歐倫斯是美中關係全國委員會會長

周建成：今年上午在卡特中心，您用中文俘獲了聽眾的心。因為您非常自謙地形容自己為“小馬鈴薯”，這令我不禁端坐傾聽。當然這個單詞用英文表達的意思是指……

歐倫斯：小人物。

周：作為一名所謂的“小人物”，您在美國國務院法律顧問辦公室開啟了您的職業生涯，雖然這樣形容自己的人從來都不是什麼小人物。請您談談當時的生活，以及是什麼樣的機遇讓您接觸到了中國？

歐倫斯：一切都源於我的家庭。我的母親是移居美國的移民。我的祖父母也是移居美國的移民。在我成長的家庭，我們被教導如果不是因為美國政府和美國人民，我們壓根不會存在，我們會在歐洲消亡。我的家人是來自歐洲的猶太移民，他們很可能死於納粹魔爪，或俄羅斯大屠殺。因此他們會說，我的兄弟、姐妹和我應該以服務來回報美國人民。所以我在成長過程中一直夢想去西點軍校讀書。但越南戰爭爆發了，而我覺得這並非我想要追尋的道路，當時的我極其反戰。相反，我到哈佛讀了本科。然後在1970年4月30日，尼克松總統宣布入侵柬埔寨，這是美國把越戰從越南擴大到柬埔寨的戰略。哈佛爆發了激烈的抗議活動，以至於學校不得不停課。所以在哈佛的最後一天，我找到了一位受人尊敬的教授，告訴他我想了解為什麼美國政府這樣的“好人”卻要做發動越南戰爭這樣的壞事。我想學習越南語。這位教授說：“史蒂夫，如果你真的想要了解亞洲和這個世界正在發生些什麼，你應該學習中文。”說完這些，他轉身準備離開，但隨即又轉過身來看着我，並說：“順便一提，如果你想學習中文，我會幫你申請一份獎學金。明天到我辦公室來。”我們的整個對話不超過60秒。第二天，我來到他的辦公室，填了一張國防外語補助金申請表。大約三周後，我得到了這份補助金，開始學習中文。因此，這段不超過60秒的對話開啟了我與中國一生的羈絆。大學畢業後，我決定去台灣提高自己的中文，在那裡我堅持15個月只講中文。隨後我回到哈佛法學院學習。畢業後，我加入了美國國務院。大約一年後，國務院發覺在他們的法律顧問辦公室有一個會說中文的律師。因此我被派往幫助籌備與中國建交的工作小組。卡特總統很早就認定了，美國將與中國建立外交關係。我當時所在的團隊，這正是最有趣的部分以及為什麼我稱自己為“小馬鈴薯”，擁有很多將軍，卻沒有幾個小兵。因此作為僅有的幾個小兵之一的我才有機會去做一些對於一個27、28歲的年輕人來說非比尋常的工作。

周：您認為為什麼您的教授告訴您中文是了解整個亞洲大陸的窗口？

歐倫斯：這是因為亞洲的古代史在很大程度上是用中文書寫的。他給了我一個了解亞洲的平台，而事實證明他的選擇是正確的。順便一提，他還說過：“這場戰爭結束後，中文或許也會派上用場。” 這句話令人難以置信地先知先覺！

周：那是在上世紀70年代早期？

歐倫斯：1970年4月30日是美國入侵柬埔寨的日子。正是因為戰爭擴大，所以我非常清楚地記得這個日子。包括我在5月1日與那位哈佛教授的對話，伍德賽德教授。

周：所以幾乎恰好在那場對話發生九年後，在這位教授改變了你人生幾乎十年後，鄧小平出訪美國。他在1979年1月底會見卡特總統時，他們談到了戰爭，包括柬埔寨和越南，還包括中國、日本和二戰。他們談論這些的目的是確保與中國恢復邦交後他們不會為兩國之間的任何戰爭承擔責任。是這樣么？

歐倫斯：隨着時間的流逝，我們忘記了當時美中關係的基礎是反蘇聯盟，對於中國和美國而言，存亡威脅都是蘇聯。而尼克松在1972年開啟，隨後卡特在1979年1月1日與中國建立外交關係的原因就是鞏固反蘇聯盟，他們認為這將防止戰爭。

周：您曾談到兩國政府令事態回歸正軌的能力。眼下兩國關係正處於一個非常棘手的狀態。當然，我們無法斷言這僅僅是現任政府的問題。究竟是什麼樣的暗流令這兩國從歡慶共同勝利走到了今天的境地，也就是吉米·卡特說的“一場現代冷戰”並非難以想像？

歐倫斯：這裡存在多種因素，包括美國的變化導致我們為發生在本國的問題尋找原因，包括中國的政策強化了部分想要將雙邊關係描述成戰略競爭對手的美國人的立場。因此，這是兩國政府的所作所為共同導致的結果。在這個時代最令人擔憂的是，問題遠不止政府這麼簡單。在美國，此前作為建設性美中關係支持者的學界、智庫、企業現在都改弦更張。當中國學生被拒簽，每個人，智庫、學術機構和商界，都應當抗議，因為這最終會傷害美國。這對美國有害無益。這不僅對美中關係有害無益，也對美國這樣一個矗立於教育之巔的明亮光輝之城有害無益。雖然人們正在發起抗議，但抗議的強度和規模都低於預期，因為中國的很多政策已經令那些曾經支持建設性雙邊關係的人們對中國感到失望。

周：當您往來奔走，遊說業界，無論是商界、學界還是政界時，他們怎麼看？

歐倫斯：作為美中關係壓艙石的商界已經厭倦了聽中國說一些根本不會兌現的承諾。你也在今天的會場上聽到中國如何在加入WTO後17年依然不履行承諾。你聽到了（美中貿易全國委員會主席）克雷格·艾倫談到他們將儘快遵守的政府採購協議。17年可不是什麼儘快。已經越來越遲了。我們聽說很多承諾最終都沒有兌現。作為一個無可救藥的樂觀派 ，作為一個過去40年見證了諸多變化的人，我依然相信這些承諾終將被兌現。但現在美國商界中瀰漫著一股巨大的挫敗感，而這種挫敗感的表現就是商界在美中關係議題上不再像以往那樣立場堅定。而由於中國對教育領域的壓制，由於中國拒絕給曾經批評過中國的美國學者簽發籤證，由於中國政府時常試圖影響美國的學術討論，這些都令曾強力支持美中關係的美國學界開始走向分裂。依然有美國學者支持美中建設性關係，但也有很多人選擇不再發聲。很多人相信我們應當擁有對等政策，如果中國政府禁止美國的某些做法，那麼美國也應以其人之道還施彼身。因此，如果美國政府，如果美國新聞署想要在全中國不同的大學開設“美國角”，他們無法做到。但中國在美國開設了超過100家孔子學院，因此美國學界就會說：“我們應當實施對等原則。如果中國不允許美國人開設'美國角'，那麼美國也不應允許中國開設孔子學院。”美國記者認為他們在中國遭受了不公待遇。如果每次一位美國記者被公安邀請去喝茶，我就可以得到1美元，那麼我將變得比現在有錢得多，因為這種事情太過頻繁。中國對於外國記者工作的干涉非同尋常。這導致美國政府現在要求中國CCTV和新華社註冊為外國代理人。風險在於這將成為對等限制，而這是極具破壞力的。但這些曾支持美中進行建設性接觸的業界已經不再支持這種方式了。智庫的情況與學界相似。他們厭倦了會議被迫取消。他們厭倦了用英文編撰的報告被翻譯成中文，而且翻譯的還不準確。因此，智庫也不再像以往那樣是美中關係的強力支持者了。這些政策很糟糕，並不符合中國自身的利益。但美國現在欠缺的是將這些政策放置到合適的語境中去理解。中國正在尋求取代美國成為世界頭號大國么？答案是中國顯然不這麼想。中國政府關注的是維護國內穩定和自身政權，這並非意味着取代美國成為世界頭號大國。中國的歷史、文化和當前的問題決定了中國未來50年要做的事。但問題是，美中兩國曾經的美中建設性關係支持者們現在不再是支持者了。

周：聽了您的所感所想，過去40年的一個重要標誌就是信任、遠見以及做出歷史性決斷的勇氣與果敢，正如鄧小平和卡特在1978年12月和1979年1月所展示出來的那樣。那麼現在有哪些擁有影響力的合適人選？我不是指總統，而是可以施加影響的社會團體？如果像您所言他們也備感挫敗，那麼他們感到挫敗的原因也是同樣么？

歐倫斯：我一直都相信美國政府。多年來我一直認為美國政府高層中缺乏中國專家。在整個中國政府中，你能找到曾經在美國學習的人。他們通常非常了解美國。一些人用英文同我交流，一些人用中文同我交流，但他們都擁有在美國學習生活的經歷。現在美國政府高層中，除了趙小蘭，還有誰真正懂中國？趙小蘭是中國人，她出生在台灣，她會說流利的中文，但她的職責所在並非中國。在奧巴馬政府期間我曾這樣覺得。（中國駐美國大使）崔天凱能用英文與美國人民交流，也非常了解美國。他是建設性接觸的一個中堅力量。我覺得要想在中國找到一個能夠同中國人民用中文交流、表達觀點的美國人，我們只能在前輩中國通中尋找。

周：您曾說您正是因為自身的語言能力而被發掘和提拔的。

歐倫斯：嗯，在當時的美國政府里，沒有其他會說中文的律師了。

周：您認為現在有更多這樣的人么？

歐倫斯：不，我覺得沒有。

周：一些人會說，這與大批中國學生遠赴美國求學類似，因為美國向中國敞開了教育大門，讓這些學生不僅事業有成，生活上也收穫良多。美國學生在中國的情況也是如此么？

歐倫斯：在中國的美國學生人數要少得多。我們現在有35萬中國學生在美國學習，但在中國學習的美國學生只有2萬。

周：為什麼會出現這種情況？是因為美國學生對中國不感興趣，還是中國不夠開放？

歐倫斯：中國學生來美國學習不是為了促進美中關係。他們來美國是因為美國擁有世界上最先進的教育體系，而對於中國人來說學習英語是他們的生存根本。但對於美國人而言，學習中文卻並非如此。對於他們來說，遠赴中國學習通常比較困難。我接觸過的一個項目在這方面就做得非常出色，清華大學的蘇世民學者項目。這個項目不僅招收美國人，還有英國人、法國人、日本人以及來自世界各地的學子，他們通過這個項目到中國的清華大學學習一年。他們是未來的領袖，我們將給予他們在中國生活的全部經驗。他們不會成為中國學者，但他們至少會對這裡正在發生的事情擁有一些了解。這有點像英國的羅德獎學金項目。這個項目已經擁有超過100年的歷史。美國人遠赴英國學習，加深了對英國的了解，回到美國後，他們成為各行各業的領袖。

周：我想以一個樂觀的調子結束今天的採訪，因為樂觀主義是前進路上的必備情緒。您曾談到當下的事態發展令您深感擔憂，但讓我們把眼光放長遠。您在最開始談到了戰爭與衝突。自從1979年中國和美國決定恢復邦交之後，沒有一名美國士兵在東亞的戰場上犧牲。這種觀點會給我們何種基礎向前推進中美關係，我們又該如何在其他議題上應用這種觀點？

歐倫斯：美國已經忘記了直到1979年亞洲是何等動蕩不安，又有多少美國人在這裡丟掉性命。所有攻擊美中建交、攻擊美國對華實施接觸政策的人們都未指出美國人從此在亞洲不再丟掉性命 。這可不是什麼小事。我於1972年前往亞洲，當時在越南每天都有美國士兵死去。妖魔化中國的代價並未被完全認清，中國追隨美國這種政策的代價在中國也並未被徹底認清。我之所以大談特談氣候變化的原因就在於超級颶風“桑迪”衝擊了我的家，所以我認識到氣候變化對紐約市的影響。我看到上海坐落在長江河岸，海拔也並不高。因此氣候變化將帶來毀滅性的影響，引發種種事故，如果這個地域遭到颶風襲擊，這就需要各國政府攜起手來。流行病的防控也是一樣，無論是新型SARS還是新型埃博拉病毒。總會發生一些事件需要美中兩國攜手合作。你無法預測未來將會發生什麼，但該來的總會來。或者會爆發一場恐怖襲擊，要求美國和中國必須協同合作，或者一場日益惡化的經濟危機，讓美國或中國人意識到我們需要合作。最終，進行這種妖魔化的不是大多數美國人，也不是大多數中國人，而是一小撮人，他們相信這符合他們的國家利益。我不會質疑他們的信仰。我只是認為這從根本上是錯的。我每天都會搭乘紐約地鐵，我會觀察思考為什麼地鐵再也無法發揮作用。這是因為我們作為一個國家，作為紐約市市民，作為紐約州州民，未能對其進行投資。這部分是由於我們在軍事開支上花費了7000億美元，而軍事開支對於提升社會的基礎設施建設毫無益處。因此人們將逐漸意識到，他們將最終告訴他們的政府，我們不能繼續在這條路上走下去了。我們需要追尋一條合作之路。終有一天，這將到來。我無法告訴你下個月或明年，事情就會朝着這個方向發展，但我可以肯定的是這終將會發生，因為最終美中兩國的人民將告訴他們的政府我們應當怎麼做。自1972年接待訪美的中國乒乓球隊後，美中關係全國委員會一直致力於促進美中兩國間的人員交流，我們深知這些紐帶更加強韌，這些紐帶將把兩國聯結到一起。因此，這就是為什麼說到底我是一個樂觀派。

周：我只是希望，當您談到在抗擊流行病、扭轉貿易戰負面影響、應對恐怖主義或抵禦氣候變化等領域分享數據時，人們不會意識到的太晚。

歐倫斯：遺憾的是，我覺得我們現在需要一場危機來讓兩國再次攜手合作。眼下，讓人們相信美中對抗對於社會而言代價巨大是非常困難的。搭乘地鐵的時候我正在讀《國防戰略》報告，我觀察了一下周圍的人們，令我難過的是這些通勤路上的人們正在為這個糟糕的戰略付出代價，而他們並不自知。

周：史蒂夫·歐倫斯，非常感謝您將這些置於人民的語境下，一個很多人面臨掙扎的語境下。

您可以在此（鏈接）收聽周建成與歐倫斯的對話。

Stephen Orlins is President of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations

JAMES CHAU: You captivated the audience this morning at the Carter Center with your Chinese, and you made me sit up because you very self-deprecatingly described yourself as xiao tudou [小馬鈴薯] which of course in English means…

STEPHEN ORLINS: Small potato.

JC: You started life as a so-called “small potato” – though people who describe themselves as such never really are – in the legal department at the U.S. State Department. Tell me about life then and what brought you into contact with China?

SO: It started with my family. My mother was an immigrant to the United States. My paternal grandparents were immigrants to the United States. I grew up in a family where we were taught that, but for the American government and the American people, we wouldn't exist, we would have perished in Europe. They were European immigrants and Jewish immigrants, and they would have died under the Nazis, or in a Russian pogrom. My parents said that my brother, sister and I owed a debt of service to the American people, and I grew up thinking that I would go to West Point. But the war in Vietnam intervened and I decided that wasn't the route I wanted to take – I was very anti-war – and instead, I ended up going to Harvard College. Then, on April 30th, 1970, President Nixon announced the invasion of Cambodia, the extension of the American war in Vietnam to Cambodia. Harvard erupted in protest so terrible that the school ended up canceling classes. So, on the last day I was at Harvard, I went to a respected professor and said I wanted to understand why good people – the American government – do bad things like the war in Vietnam, and that I wanted to study Vietnamese. He said, “Steve, if you really want to understand Asia and what's going on, you should study Chinese”. He turned to go away, but then turned back, looked at me, and said, “By the way, if you want to study Chinese, I'll get you a fellowship. Come to my office tomorrow”. This entire conversation lasted less than 60 seconds. I went to his office the next day, filled out a form for a National Defense Foreign Language grant, which I was then given about three weeks later to start the study of Chinese. This less than 60-second conversation began a life-long relationship with China. When I graduated college, I decided to perfect my Chinese by going to Taiwan, where I only spoke Chinese for about 15 months. Then I went to Harvard Law School. When I graduated law school, I joined the U.S. State Department, who discovered after about a year that they had this Chinese speaking lawyer in the legal advisor's office. I was then put on the team that was going to help establish diplomatic relations with China, which President Carter early-on decided we were going to do. I was put on a team where, interestingly, and why I call myself a xiao tudou, there were a lot of chiefs and very few Indians. So as one of the few Indians, I got to do things which for a 27, 28-year old, were truly extraordinary.

JC: Why do you think your professor gave you the language of Chinese as a vista to understanding an entire continent?

SO: Because the ancient history of Asia was substantially written in Chinese, and so he was giving me a platform to understand Asia, which turned out to be true. He also, by the way, added, “Maybe Chinese might be useful after this war is over” – which was incredibly prophetic!

JC: This was the early 1970's?

SO: It was 1970. April 30th was the invasion of Cambodia, a date I remember with incredible clarity because of the expansion of the war. And then May 1st was the conversation I had with the Harvard professor, Professor Woodside.

JC: So almost exactly nine years after that conversation, almost an entire decade after your professor transformed your life, Deng Xiaoping went to the United States. When he met with Jimmy Carter in late January 1979, they talked about war, including Cambodia and Vietnam, and also China, Japan, and World War Two. They talked about it so that they would ensure that, in normalizing the Chinese relationship, they would not be responsible for any wars between them. Is that correct?

SO: We forget over time that the original basis for the U.S.-China relationship was an anti-Soviet alliance. The existential threat to both China and the United States was the Soviet Union, and the reason Nixon opened in 1972 and then Carter established diplomatic relations on January 1st, 1979, was to cement the anti-Soviet alliance, which would in their view prevent war.

JC: You've talked about the capacity of both governments to set things back on track. The relationship is at a very tricky stage, and surely we can't say it's just about the current administration. What's been the undercurrent that has brought these two countries from celebration, to the point where Jimmy Carter says a “modern Cold War” is not inconceivable?

SO: Numerous factors: from changes in the U.S. which lead us to look for a cause for the problems here, to Chinese policies that have strengthened those in the United States who want to characterize the relationship as strategic rivals. It's a combination of what both governments have done. What's most troubling in this era is that it's much deeper than governments. In the United States, academics, think-tanks, and businesses that formerly were supporters of constructive U.S.-China relations are not today. When Chinese students are denied visas, everyone- think tanks, academic institutions, the business community- should protest, because ultimately that decision is terrible for the United States. It's not just bad for U.S.-China relations, it's bad for America as the bright shining city on the hill of education. People are protesting, but it's not in the strength and numbers you expect, because many Chinese policies have made those who formally supported constructive relations unhappy with China.

JC: When you go out and speak to these communities, whether it be business, academic, or political, what do they say?

SO: The business community, which was really the ballast for the U.S.-China relationship, is tired of hearing promises which are not implemented from China. You heard today talk about China's entry into the WTO and how 17 years later commitments are not fulfilled. You heard Craig Allen [President of the U.S.-China Business Council] talk about the government procurement agreement that they would adhere to as soon as possible. Seventeen years is not as soon as possible. It's getting late. We hear many commitments which ultimately are not implemented. As an eternal optimist, somebody who's seen the changes that I've seen in 40 years, I still believe that a lot of the promises that are made will ultimately be implemented. But there's great frustration in the business community. That's reflected in them not taking as strong a stand as they would have on issues relating to the U.S.-China relationship. The crackdowns on education in China, denying visas to academics from the United States who have written negatively about China, the Chinese government at times trying to influence academic discussions in the United States, has all caused the U.S. academic community, which used to be so strong in its support, to become divided. There still are those who support constructive relations, but there are many who don't speak out. There are many who believe we should have reciprocal policies, where if the Chinese don't allow something, then the U.S. shouldn't allow something. If the U.S. government wants to set up “America corners” in different Chinese universities around China, they're not able to do that. But China has over 100 Confucius Institutes in the United States. So academics say, “Let's have it be reciprocal, so if China doesn't allow America to do it, then America should prevent China from doing it”. American journalists believe that they are not treated well in China. If I had a dollar for every time an American journalist is invited to have tea with public security, I would have a lot more money than I do, because it's done far too often. The interference in foreign journalists' work in China is substantial. So that's led the U.S. government now to require CCTV and Xinhua to register as foreign agents. The risk is that these are then going to become reciprocal restrictions, which is extremely damaging. These U.S. communities, which formerly supported constructive engagement, aren't now. What I said about academics applies to think-tanks. They get tired of having conferences canceled. They get tired of having things they write in English translated into Chinese and not translated accurately. So, they are no longer as strong a supporter as they were. These policies are not good. They are not in China's own interests. But what's lacking in the U.S. is putting those policies in context. Is China seeking to replace the United States as the world's leading power? The answer is, it's really not. The Chinese government is interested in maintaining stability in China and maintaining their power, which does not mean replacing America as the number one power in the world. Chinese history, culture, and current problems dictate what they're going to do for the coming 50 years. But the problem is that the constituencies on both sides who were supporters before are not supporters today.

JC: One of the hallmarks of the 40 years, bearing in mind everything that you just said, has been trust, far-sightedness, and the bravery and courage required to make historic decisions as these two men did in December 1978 and leading into January 1st, 1979. Are there the right people in positions of influence right now? And I'm not saying presidents, but communities who are able to do that. Is there the same incentive, if they feel discouraged as you said?

SO: I always believe in the United States government. And I have believed for many years that we don't have sufficient China expertise at senior levels. You can go through the Chinese government and find people who have studied in the United States. They actually know the United States pretty well. Some of them talk to me in English, some of them talk to me in Chinese, but there is this experience. Except for Elaine Chao today, who in senior levels of the U.S. government really knows China? Elaine is Chinese, born in Taiwan, she speaks fluent Chinese, but her responsibility is not China. I felt that in the Obama administration too. [China's Ambassador to the U.S.] Cui Tiankai can communicate to the American people in English and understands America extremely well. He becomes a force for constructive engagement. You have to go pretty far back to find the equivalent American in China who can speak to the Chinese people in Chinese and convey what is going on.

JC: You said that you were noticed and hand-selected because of your linguistic abilities?

SO: Well, there were no other Chinese-speaking lawyers in the United States government.

JC: Do you think there are many more today?

SO: No, I think not.

JC: Some people would look and say that it is similar to how Chinese students have come to the United States in droves as the U.S. has opened up its educational gateway and allowed them to truly flourish, not only in their careers but also in their lives, but can the same been said of the reverse?

SO: It's much smaller. Whereas we have 350,000 Chinese students here in the United States, we have 20,000 American students in China.

JC: And why is that? Is that due to lack of interest or a lack of openness?

SO: The Chinese students are not coming here to work on U.S.-China relations. They're coming here because we have the best university system in the world, and learning English for Chinese is fundamental to their existence. Whereas for an American, learning in Chinese is not fundamental. So, for them to go to China and study is often difficult. One program I've been associated with that has been fabulous in that regard is the Schwarzman Scholars program in Tsinghua University, which is bringing not only Americans but Brits, French, Japanese, and students from all over the world to China to study at Tsinghua for year. These are future leaders, and we will give them all the experience of having lived in China. They won't be China's scholars, but they will at least have some knowledge of what has gone on, similar to the Rhodes Scholarship in England, which has been around for 100 years. The Americans that have gone there and have understood the UK, and have come back to the United States in leadership positions has been fantastic.

JC: I want to end on an optimistic note, because optimism must be a necessary emotion in order to find a way forward. You've talked about being deeply troubled by the current course, but let's take the long-term view of this. You started off by talking about war and conflict. There have been no battlefield in which American soldiers have lost their lives in East Asia since the normalization of the U.S.-China relationship in 1979. What foundation does that give us going forward, and how should we apply it for other issues?

SO: We've lost sight in the United States of how tumultuous Asia was up until 1979, and the number of deaths of Americans. None of the people attacking the establishment of diplomatic relations, attacking the policy of engagement that the United States has had, point out that Americans stopped dying. That's a huge deal. I went to Asia in '72 when Americans were dying by the day in Vietnam. The cost of demonization of China is not fully recognized in the U.S., and the cost of the kind of policies that China is following towards the United States are not fully recognized in China. The reason I talk so much about climate change is that I was flooded out of my home during Superstorm Sandy, and I saw what climate change did to New York City. I see that Shanghai sits on the banks of the Yangtze River, and not very much above it. Climate change is going to have a devastating effect, and there will be some incident that's going to require governments to get together. The same is true of pandemics, whether it's a new SARS or a new Ebola or something else. There's going to be an event which requires the United States and China to work together. You can't predict what it's going to be, but it's going to come. Or there will be a terrorist incident that requires joint cooperation, or the economic crisis will deteriorate so much that the people in the United States or in China will recognize that we need to cooperate. Ultimately, this demonization is not coming from the majority of Americans and it's not from the majority of Chinese. It's a small group that believes that this is in the national interest. I believe it is fundamentally wrong. I take the New York subway every day, and I watch how it doesn't work. It doesn't work anymore because we as a country, we as citizens of New York City, of New York state, have failed to invest. And that in part is because we spend $700 billion on military expenditures which have no benefit to the infrastructure of society. People are going to recognize that, and they're going to ultimately tell the government that we can't go down this path, we need to go down a path of cooperation. That will happen one day. I can't tell you if it's going to happen next month or next year, but I'm sure it will happen. Having worked on people-to-people exchanges between the United States and China since the Committee hosted the Chinese ping pong team in 1972, we know that those bonds are strong and they're going to pull the two countries together. So that's why in the end I'm an optimist.

JC: I hope that, when you talk about sharing data on a health pandemic, or reversing the effects of the trade war, or addressing terrorism or climate change, that it won't be too late when this realization happens?

SO: Sadly, I think it will require a crisis to pull us back together. Right now, it's very tough to persuade people that this confrontation has enormous cost to society. I was reading the National Defense Strategy when I was on the subway, and I looked around at the people around me, and it saddened me because these people, who are just going to their everyday jobs, are paying the price for this bad strategy, they just don't know it.

James Chau: Steve Orlins, thank you very much for putting this into a context of people, and the struggles that many face today.

You can listen to this conversation with James Chau and Stephen Orlins.