習近平同朝鮮勞動黨委員長、國務委員會委員長金正恩舉行會談

時隔14年，中國最高領導人再次踏上朝鮮的土地。

2019年6月20至21日，應朝鮮勞動黨委員長、國務委員會委員長金正恩邀請，中共中央總書記、國家主席習近平對朝鮮進行國事訪問。

這次訪問是習近平對金正恩2018年三次、2019年一次訪華的回訪。金正恩接任朝鮮黨和國家最高領導職務以來，已四次來華與習近平會晤，多次向習近平發出訪朝邀請，中方也派出栗戰書、王毅、宋濤等高官分別利用不同時機訪朝。今年是中朝建交70周年，也是中華人民共和國成立70周年，兩黨兩國關係已做足鋪墊，習近平訪朝時機成熟。

習近平與金正恩在中國的四次會晤主要是圍繞兩個議程進行。一個是挽救因朝核問題和治國理念差異而陷入低谷的中朝關係，修復相互地緣政治依託。另一個是就朝鮮“新戰略路線”（把核導戰略和經濟發展戰略“並進”的路線調整為集中精力發展經濟的路線）進行協調。這種協調有效緩衝了朝鮮在空前嚴厲國際制裁下深陷的人道困境，也在2018年6月和2019年2月兩次朝美首腦會晤之前助推朝方的“分階段、同步行動”思路和“雙暫停”（朝方暫停核和遠程導彈試驗，美方暫停大規模聯合軍演）原則走向明晰。

習近平訪朝完成了中朝雙方共同努力把彼此關係拉回到特殊鄰邦狀態的進程。此訪設定了“共同擘畫中朝關係美好未來，共同開啟中朝友誼嶄新篇章”的主題。朝方極盡其禮，25萬民眾湧上街頭歡迎，在錦繡山太陽宮廣場的致敬活動史無前例，10萬人團體操表演盛況空前，凸顯了對華關係在朝對外關係中的優先性和中朝關係的獨特性。習近平則於啟程前在《勞動新聞》等朝鮮主要媒體發文，確認中朝是“好同志、好鄰居”，中方堅持中朝友好合作，支持朝新戰略路線。

訪問期間，習近平進一步闡明中方對中朝關係的基本認識：堅持共產黨領導的社會主義國家是中朝關係的本質屬性；共同的理想信念和奮鬥目標是中朝關係的前進動力；最高領導人的友誼傳承和戰略引領是中朝關係的最大優勢；地緣相親和文緣相通是中朝關係的牢固紐帶。更明確了中國對朝政策的“三個堅定支持”：無論國際形勢如何變化，都堅定支持朝鮮社會主義事業，堅定支持朝方實施新戰略路線，堅定支持朝方為政治解決半島問題、實現半島長治久安所做的努力。可以說，這一定調是在中朝兩國內外政策調整和相互頻密接觸過程中，以及中國外部環境深刻變化的背景下逐步形成的，反映出濃烈的“命運共同體”意識，結束了中國國內在對朝關係取向問題上持續多年的爭議和遲疑，表明在習近平6月訪俄正式宣告中俄戰略協作夥伴關係進入“新時代”後不久，中朝構建“命運共同體”的彼此關係“新時代”也正式開啟，中國對外戰略加強亞歐大陸布局的調整提速進行。

習近平訪朝的主要議題當然包括朝鮮半島局勢。作為半島長治久安的重要前提條件，半島無核化進程目前受阻，癥結還是在朝美之間。今年2月朝美首腦在河內的會晤功敗垂成，主因在於朝方“分階段、同步行動”原則與美方“一攬子棄核”原則差距太大，難以調和，同時也是因為雙方對對方為“政治解決朝核問題”做出讓步的預期過於樂觀，導致談判節奏紊亂。河內會晤後，朝美並未放棄接觸，雙方仍然需要一個協議。6月11日，美國總統特朗普證實他再次收到金正恩來信，不排除同金舉行第三次會晤。6月23日，朝中社受權宣布，金正恩收到特朗普的複信，對信中包含良好的內容表示滿意，“將慎重考慮有趣的內容”。

“有趣的內容”是什麼，外界尚不得而知，大抵應是美方以更有形的保證換取朝方實質棄核的具體建議。由於朝美互信缺失，且朝方還在調整談判團隊，朝美之間全面重啟談判並促成領導人再次會晤恐怕還要拖上一段時間。但隨着2020年美國大選選戰的升溫和中美關係的變化，特朗普政府對達成協議的需要將會重新上升，對自身談判策略的反思也已開始，朝美和解的前景仍是開放性的。

當前朝鮮半島種種現象無法忽略的另一背景是中美戰略競爭表面化。外界有種判斷認為，中方為疏緩美方壓力，有可能對朝施壓，不僅幫助特朗普把朝鮮拉回談判桌，更會在促朝棄核方面尋求進展。這種判斷不符合中朝兩國的政治邏輯。能夠趨使中國強行介入朝核形勢的只有自身利益的攸關性，無論中美關係走勢如何，促使朝鮮合理處置其核導計劃和推動半島局勢緩和都是中方工作的基本方向。對朝鮮而言，直接與美國談判做交易是既定路徑，其內心不會認同“通向華盛頓的路必須經過北京”。6月20日，為紀念金正日著作《在革命和建設中堅持主體性和民族性》發表22周年，朝鮮《勞動新聞》刊登署名文章，大談主體性和民族性是“國家和民族的生命”。

習近平訪朝做了繼續推動對話進程的工作，鼓勵朝鮮繼續與美國溝通和保持“暫停”不可能不在其中。習近平對金正恩說，國際社會普遍希望朝美談下去並談出成果，中方支持推進半島問題政治解決進程，為解決問題積累和創造條件。金正恩回應，過去一年多來，朝方為避免局勢緊張、管控半島局勢，採取了許多積極舉措，但沒有得到有關方的積極回應，這是朝方不願看到的；朝方願保持耐心，同時希望有關方同朝方相向而行，探索符合各自合理關切的解決方案，推動半島問題相關對話進程取得成果。這番對話理性而平和，說明中方仍努力在恢複發展對朝關係和促使朝鮮堅持無核化方向之間保持平衡，不會因為加強對朝關係和對沖美國戰略壓力的需要而改變堅持半島無核化政策的底線。同時也表明，朝鮮堅持把無核化談判的重心放在朝美雙邊渠道，只要美國對朝鮮的安全威脅不消除，朝方就無法在涉及半島未來的一系列規划上放開手腳。

習近平利用訪朝推動中國在朝核問題政治解決進程中發揮更直接的作用。他在出訪前發表的文章中指出，“中方願意和朝鮮同志攜手努力，共謀實現地區長治久安的大計”。在與金正恩的會晤中他強調，“中方願為朝方解決自身合理安全和發展關切提供力所能及的幫助，願同朝方及有關各方加強協調和配合，為實現半島無核化和地區長治久安發揮積極建設性作用”。從這兩句關鍵性的表述可以看出，一攬子和平解決半島問題的“中國方案”或“中國路線圖”已在路上，其要義大體是：以朝鮮可核查、可驗證、分階段棄核為前提，大國共同向朝鮮提供不超出自身能力的安全保障和經濟發展援助。總之，堅持無核化方向，在無核化進程中一攬子構建半島和平機制，大國共同擔保朝鮮的合理安全與發展關切，是習近平與金正恩第五次會晤圍繞半島局勢傳遞出來的核心信息。未來這一藍圖如獲實現，中國向朝鮮提供的安全保障有望在軍事安全合作、核安全保證、核材料拆卸等方面得到體現。今年4月普京在符拉迪沃斯托克與金正恩會晤，俄方展現的也是這樣的姿態。

什麼是朝鮮的“合理安全和發展關切”？從長期的六方會談進程和過去兩年朝方與有關各方溝通的情況看，就是終結半島戰爭狀態，朝美簽署互不侵犯條約，並相互給予外交承認，從根本上解決朝鮮政權的合法性和續存問題，以利朝鮮集中精力發展經濟、改善民生、改良體制。相對於“合理安全和發展關切”，是“不合理的安全和發展關切”。朝鮮如置周邊國家安全與利益於不顧，執意繼續發展核導能力，在國際核不擴散體制中謀求與有核國同等的地位，甚至企圖以核訛詐為手段獲得安全利益，通過核導擴散行為賺取外匯，顯然就不屬於“合理的安全和發展關切”。

在即將到來的G20大阪峰會期間，習近平將與特朗普舉行會晤，通報訪朝情況並與美方就朝核問題解決方案做進一步溝通肯定是議題之一。之後，相信各方圍繞朝鮮半島和平與安全問題的接觸將會提速，第三次朝美會晤更加可期，半島持久和平和東北亞次區域合作之門緩緩開啟的勢頭將重新得到加強。

習近平同朝鮮勞動黨委員長、國務委員會委員長金正恩舉行會談

It has been 14 years since the last time a Chinese head of state visited the DPRK.

Kim Jong-un, Chairman of the Worker's Party of Korea (WPK) and Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, invited Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and Chinese President, to make a state visit to the DPRK from June 20 to 21, 2019.

This was Xi's return trip after Kim's previous four visits to China, three in 2018 and one in 2019 since Kim assumed the top leadership of the WPK and the country. Kim has sent multiple invitations to Xi, while China has also delegated top officials including Li Zhanshu, Wang Yi, and Song Tao to visit the DPRK on different occasions. This year celebrates the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, as well as the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. The two sides have come a long way in terms of the relationship between both Parties and countries, laying a sound foundation for Xi's visit to the DPRK.

As the top leader of the DPRK, Kim's past visits to China centered on two agendas: first, to remedy the nose-diving China-DPRK relationship that is shadowed by the nuclear issue and the two countries' differing development paths, in order to secure North Korea's most important source of geopolitical support; second, to discuss with China the DPRK's “new strategic line”, which is shifting away from its previous approach of pursuing nuclear missiles alongside economic growth, towards a new model: a commitment to put economic growth first. Talks with Xi allowed for an exchange of views on DPRK-US negotiations and a chance to win China's support for North Korea's prioritization of economic development. These efforts at coordination effectively alleviated the DPRK's humanitarian predicament brought on by the strictest international sanctions ever. More importantly, they played a key role in preparing the DPRK for talks with the US in June 2018 and February 2019 respectively, so that North Korea could gradually put forward proposals for “phased and synchronized” approach and “suspension for suspension” principle, calling for the suspension of nuclear and long-range missile activities by the DPRK and the suspension of massive military exercises by the US and the Republic of Korea (ROK).

Xi's visit to the DPRK elevated the joint attempt to bring back the special-neighbor relationship to the highest level. Under the theme of “Jointly Blueprinting a Bright Future of the Bilateral Relationship and Opening a New Chapter of the China-DPRK Friendship,” North Korea offered its best welcome including a crowd of 250,000 people, an unprecedent salute at the square of Kumsusam Palace of the Sun and a majestic group calisthenics performance involving 100,000 people. All accentuated how important China is to the DPRK and how special the China-DPRK relationship is. Before starting his visit, Xi published in Rodong Sinmun (Worker's Newspaper) and other major DPRK media, confirming that China and the DPRK are “good comrades and neighbors.”

During his visit, Xi further clarified China's fundamental take on the China-DPRK relationship: essentially, both are socialist countries adhering to the leadership of a Communist party; shared ideals, beliefs, and goals are driving force of the relationship; the continuous friendship between top leaders and the strategic guidance they offer are the two countries' greatest strength; while geographic proximity and cultural affinity offer a firm bond. Xi also confirmed China's resolute support for the DPRK in three aspects: China will resolutely support North Korea's socialist cause, its implementation of the new strategic line, and its efforts to solve the Korean Peninsula issue through political means to create long-term peace and order in the area. These tone-setting events — achieved by fine-tuning both countries' domestic and international policies, and amid profound changes in China's external environment, represented the philosophy of “community of shared future” — and this welcome seemed to be designed to end the contention and hesitation that had long marked China's relationship with the DPRK, and signaled the start of a “new era” for China-DPRK relations. The two sides seem set to build a “community of shared future,” coming soon after Xi's announcement that China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination ushered in a “new era” this June during his state visit to St. Petersburg. So far, China has picked up speed in rearranging its foreign policy strategies across the Eurasian continent.

The Korean Peninsula's nuclear issue was certainly among the top topics during Xi's visit, but the current prospect for denuclearization is still impeded by the relationship between the DPRK and the United States. The Xi-Trump in Hanoi this February failed at the last hurdle, mainly due to huge difficulties in bringing together the DPRK's “phased and synchronized” principle and America's “Libya-style” approach; and also partly because they each had overly high expectations for the other side to make concessions. Nevertheless, the two sides did not stop reaching out even after the failure in Hanoi. On June 11, President Trump confirmed that he has received a letter from Kim Jong-un once again, and that there might be a high chance for them for hold a third meeting. The Korean Central News Agency was authorized to announce on June 23 that Kim received Trump's reply and had positive feelings about the favorable contents of the letter. He also expressed his gratitude to Trump for his “great political judgment and extraordinary courage” and would “give careful thought to the interesting content.”

Though this “interesting content” is kept away from the outside world, it might contain some specific suggestions on solid guarantees the US could offer in exchange for the DPRK's commitment on concrete denuclearization actions. It's very likely that it will be long before the two sides reopen negotiations and hold another meeting between their leaders, owing to feeble mutual trust and the DPRK's adjustment of its negotiating team. However, as the US 2020 presidential election draws near and China-US relations are ever changing, the Trump's administration is eager to close a nuclear deal with the DPRK and has started to reflect on its negotiation strategies. The prospect of reconciliation between the DPRK and the US is still open.

Another context that cannot be ignored in the Korean Peninsula issue, besides the growing contacts between China and the DPRK, is the apparent strategic competition between China and the United States. Some believe that China may distance itself from the DPRK so that the US will ease up in its pressure on China. This will not only help Trump to get the North Koreans back to the negotiating table, but also promote progress for the DPRK to abandon nuclear weapons. However, this stance does not conform to the political logic of China and the DPRK. China has chosen to play a more active role in the Korean peninsula nuclear issue for its own reasons. Regardless of the future of China-US relations, China aims to ease the situation on the peninsula. For the DPRK, direct negotiation with the United States is a path it has already taken, so Kim Jong-un and his comrades will not agree that "the path to Washington must pass through Beijing." On June 20th, to celebrate the 22nd anniversary of Kim Jong Il's book Maintaining Subjectivity and Nationality in Revolution and Construction, a signed article published in Rodong Sinmun described these values of subjectivity and nationality as "the life of the country and the nation"—a reminder of North Korean pride.

Xi's visit to Pyongyang continued to promote dialogue and the “suspension for suspension” principle between the DPRK and the US. Xi said to Kim Jong-un that the international community hopes that the North Korea-US dialogue can continue and bear fruitful results, and that China supports a political settlement for the peninsula, creating conditions to solving problems based on previous experience. Kim Jong-un responded that over the past year, the DPRK has taken many positive measures to avoid tensions and manage the situation on the peninsula, but it has not received positive responses from the relevant parties, a result the DPRK does not wish to see. However, the DPRK is willing to remain patient and hopes that the parties concerned will meet each other halfway, exploring solutions that meet their respective legitimate concerns. The dialogue between Xi and Kim was rational and smooth, indicating that China still strives to maintain a balance between restoring relations with the DPRK and promoting denuclearization, and will adhere to the policy of denuclearization on the peninsula and oppose DPRK's nuclear pursuit — despite the need to strengthen relations with DPRK and offset US strategic pressure on China. At the same time, it also shows that North Korea believes the denuclearization negotiations heavily depend on how the DPRK and the US interact. As long as the US threat to the DPRK is not eliminated, the DPRK will not be able to implement a series of plans concerning the future of the peninsula.

Xi, by going on this trip, managed to promote China's role in the political settlement of the Korean peninsula nuclear issue. In an article published before the visit, he pointed out that "China is willing to work with the DPRK to seek [a] common strategy for long-term stability in the region." In the meeting with Kim Jong-un, he stressed that "China is willing to provide the DPRK with support to the best of its ability to solve its own legitimate security and development concerns. We are committed to strengthening coordination and cooperation with the DPRK and other parties concerned so as to play a positive and constructive role in achieving denuclearization of the peninsula and long-term regional stability." From these two key statements, it can be seen that a "China Plan" or "China Road Map" for a peaceful settlement of the Korean Peninsula issue is in the making, the essence of which is that major countries should do everything possible to jointly provide the DPRK with security guarantees and economic development assistance on the premise of examinable, verifiable phased nuclear dismantlement by the DPRK. If this blueprint is realized in the future, the security guarantees provided by China can be expected to include military security cooperation, nuclear material dismantlement, and nuclear safety assurance.

What are the DPRK's “legitimate security and development concerns”? Judging from the long-term process of the Six-Party Talks and the dialogue between the DPRK and relevant parties in the past two years, it means ending the state of war on the peninsula, signing mutual non-aggression treaties between the DPRK and the US, granting diplomatic recognition to each other, and fundamentally affirming the legitimacy and survival of the regime, so as to help the DPRK focus on the economy, the people's livelihood, and improving the system. What, then, is the opposition to these “legitimate security and development concerns”? The answer is obvious: the DPRK ignores the security and interests of neighboring countries, is determined to continue developing its nuclear weapons, seeks the same status as a nuclear power within the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, and even attempts to obtain security benefits through nuclear blackmail, while cashing in on foreign exchange through the nuclear missile trade.

At the upcoming G20 Osaka Summit, President Xi will meet President Trump to share information about his visit to the DPRK and further communicate with the US on the peninsula's nuclear issue. After that, discussions of peace in Korea and security among all parties will gain momentum, with the expectation of a third meeting between North Korean leadership and the Trump administration. Thus the prospect of lasting peace on the peninsula may be more promising, and cooperation in the Northeast Asian region will gradually gather strength once again.