普密蓬·阿杜德國王10月13日去世後，泰國進入了一個相當關鍵、如履薄冰的過渡期，王位將從世界上在位時間最長的國王傳給王儲瑪哈·哇集拉隆功。王儲預定於12月1日繼位，但加冕典禮要等到一年之後。他父親在過去70年統治期間獲得泰國人民高度愛戴，新國王在這方面很難比肩其父，這增加了發生內部動亂的可能。因此，無論是皇位繼承還是日常政務，目前都由軍政府總理巴育·占奧差將軍掌控，他在2014年軍事政變中奪取了政權。

根據軍政府頒佈的新憲法，泰國很可能在2018年舉行大選，選出新一屆政府。不過，在大選後軍方很可能繼續通過某種方式控制政權。新憲法規定，議會上院的議員均由軍方指定，並保留指定而非選舉產生總理的可能性。圈內人預計，2018年之後巴育將作為符合憲法程序的總理繼續控制泰國政治。

2014年軍事政變以來，泰國變得日趨關注國內事務，外交政策有所收縮。美泰關係在此期間有所惡化。美國法律規定，民選政府被軍事政變推翻之後，所有援助必須暫停發放。因此，逾400萬美元本該撥付給泰國的安全援助款被推遲，每年一度的美泰“金色眼鏡蛇”軍事演習規模也被縮小，但所幸並未完全暫停。作為美國的長期安全盟友，這些限制令泰國軍政府和巴育非常惱火。曼谷還對華盛頓批評軍政府限制政治和公民自由感到不滿。

兩大盟友關係陷入僵局給了中國改善與泰國關係的機會，事實上兩國關係在過去20年里持續發展。在北京的“一帶一路”倡議中，泰國的位置非常重要：規劃中旨在促進中國和東南亞貿易的南北向鐵路將穿過老撾、泰國、馬來西亞，最終抵達新加坡（雖然由於泰國政府認為北京目前的金融條款不太具有吸引力，因此尚未成為這一鐵路的正式合作夥伴）。由於泰國和中國在南海沒有領土爭議，因此泰國通常不願在中國和東南亞國家的領土糾紛中選邊，這也令北京感到滿意。得益於中泰2003年達成的雙邊自由貿易協定，中國已成為泰國最大貿易夥伴，雖然日本和美國是更重要的投資來源國。

由於軍事政變後美泰關係出現裂隙，泰國和中國的安全關係大幅增進，兩軍如今聯合展開海陸空軍事演習，雖然這些演習的規模還不能和美泰軍事合作相比（即便考慮到目前的種種限制）。泰國已簽署協議將向中國購買三艘潛艇。在政治領域，巴育政府更傾向於不向中國異見分子提供庇護，遣返那些被聯合國視為難民的中國維吾爾族人。而北京也盡量避免批評巴育政府對政治異見分子的鎮壓。

不過，雖然泰國、中國、美國存在複雜三角關係，但這種關係並不是零和遊戲。曼谷的地區力量平衡術頗為老道——泰國人將這種頗具彈性的政策稱為“竹子外交”，這令泰國在19世紀成功避免了被西方殖民的命運。泰國領導人認為，同時與北京和華盛頓維持良好關係不存在衝突，雖然他們也偶爾利用一方對付另一方。當與一方關係出現問題時，曼谷就會適度倒向另一方。此外，泰國的權力平衡術也並不總盯着中美兩國。在巴育政府治下，泰國和俄羅斯的關係回暖，在英國公投“脫歐”之後，曼谷還從同時與英國和歐洲大陸增進關係中看到機遇。

在唐納德·特朗普意外當選美國總統之後，曼谷可能開始改善與華盛頓的關係：

首先，泰國並不是跨太平洋夥伴關係協定（TPP）成員，儘管巴育曾表達過加入這一協定的意願。如果特朗普兌現競選承諾退出TPP，並着手新的雙邊貿易協議，華盛頓和曼谷或可重啟兩國自由貿易協議談判。之前的談判於2006年擱淺，部分是因為當時的總理他信·西那瓦遭遇政治危機，如今更為穩固的政權有助於達成自由貿易協議。

其次，美泰安全同盟和美國在亞洲的其他盟友關係（例如與日本、韓國和菲律賓）顯著不同，因此特朗普對盟友極具爭議的態度反而可能有利於美泰同盟發展。這是因為，對美泰安全同盟來說，分攤安保成本並不是個問題，並且美國目前似乎從這種同盟關係中獲益更多。泰國並沒有特別重大的外部安全威脅需要美國保護，而美國則依賴這個弱小盟友提供基地來補給、維修艦船和飛機，並允許美軍飛越領空。如果泰國新政府能協助擴大美國海軍在太平洋的存在，正如特朗普所希望的那樣，在越南戰爭期間美泰聯合建設的海軍基地烏塔保或將成為這一計劃中的咽喉要地。

再次，特朗普對氣候問題缺乏興趣對泰國來說既是利好也是利空。總體來看，東南亞將直接受氣候變化影響，並且近年泰國遭遇了越來越多的季風雨和洪水。不過，泰國也面臨要求放棄參與湄公河大壩修建的壓力，因為這可能給下游國家帶來嚴重生態影響。雖然這些大壩目前正在老撾境內建設，但泰國將是水電站所發電力的主要消費者。

最後，特朗普在選戰期間沒有打人權牌，不管對錯，這讓曼谷認為美國新政府不會高調關注這一問題。這可能使因為軍政府限制政治自由導致的兩國緊張關係有所緩和。軍政府預計，如果希拉里當選，兩國緊張關係可能持續下去。

如果特朗普政府提供改善美泰關係的機會，曼谷很可能將充分利用。不過，華盛頓能收穫些什麼，只有等到特朗普外交政策方針明確成型後才能評估。

When King Bhumipol Adulyadej died on October 13, Thailand entered a profound and long-feared transition, from the world's longest-serving monarch to his heir, Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn. The Crown Prince is scheduled to be proclaimed king on December 1, but will not be crowned for at least a year. He is not expected to enjoy the high regard - indeed the reverence - of the Thai people that his father had accrued over a seventy-year reign, which raises fears of internal instability. As a result, both the royal transition and daily governmental affairs are managed by the military government of Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-ocha, who seized power in the 2014 coup.

Under the new constitution midwifed by the junta, elections will take place to select a new government, most likely in 2018. However, the possibilities of prolonged military rule in some form after that are considerable. The constitution mandates an appointed upper house in parliament, whose members will be chosen by the military, and allows for the possibility that the prime minister can be appointed rather than elected. The smart money is on Prayuth's continued domination of politics as a constitutionally-approved prime minister after 2018.

Since the 2014 coup, Thailand has been inward-looking, with a scaled-down foreign policy. In this interval, U.S.-Thailand relations have deteriorated. U.S. law requires that assistance be withheld when a government is overthrown by a military coup. Over $4 million in U.S. security assistance to Thailand was therefore suspended, and the annual Cobra Gold exercises were downsized, although they were not halted altogether. As a longstanding security ally of the United States, these restrictions rankled the Thai military and Prayuth in particular. Bangkok also objected to Washington's criticism of the junta's suppression of political and civic liberties.

This state of affairs between the two allies has provided opportunities for China to advance relations with Thailand, which had been expanding gradually for two decades. Thailand is critical to Beijing's One Belt, One Road regional framework: the planned north-south railway that will facilitate Chinese trade with Southeast Asia will run through Laos, Thailand and Malaysia to Singapore (although the Thai government is not yet a formal partner, since it finds Beijing's current financial terms to be unfavorable.) Thailand is not a claimant to the contested islands in the South China Sea and for the most part declines to take a position on China's sovereignty disputes with the Southeast Asian claimants, which often works in Beijing's favor. China is Thailand's largest trading partner (although Japan and the United States are more significant investors), aided by the 2003 China-Thailand Free Trade Agreement.

With U.S.-Thailand disaffection over the coup, Thai security relations with China have expanded to the point that the two militaries now conduct joint land, naval and air exercises, although these are still modest in comparison to cooperation between the Thai and U.S. militaries, even with the present restrictions. Thailand has contracted to purchase three submarines from China. On the political side, the Prayuth government has shown greater willingness to deny sanctuary to Chinese dissidents; over the past year, Bangkok has willingly returned to China Uighurs that the United Nations had classified as refugees. For its part, Beijing has assiduously refrained from criticizing the Prayuth government's crackdown on political dissent.

But although there is a triangular nature to Thailand's relations with China and the United States, it would be a mistake to view that dynamic as zero-sum. Bangkok is a supreme balancer of regional powers - a flexible practice the Thais describe as “bamboo diplomacy” - which enabled Thailand to avoid Western colonization in the 19th century. Thai leaders see no conflict in forging equally strong relations with Beijing and Washington, although they are not above playing one against the other on occasion. If relations with one power suffer a downturn, Bangkok will lean toward the other, but to a limited degree. Moreover, Thailand looks beyond the China-U.S. nexus in its balancing act. Under Prayuth, Thai relations with Russia have warmed, and Bangkok sees opportunities to strengthen relations with both Britain and the Continent in the aftermath of Brexit.

With the surprise election of Donald Trump, Bangkok may find openings to improve relations with Washington:

1. The U.S.-Thailand security alliance is significantly different from other U.S. alliances in Asia (with Japan, South Korea and the Philippines) and may therefore fare better under Trump's critical approach to alliances. Burden-sharing is less of an issue; indeed, the United States arguably benefits from the alliance more than Thailand does at present. Thailand has no major external security threat from which it needs protection, while the U.S. depends upon its smaller ally for access to bases for refueling and repair of ships and planes, as well as flyover rights. If the new administration moves to expand the U.S. naval presence in the Pacific, as Trump has indicated it will, Utapao, the Thai naval base jointly developed with the United States during the Vietnam War, could become a critical chokepoint in that plan.

2. Thailand is not a member of the TransPacific Trade Partnership (TPP), although Prayuth has expressed interest in joining at some point. If, as he promised in the campaign, Trump eschews the TPP in favor of bilateral trade agreements, Washington and Bangkok may revive talks on a U.S.-Thailand Free Trade Agreement. Those foundered in 2006, in part because then-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was failing politically, but the FTA may succeed under a more stable regime.

3. Trump's expressed lack of interest in the environment could be both an advantage and a detriment to Thailand. Overall, Southeast Asia will be acutely affected by climate change and in recent years Thailand has experienced more severe monsoon rains and resulting floods. However, Bangkok would also be under less pressure to abandon its participation in the construction of dams on the Mekong, which will have a severe ecological impact on the downriver countries. Although these dams are being built on the Laotian side of the river, Thailand will be the major consumer of the electricity they will produce.

4. Trump did not raise human rights during the campaign which, rightly or wrongly, has led Bangkok to assume they will not have a high profile in the new administration. This could reduce bilateral tensions over the military's restrictions on political freedoms, which the junta had anticipated would continue if Clinton had won the election.

If the Trump administration offers opportunities to improve U.S.-Thai relations, Bangkok will likely move to maximize them. What gains Washington may reap, however, can only be calculated when the shape and direction of a Trump foreign policy are more clearly defined.