特朗普當選美國總統可能帶來孤立主義風險，並導致美國撤離亞洲。特朗普迄今的言論，例如他反對跨太平洋夥伴關係協定（TPP）、威脅對中國商品大規模加征進口關稅，都意味着他可能放棄奧巴馬的“重返亞太”戰略,以及目前“友好”的美中關係。不過，說起來容易做起來難。美國脫離與亞洲的貿易將幫助而非損害中國，而對中國採取更加咄咄逼人的態度也很可能損害美國利益。

特朗普試圖廢止TPP計劃的諷刺之處在於，這主要是出於提防中國未來從“後門”加入TPP並損害美國利益。不過，TPP胎死腹中卻很可能令中國長舒一口氣，因為這一貿易協定將妨礙中國與亞洲貿易夥伴的貿易關係。不僅如此，中國還能以其倡導的地區貿易協定對美國展開反擊。中國已經朝這一方向邁出步伐，例如區域全面經濟夥伴關係（RCEP），這一協定將囊括亞太地區主要貿易夥伴，包括日本、韓國、澳大利亞、新西蘭、印度和東盟。這些國家佔美國出口的比重高達1/4。如果美國背棄TPP，而RCEP順利推進，則美國出口商將面臨非常不利局面。此外，屆時美國也將失去在亞洲推廣其規則和價值的機會，例如更嚴格的勞工、環境和知識產權保護標準。與成功實施TPP相比，這種制度缺陷將令美國公司在亞洲市場更加缺乏保護。

同時，美國單方面提高對中國商品的關稅將擾亂全球生產鏈。雖然中國看上去比美國更容易受貿易戰攻擊（因為中國從美國的進口額高於美國從中國的進口額），但兩國如今都被深度整合進全球生產鏈，任何一方挑起事端都會令雙方受損。考慮到亞洲經濟將在RCEP之下進一步整合，特朗普在選戰中的主要承諾之一——把製造業崗位帶回美國——幾乎不可能實現，因為工作崗位更可能留在地區整合程度更高、日趨由消費驅動經濟增長的亞洲。如果中國積極展開報復，對美國來說情況將變得更糟。鑒於美國對中國的巨大外國直接投資（FDI），以及很多美國公司看重中國巨大的消費市場機遇，中國想要報復的話方式有很多。

從更廣泛意義來說，鑒於亞洲的經濟和人口規模，很難想像美國會主動後撤，坐視中國取代其在亞洲的位置。中國和東盟之間的生產和貿易結構正變得日趨互補：中國主要從東盟國家進口石油、天然氣和其他原材料，而東盟國家則從中國進口電子產品和紡織品。中國和東盟國家之間的生產鏈關係也變得越來越緊密，而美國公司未必能參與其中。東盟如今已超過歐盟，成為中國第三大貿易夥伴。因此，通過貿易協議來進一步推進整合符合各方利益。

不過，如果中國主導亞洲的代價是失去美國市場，中國也無法完全滿意。一個更加可能的情況是，美國（即便特朗普上台）仍會在東亞地區領導問題上和中國合作。話雖如此，如果特朗普信守其競選承諾終止TPP並對中國高築保護主義壁壘，那麼中國將確立其在亞洲的地位，並將在亞洲之外尋找彌補美國市場損失的機會，比如說歐洲。

因此，最可能發生的情況是大致保持現狀：特朗普政府雖然沒有通過TPP和跨大西洋貿易與投資夥伴協議（TTIP），但鑒於害怕報復，也沒有出台針對中國的貿易保護主義措施。不過，即便在這種情況下，中國在地區自貿安排方面也有先發優勢。在奧巴馬政府晚期，針對美國對TPP流露出的猶豫態度，中國反應迅速，這意味着反貿易的特朗普上台之後，中國不太可能和美國妥協。在我們看來，歐洲可以成為中國的下一站。這非常合乎邏輯，因為在“一帶一路”倡議下，中國已經規劃並開始啟動大規模投資來增強和歐洲的聯通。

對歐盟來說，在TTIP闕如情況下，與中國建立更緊密的經濟關係或許是唯一選項。考慮到RCEP可能達成，這一議題變得更為緊迫，因為RCEP成員國占歐盟對外貿易的比重達30%。如果歐盟不能與這一地區達成令人滿意的貿易協議，那麼歐盟企業可能面臨貿易轉移問題，並且在市場准入方面也將不如中國這樣的本地區國家。事實上，歐盟在2007年曾啟動與東盟國家的談判計劃，但其後陷入雙邊細節談判，進展緩慢。截至目前，在東盟10國中，歐盟只與新加坡和越南達成了自由貿易協議。並且兩份協議都尚未生效。在目前的特定時刻，鑒於亞太國家正邁向貿易和投資一體化，歐盟是時候加快速度並重估其戰略了。目標應當是和亞太國家達成一個區域性協議，而中國將發揮重要作用。

無論如何，歐盟如果想放棄其長期（但日漸沒有成效）的跨大西洋聯盟轉向中國，建立信任至關重要。這比鐵路聯通更加關鍵。不過，雙方目前的互信程度很低，尤其考慮到歐盟委員會近期發出的反傾銷呼聲，以及中國去產能改革不力。不過，只關心國內、行為乖張、咄咄逼人的特朗普政府可能成為歐中信任感快速提升的催化劑。無論如何，特朗普時代的歐中貿易關係很可能改善。

全文翻譯自：布呂格爾經濟研究所（Bruegel）網站，原文標題Trump could give new impetus to EU-China relations。

Donald Trump's presidency threatens isolationism and could cause the United States to turn away from Asia. Trump's statements so far, from his dislike of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) to his threat to impose massive import tariffs on Chinese goods, seem to indicate that he wants to undo Obama's pivot towards Asia and the current “cordial” US relationship with China. However, this is easier said than done. A US disengagement from trade with Asia would help, rather than harm, China, while a more aggressive approach to the bilateral relationship with China would risk undermining US interests.

The irony of Trump's plan to dismantle TPP is that it is based on the belief that China would enter TPP through the back door at a later date and hurt US interests. However, China is probably relieved at the likely demise of TPP, a trade agreement that would hamper China's trade relationships with its most natural trading partners in Asia. Not only that, China would be able to strike back with its own regional trade arrangements with Asian partners. China has already moved in this direction by launching the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) initiative with all key Asia-Pacific trading partners: Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, India and the Association of Southeastern Asian Nations (ASEAN). These countries account for as much as one quarter of US exports. If the US reneges on TPP but the RCEP proceeds nevertheless, then US exporters will be put at a serious disadvantage. In addition, the US would miss the opportunity to promote its rules and values in Asia, such as strict labour, environmental and intellectual property protection standards. Such an institutional deficit will leave US firms less protected in Asian markets than they would be with a successful implementation of TPP.

Meanwhile, a unilateral increase in US tariffs on Chinese goods would disrupt the global production chain. Although China seems to be more vulnerable than the US because China imports less from the US than the US from China, both countries are now heavily integrated into the supply chain and any shock from either side would be reciprocally painful. With the potential further integration of Asia's economies under RCEP, one of Trump's key messages during his campaign – the repatriation to the US of manufacturing jobs –is not likely to happen because jobs might actually stay in a more regionally integrated and increasingly consumption-driven Asia. Even worse for the US would be if China were to actively retaliate. This could take many forms given the still relatively large stock of US FDI in China and the interests of US companies that aim to tap into China's huge consumer market.

More generally, given Asia's size in terms of both GDP and population, it is hard to believe that the US would just step back and watch China take its place in Asia. This is no longer as unlikely as Trump might have thought when making such statements. The production and trade structures of China and the ASEAN bloc are increasingly complementary: China mainly imports oil, gas and other raw materials from the ASEAN countries, whereas they import electronics and textiles from China. There is also a growing production chain linking China and ASEAN countries in which US companies are not necessarily involved. The ASEAN bloc is now China's third largest trading partner, surpassing the European Union. As such, Asia's further integration through trade agreements is in the interests of all partners.

However, China would not be completely satisfied with the idea of dominating Asia at the cost of losing the US market. A more practical possibility would be for the US – even under Trump – to cooperate with China in regional leadership among East Asian countries. Still, if Trump does keep his promises (no TPP, and barriers against China and perhaps others), China could cement its position in Asia and look beyond Asia to make up for the loss – namely, to Europe.

So, the most likely scenario is that many elements of the status quo hold: the Trump administration does not conclude TTP or TTIP successfully, but also does not impose protectionist measures on China because of the rebound effect on the US. Nevertheless, even in such a scenario where the US does not advance on regional trade agreements, China would have a first-mover advantage to China. Indeed, China's rapid reactions to US hesitation over TPP during the last years of Obama's administration sends a clear signal that China is unlikely to compromise with the US under a trade-adverse Trump. To our mind, Europe could be the next stop for China. This would be all the more logical given the hefty investment that China has planned –and started to carry out – for a much better connectivity with Europe under the Belt and Road Initiative.

As for the EU, closer economic relations with China might be the only call left in the absence of TTIP. The issue is more urgent against the backdrop of the potential RCEP agreement, whose members would account for about 30 percent of the EU's external trade. If the EU cannot proceed with a favourable trade agreement with the region, its firms would also face trade diversion and enjoy less market access compared with other countries in the region such as China. In fact, the EU launched a plan to negotiate with the ASEAN countries in 2007 but the talks have moved to specific bilateral negotiations and progressed very slowly. Until now, out of the 10 ASEAN members the EU has only concluded free trade agreements with Singapore and Vietnam. Neither agreement has yet come into force. At the current juncture, with Asia-Pacific countries moving towards trade and investment integration, it is the time for the EU to speed up and rethink its strategy. The aim should be to reach a regional agreement with Asia-Pacific countries in which China plays an important role.

In any event, for Europe to move away from its long – although increasingly fruitless – transatlantic alliance towards China, it is vital to build real trust. This is even more important than railway connections. However, trust is currently at a low level, after the recent antidumping calls by the European Commission and China's lack of reform to sectors over capacity. However, an inward looking, erratic and/or aggressive Trump administration might be the catalyst for a rapid increase in trust between the EU and China. In any case, the chances are that EU-China trade relations will improve under Trump.

This article was originally published on Bruegel.