中國經濟對出口，尤其是對美國出口的依賴，近年來已顯著下降（對包括美國在內的外國直接投資的依賴亦有所減弱）。2024年，產品與服務出口佔中國GDP的比重為21.2%，2025年第一季度則降至19.2%；相比之下，2006年這一比例曾高達35.5%。2024年，中國產品與服務的凈出口（即貿易順差）佔GDP的比重為4.37%，而2007年曾達到8.55%的峰值。2024年，對美產品與服務出口相當於中國GDP的2.9%，而2006年高達7.5%（對美出口現在約佔中國出口總額的14%）。2024年，對美產品與服務凈出口佔中國GDP的1.74%，而2006年曾達到5%的峰值（見圖表1與圖表2）。值得注意的是，2024年的出口數據可能偏高，部分原因是中國企業為應對即將實施的關稅而加快了對美出口。以上種種跡象表明，新增關稅對中國出口以及對中國經濟的整體影響，可能沒有外界預期的那麼強烈。

根據中美雙方最新設定的關稅稅率（美國對中國進口商品加征145%的關稅，中國對自美進口商品加征125%的關稅），雙邊貿易已無實際可能繼續進行。原因在於，無論是出口還是進口，兩國企業幾乎都無法承受如此高昂的關稅成本。例如，如果空客公司面臨的關稅極低或者為零，波音公司幾乎不可能在125%關稅的條件下繼續向中國出售飛機。通過第三國（如墨西哥或越南）進行轉口貿易以規避關稅的行動，也因“原產地規則”的嚴格執行而難以奏效。因此，中美雙邊貿易的全面中斷將在一段時間內成為“新常態”，貿易順差與逆差亦將因此消失。不過，美國近期宣布將“電子產品”列為豁免項目，包括手機、筆記本電腦與半導體等，或可使價值約1000億美元（相當於中國對美產品出口總額的1/4）的貿易活動在短期內得以繼續。這一舉措將有助於緩解貿易戰在短期內對中國出口造成的衝擊，但該豁免措施能夠持續多久，目前尚無定論。

隨着時間的推移，中國對美出口產品的附加值不斷增加，從2010年的0.56上升至2023年的0.71。因此，中國對美出口每減少1美元，意味着中國GDP減少約0.71美元。相比之下，美國對華出口產品的附加值一直較高。例如，美國對華出口的農產品，如牛肉、玉米和大豆，其國內附加值幾乎是100%。

在其他條件不變的情況下，如果中美完全經濟脫鉤，關稅戰對中國GDP的損害可大體估算為凈貿易順差乘以附加值，即1.74%乘以0.71，約為1.2%。如果考慮到“電子產品”豁免，損失可以估算為0.9%。儘管中國經濟肯定會經歷動蕩與困難，特別是出口導向型企業及依賴出口的地區，但全面衰退的風險較小。中國經濟在約5%的增速下，能夠承受1.2%的實際GDP損失。面對關稅帶來的各類干擾，中國能找到應對之策，主要得益於相對完善的國內供應鏈。中國的出口商將尋求開拓國內市場以及美國以外的其他國家市場，而旨在替代進口產品的創新活動，如DeepSeek和華為從事的創新，也將加速發展。此外，中國很可能通過公共投資和公共產品消費來刺激國內總需求，以應對出口下滑，同時更充分地利用過剩產能，尤其是那些因關稅而閑置的產能。

2025年3月，中國宣布2025年的增長目標約為5%。今年前幾個月，各省、市、自治區公布的目標增速加權平均值為5.26%。這表明仍有一定的額外增長空間。2025年第一季度，中國經濟的年化增速為5.4%，部分原因是企業為應對關稅加快了出口。我預測，受關稅戰影響，2025年的中國經濟增速約為4.5%（5.26 - 1.2 + 0.5），其中0.5%來自可能推出的更多經濟刺激措施。如果這一目標果真實現，考慮到諸多不確定性的存在，這將是一個相當可觀的實際增速。展望2025年之後的十年，中國經濟的平均增速有望維持在5%至6%之間。對中國來說，天還沒有塌下來！

短期內，中美兩國經濟在某種程度上的脫鉤是不可避免的，這將導致兩國福祉的下降。然而，從長遠來看，最終結果很可能是全球不同地區將出現更多的供應鏈，這將增強全球經濟的韌性和穩定性，甚至可能提升全球福祉。隨着多個供應鏈的並存，地緣政治衝突、疫情或自然災害帶來的負面影響將會減少到最低，市場競爭增強也將提高產品質量，降低價格，造福各方。

美國在此次關稅戰中的最終目標尚不明確。除了貿易，關稅還可能牽連其他問題，如中國建造的船隻是否能夠進入港口、資本管制、購買美國國債、二級制裁以及是否使用國際結算系統SWIFT等。鑒於種種不確定性，中國最好不考慮美國的行動，繼續推進自己的經濟政策。中國應努力實現自力更生，獨立創新，但不應追求完全的閉關自守或者自給自足。在可能的情況下，中國應繼續保持開放，不僅在經濟領域，還包括教育、科技等領域。

關稅戰不太可能很快結束，但也不太可能升級為中美兩國之間的熱戰，因為這樣的戰爭沒有贏家，只有輸家。蘇聯與美國在上世紀能夠避免爆發熱戰，中國與美國也應能夠做到這一點。中美戰略競爭的最終結局，將是兩國在和平共處、相互尊重和互利共贏的原則下，彼此平等相待。同時，中美關係將由“經濟相互依存”和“相互確保毀滅”來維繫。

The dependence of the Chinese economy on exports and, in particular, on exports to the U.S., has declined significantly over time (and for that matter, so has dependence on foreign, including U.S., direct investment). Chinese exports of goods and services as a share of Chinese GDP was 21.2% in 2024, and 19.2% in 2025Q1, compared to a peak of 35.5% in 2006. Chinese net exports (trade surplus) of goods and services was 4.37% of Chinese GDP in 2024, compared to a peak of 8.55% in 2007. Chinese exports of goods and services to the U.S. was 2.9% of Chinese GDP in 2024, compared to a peak of 7.5% in 2006. (The share of Chinese exports to the U.S. in total exports is around 14%.) Chinese net exports of goods and services to the U.S. was 1.74% of Chinese GDP in 2024, compared to a peak of 5% in 2006. (See Charts 1 and 2.) The 2024 export numbers are probably higher than normal because of the acceleration of exports to the U.S. in anticipation of tariffs. All of this suggests that the impact of the additional tariffs on Chinese exports and hence on the Chinese economy is not as large as may be expected.

At the latest tariff rates set by both countries, 145% on U.S. imports from China, and 125% on Chinese imports from the U.S.,2 there is no possibility of trade because no enterprise in either country, whether exporting or importing, has the profit margin to absorb the cost of such tariffs. (For example, it is unlikely that Boeing can continue to sell its airplanes to China at a 125% rate of tariff if Airbus faces little or no tariff.) Trans-shipments through third countries such as Mexico and Vietnam to avoid the tariffs are unlikely to be successful because the “rules of origin” are expected to be applied stringently. Thus, the total cessation of bilateral trade will become the “new normal”, at least for a while, eliminating any trade surplus or deficit altogether. However, the recently announced exemption of “electronic products”, including cell phones, notebook computers and semiconductors, by the U.S., may allow around US$100 billion, or almost a quarter, of Chinese exports of goods to continue for the time being, reducing the short-term negative impact of the tariff war, but it is uncertain how long the exemption will last.

The value-added content of Chinese exports of goods to the U.S. has been increasing over time. It rose from 0.56 in 2010 to 0.71 in 2023.3 Thus, a US$1 reduction in Chinese exports to the U.S. implies a reduction of approximately US$0.71 in Chinese GDP. In contrast, the value-added content of U.S. exports to China has always been quite high. For example,U.S. exports of agricultural goods to China such as beef, corn and soybeans have almost 100% domestic value-added content.

The damage of the tariff war to the Chinese GDP resulting from a total economic de- coupling with the U.S. may therefore be approximately estimated as the net trade surplus times the value-added content, 1.74% times 0.71 = 1.2%, other things being equal. 4 With the “electronic products” exemption, the damage may be estimated to be 0.9%. While there will definitely be turbulence and hardship in the Chinese economy, especially for exporters and for localities specialising in exports, there is little risk of a full-blown recession. The Chinese economy, with a rate of growth of around 5%, can survive a loss of its real GDP by 1.2%. It can also navigate among the disruptions caused by the tariffs because of its relatively complete domestic supply chains. Its exporters will explore domestic and other markets than the U.S., and import-substituting innovations, such as those undertaken by DeepSeek and Huawei, will be accelerated. In addition, China is likely to increase its domestic aggregate demand through public investment and public goods consumption to counter the decline in exports and to more fully utilise its excess production capacity, especially that idled by the tariffs.

In March 2025, China announced a target growth rate for 2025 of around 5%. The weighted average of the target growth rates of its individual provinces/municipalities/ autonomous regions announced in the first months of this year is 5.26%. This suggests that there is still some residual room for additional growth. The Chinese economy grew 5.4% annualised in 2025Q1, driven in part by the accelerated exports in anticipation of tariffs. I would venture to predict a rate of growth of around 4.5% (5.26 - 1.2 + 0.5) for the Chinese economy in 2025 under the tariff war, with 0.5% coming from the anticipated additional economic stimulus. If achieved, given the many uncertainties, it is a very respectable real rate of growth. For the decade beyond 2025, an average rate of growth between 5% and 6% for the Chinese economy is feasible. The Sky is Still Not Falling for China!

In the short term, some degree of de-coupling between the two economies is inevitable, lowering welfare in both. However, in the longer term, when all is done and settled, the net result is likely to be the emergence of additional supply chains in different parts of the world, which will enhance the resilience and stability of the entire global economy and perhaps even increase welfare. With multiple supply chains, the negative effects of disruptions due to geo- political conflicts, pandemics or natural disasters will be minimised and the increased market competition will bring about higher qualities and lower prices for all.

It is not clear what the ultimate U.S. goal is for its tariff war. The tariffs may be tied to other issues beyond simply trade, such as the access of Chinese-built ships to ports, capital control, the purchase of U.S. bonds, secondary sanctions, and the use of SWIFT for international settlement. Given all the uncertainties, China is better off pursuing its own economic policies independently of what the U.S. may or may not do. It should strive to be self-reliant and innovate independently, but not aim at achieving autarky or total self- sufficiency. Insofar as possible, it should continue to maintain openness not only with respect to its economy, but also in the fields of education and science and technology.

It is unlikely that the tariff war will end soon, but it is also unlikely to escalate into a hot war between the two countries, because such a war will have no winners, only losers. If the former Soviet Union and the U.S. could manage to avoid a hot war in the last century, China and the U.S. should also be able to do so. China-U.S. strategic competition will eventually end with both countries accepting each other as equals under the principles of peaceful coexistence, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation, and the relationship will be sustained by "economic interdependence“ as well as “mutually assured destruction”.

1. Ralph and Claire Landau Professor of Economics, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, and Kwoh-Ting Li Professor in Economic Development, Emeritus, Stanford University. The author wishes to thank Dr. Mingchun Sun and Prof. Yanyan Xiong for their most helpful advice, assistance and comments. He is solely responsible for any remaining errors therein.

The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute.

2. The Chinese Government has indicated that it would “no longer respond” to any further tariff escalations.

3. Private estimates.

4. There is, in principle, a second-round effect from the reduction of GDP due to the reduction of exports. However, if the additional economic stimulus is launched in a timely manner, it will dominate the second-round effect.