（IPEF）。

四是為台灣當局拓展所謂“國際空間”。法案要求，美國政府協助台灣當局參與國際組織，美國常駐聯合國代表和駐其他有關國際組織的代表也要為台灣加大“發聲”，支持台灣當局有意義地參與國際組織。法案要求，美國在聯合國提出新的議案，以釐清聯合國第2758號決議有關台灣代表權和主權問題的立場。法案還提出，要進一步擴大美國和台灣當局共同構建的“全球合作與訓練框架”機制，與日本、歐盟、澳大利亞等美國盟友合作應對中國大陸展開的“影響力行動”和“不實信息行動”。

無疑，該法案中的上述內容對於中國大陸來說具有強烈的刺激性。拜登政府非常擔心該法案將會進一步激怒中國政府。在白宮方面的勸說以及相關議員的質疑之下，梅內德茲等人對“台灣政策法案”的條款和表述進行了調整。目前參議院外委會通過的法案版本把將“駐美國台北經濟文化代表處”更名為“台灣代表處”之事從“授權”改為“國會建議”。法案也不再要求美國在台協會駐台北負責人的任命獲得參議院批准。參議院外委會通過的版本改為要求以等同於“主要非北約盟友”的地位來對待台灣，而非直接賦予台灣當局這一地位。

雖然有這些調整，但仍難以掩蓋“台灣政策法案”對中美關係的惡劣影響。實際上，一些國會議員如民主黨籍參議員克里斯·墨菲（Chris Murphy）、共和黨籍參議員蘭德·保羅（Rand Paul）擔心該法案不僅會讓中美關係變得更加緊張，還可能導致大陸加快針對台灣的“武統”進程。參議院外委會亞太小組主席、民主黨籍參議員埃德·馬基（Ed Markey）就“台灣政策法案”提出修正案，要求設立軍事危機熱線，以處理在台灣海峽可能發生的“誤判”事件。

顯然，如果“台灣政策法案”的相關內容得以執行，將進一步加劇中國大陸對美方以“一中一台”替換“一個中國”的認知，促使大陸方面採取更多“斷然舉措”，中美在台海地區陷入直接衝突的風險勢將顯著升高。梅內德茲口口聲聲稱要用“台灣政策法案”對中國大陸進行威懾，但他對“威懾”的涵義缺乏準確的認識。“威懾”的目的是避免戰爭，但梅內德茲之流所為卻是在將中美推向兵戎相見的境地。

應看到，“台獨”才是造成台海地區形勢日益緊張的根本原因，美國對台政策曾注重“反武統”和“反台獨”的平衡，但如今已近乎放棄“反台獨”，這體現了美國在台灣問題上的“改變現狀”之勢。中國大陸懾止“台獨”的諸多做法被美方誤讀為加速走向“武統”，蔡英文當局則試圖利用美國對華“新冷戰”帶來的機會窗口推進“謀獨”議程。兩岸之間以及中美之間的戰略溝通和互信嚴重缺失，各方都在為未來數年可能出現的“攤牌”以及大規模軍事衝突預做準備。“台灣政策法案”着實具有火上澆油的效果，台海地區的和平穩定勢將面臨更加嚴峻的挑戰。

The US Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs just endorsed the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022 by 17-5. The legislation will then be submitted to the Senate for review. If the House also proposes and approves a corresponding legislation later, President Biden may sign it into law. Even if the Act won't sail through Congress, corresponding clauses may still be incorporated into such legislations as the National Defense Authorization Act and put into practice.

The Taiwan Policy Act of 2022 has the potential to reshape US Taiwan policy as another heavy blow US Congress members have dealt to China-US relations following House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's Taiwan visit. Against the backdrop of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, there has been a new wave of clamors about “supporting Taiwan” in US Congress. Some American politicians have confused the Russia-Ukraine conflict with the Taiwan question, asked the Biden administration to replace “strategic ambiguity” on Taiwan with “strategic clarity”, and carry out deterrence against potential “invasion” by China's mainland.

In April, Republican Senator Lindsey Graham and Democratic Senator Bob Menendez led a congressional delegation to visit Taiwan. Graham is the Republican Ranking Member on the Senate Committee on the Budget , Menendez is Senate Foreign Affairs Committee chairman. In June, the two heavyweight senators formally proposed the Act, which incorporated contents of multiple previous Taiwan-related legislations, such as the Taiwan Deterrence Act, and has thus been deemed as a “flagship” legislation supporting Taiwan by the US Congress.

Menendez emphasized the Act will send a clear message to Beijing that it should not make the same mistakes Russia made in invading Ukraine. Graham claimed it will facilitate the most significant expansion of US military and economic relations with Taiwan over the past decades. Once the Act becomes law, it would represent the most in-depth and comprehensive adjustments in US Taiwan policy since the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979.

The initial draft of the Act included a series of seriously provocative clauses meant to promote “one China, one Taiwan”. First, it offered political support for Taiwan authorities. The draft asked for terminating various restrictions on federal officials' exchanges with the Taiwan side, renaming the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States as “Taiwanese Representative Office”, and at the same time give Director of the American Institute in Taiwan the tile as “Representative”, which would need approval by the US Senate and receive “ambassadorial” treatments. The draft also proposed to establish a sanctions regime, so as to prevent Chinese mainland officials as well as mainland citizens and entities from taking “hostile actions” targeted at Taiwan.

Second, it offered greater security support for Taiwan. It asked for revising the Taiwan Relations Act, expanding the scope of arms sales to Taiwan from defensive weapons to those conducive to deterring “aggressive actions” by the PLA. It asked for formally bestowing on Taiwan a major Non-NATO Ally status, establishing the Taiwan Security Assistance Initiative, providing Taiwan $4.5 billion in foreign security assistance over four years, accelerating upgrade of Taiwan's asymmetrical war-fighting capabilities, and upgrading substantive relations with Taiwan in military personnel exchanges and defense planning.

Third, it sought to deepen US economic relations with Taiwan. The draft stated that developing US-Taiwan relations of economic cooperation is of extremely pressing importance. It asked for further improving such mechanisms as the US-Taiwan Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue, promoting Taiwan to play a greater role in US efforts for coping with supply chain security risks and promoting free and open economies in the Indo-Pacific. It urged the US government to finish TIFA negotiations with Taiwan, and incorporate Taiwan into the IPEF the Biden administration proposed.

Fourth, the draft attempted to expand the so-called “international space” for Taiwan. It required the US government to help Taiwan authorities participate in international organizations, the US representative to the UN and representatives at other international organizations were also asked to give voice to Taiwan, and support Taiwan authorities' meaningful participation in international organizations. It required the US to propose a new resolution at the UN so as to clarify US position on Taiwan's representation and sovereignty issues in UN Resolution 2758. It also proposed to further expand the Global Cooperation and Training Framework mechanisms the US has set up with Taiwan authorities, and cooperate with such US allies as Japan, the EU and Australia to cope with “influence operations” and “disinformation operations” by the Chinese mainland.

Such contents of the Act no doubt are strongly provocative to the mainland. The Biden administration is very worried the Act would further infuriate the Chinese government. Following lobbying by the White House and some Congress members' questioning, Menendez and others have made adjustments to the clauses and their wording. The current version of the Act passed by the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee changed renaming of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States as “Taiwanese Representative Office” from congressional “authorization” to “suggestion”. Nor does it require Senate approval of the appointment of the AIT director. The present version asks for treatments for Taiwan equivalent to a Non-NATO Ally, instead of directly giving Taiwan authorities such status.

But such adjustments won't be able to conceal the Act's odious impacts on China-US relations. In fact, some Congress members, such as Democratic Senator Chris Murphy and Republican Senator Rand Paul, worry the legislation will not only result in greater tensions in China-US relations, but even accelerate the mainland's moves to seek reunification by force. Ed Markey, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy, has proposed to amend the Act, asking to set up a military crisis hotline in order to handle possible incidents of miscalculation across the Taiwan Strait.

Obviously, if corresponding clauses in the Taiwan Policy Act are put into practice, they will further consolidate the mainland's perception that the US side is replacing “one China” with “one China, one Taiwan”, and prompt the mainland to take more “resolute measures”, the risk of China and the US sinking in direct conflict in the Taiwan Strait will hence increase significantly. Menendez has been clamoring about deterring the Chinese mainland with the Taiwan Policy Act, but he lacks accurate understanding of the connotations of “deterrence”. The purpose of “deterrence” is to avoid war, yet what Menendez and his likes are doing is pushing China and the US toward military conflict.

We should not ignore “Taiwan independence” is the fundamental cause of the escalating tensions across the Taiwan Strait, US Taiwan policy once highlighted a balance between “opposing reunification by force” and “opposing Taiwan independence”, but it has nearly given up on “opposing Taiwan independence”, reflecting US tendency to “change the status quo” on Taiwan. Many of the mainland's moves to deter “Taiwan independence” have been misread by the US as accelerated steps toward “reunification by force”, and the Tsai Ing-wen authorities have attempted to push their agenda for independence taking advantage of the window of opportunities the US new Cold War against China has brought them. There are serious deficits in strategic communication and mutual trust between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait as well as between China and the US, all parties are preparing for the possible “showdown” and large-scale military conflict that may occur in the next few years. The Taiwan Policy Act of 2022 does have the effect of adding fuel to the fire, and peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait will inevitably face even more severe challenges.