3月24日，朝鮮進行4年多來首次洲際彈道導彈試射。此舉正式打破朝鮮在2018年4月宣布中止核試驗和洲際彈道導彈試驗的決定，也違反多個安理會決議及2018年美朝、朝韓之間的一系列協議或共識，被視為觸碰了美國設定的“紅線”。美韓日等國相繼給予強烈譴責，朝鮮半島局勢再度進入新一輪緊張周期。

朝鮮此次試射並不令人意外。近日，美韓國防和情報機構已多次公開預測，朝鮮將進行遠程導彈試驗，甚至不排除核試。朝鮮領導人金正恩在今年1月19日召開的第八屆中央政治局第六次會議上曾表示，將研討是否需要重啟暫停的核導試驗活動。2月27日和3月5日，朝鮮以衛星開發為名進行了相關試驗。3月16日，韓國軍方稱朝方疑似發射新型洲際導彈，但試驗失敗。

朝鮮時隔4年多重新進行洲際導彈試射，主要有以下意圖和背景：

首先，打破目前的被動局面。2018年初朝鮮宣布暫停核導試驗以來的4年多時間裡，美國並未給予相應的補償措施。2019年初美朝河內峰會不歡而散後至今，朝核問題長期處於僵滯狀態，美國不願再在朝核問題上浪費外交資源，對近兩年朝鮮的一系列軍事示強舉動也基本置之不理。由於美國主導的對朝制裁體系長期維持，朝鮮經濟民生異常困難，此狀態長期拖延明顯不利於朝鮮。外界普遍認為，核和遠程導彈試驗是美國的紅線，朝鮮希望藉此迫使美國重視朝鮮訴求、打破當前困局。

其二，由於俄烏衝突，當前的國際時機對朝鮮比較有利。此前外界大多推測朝鮮顧忌安理會制裁加碼，可能在核導問題上較為謹慎。然而今年年初俄烏衝突的意外爆發，使主要大國無暇顧及朝核問題。美國在俄烏問題上焦頭爛額，無過多精力應對朝鮮。安理會中，美俄現在處於嚴重對立狀態，俄羅斯很難配合美國同意追加對朝制裁。美國不斷打壓中國，中國也很難同意美國側重於以制裁解決朝核問題的主張，而主張重視朝鮮的安全和發展關切。韓國則處於新舊總統交接期，朝野正忙於總統府搬遷、人事任命、政策分歧等一系列鬥爭，對朝鮮很難有實質應對。

其三，給韓國新政府“下馬威”。韓國剛剛選出尹錫悅新一屆政府，其對朝政策基調更強調“原則”，要求朝鮮“先棄核、後補償”，所重用的外交安全團隊多是李明博政府舊部，曾主張強硬的對朝政策。朝鮮進行洲際導彈試驗，對韓國新政府也是一種壓力測試和提前示威。

朝鮮試射遠程導彈，對東北亞地區的政治影響遠大于軍事影響。近年來，美國對朝鮮核導的實際威脅能力並無過度擔憂，它認為以朝鮮的綜合國力、工業能力等製造的導彈，離實際威脅美國本土還有很大距離。因此，美國近兩年對朝鮮高超音速導彈、潛射導彈等一系列試驗都輕拿輕放，甚至視而不見。近期，美國對朝核問題的重視程度有所提高，美國國防與情報當局接連詳細公布朝鮮將恢復遠程導彈和核試驗等消息。不過，美國卻不着急推出避免朝核危機的方案（例如儘快恢復談判、對朝釋放善意等），反而實施新的對朝制裁，頻繁與日韓加強軍事和外交溝通。

目前，美國在朝核問題上既不願對朝謀求務實交易，也不可能採用武力手段，反而更可能趁機利用朝核問題，加大對華施壓。在韓國新當選的保守政府更親美、對朝強硬的政策傾向下，美國大概率會以朝核問題為抓手，趁機加強美日韓合作和美韓同盟，甚至在半島加大“薩德”等軍事部署，推動韓國加入四國機制或五眼聯盟。若此，必將惡化東北亞地區的繁榮穩定，加劇陣營對立。

與世界其他區域相比，穩定繁榮是東亞地區當下最大的優勢，也是東亞國家最大的利益公約數。朝核問題還是應當用和平對話的方式解決。美國及各方應當考慮朝鮮的安全和發展需求，朝鮮也應該堅持七屆三中全會確立的經濟建設為重的路線，不斷提升本國綜合國力，在無核化上做出積極姿態。持續對立和對抗，是東亞地區大部分國家都不願意看到的。

On March 24, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea tested an intercontinental ballistic missile for the first time in more than four years. The launch ended the DPRK's suspension of nuclear and ICBM tests that it had announced in April 2018, violating several UN Security Council resolutions, as well as a series of agreements or matters o consensus in 2018 between the U.S. and the DPRK, and between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea. The test was said to have crossed a red line set by the U.S., which, along with the ROK, Japan and other countries, strongly condemned the DPRK. Thus, the situation on the Korean Peninsula once again entered a new cycle of tension.

The DPRK's missile launch was not a surprise. Recently, the U.S. and ROK defense and intelligence agencies predicted in public that the DPRK would soon conduct a long-range missile test, or even a nuclear test. The DPRK's leader, Kim Jong-un, said at the sixth Political Bureau Meeting of the Eighth Central Committee on Jan. 19 that he would examine the need to restart the suspended nuclear missile tests. The DPRK conducted tests on Feb. 27 and March 5 under the pretext of satellite development.

The DPRK launched a new ICBM after more than four years, mainly with the following intentions and background:

First, it wanted to break the current passive situation. In the more than four years since the DPRK announced the suspension of nuclear missile tests (in early 2018), the U.S. has not given it compensatory measures. After the breakup of the Hanoi summit in early 2019, the DPRK nuclear issue was put on hold. The U.S. has been unwilling to expend diplomatic resources on it and has largely ignored a series of military shows of strength by the DPRK over the past two years.As the U.S.-led sanctions regimen against the DPRK has been maintained for a long time, the DPRK's economy and people's lives have been in exceptional difficulty. If this continues long-term, it clearly benefits the U.S. to the detriment of the DPRK.It is widely believed that nuclear and long-range missile tests by the DPRK are a U.S. red line. The DPRK hopes to force the United States to pay attention to the its demands and break the current deadlock.

Second, the current international timing, given the Russia-Ukraine conflict, is more favorable to the DPRK. Previously, it was widely speculated that the DPRK might be more cautious on nuclear and missile issues for fear of more sanctions. However, the unexpected outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict earlier this year has left the major powers with no time for the DPRK's nuclear issue. The U.S., preoccupied with the Russia-Ukraine issue, is not focusing on the DPRK nuclear issue.In the Security Council, the U.S. and Russia are now in a serious confrontation, and it's difficult for Russia to cooperate with the U.S. on additional sanctions against the DPRK. As the U.S. continues to suppress China, it is also difficult for China to agree with the U.S. proposition of focusing on sanctions to resolve the DPRK nuclear issue. Instead China is advocating attention to the DPRK's security and development concerns. The ROK is in a period of transition between old and new presidents, and the entire country is busy with a series of struggles, including the presidential office relocation, personnel appointments and policy disagreements. All this makes it difficult for the country to respond substantively to the DPRK.

Third, the DPRK wants to give the new ROK government a kick in the pants. The ROK has just elected a new government, led by Yoon Suk-yeol, whose policy tone toward the DPRK emphasizes “principles” and demands that the DPRK give up its nuclear weapons before being compensated. The new government uses mostly the same diplomatic and security teams as the old Lee Myung-bak administration, which have advocated a tough policy toward the DPRK. The DPRK's ICBM test is also a stress test and an early demonstration for the new government.

The test will have far greater political than military implications for Northeast Asia. In recent years, the U.S. has not seemed very concerned about the actual threat capability of the DPRK's nuclear missiles but rather believes that missiles made with the DPRK's comprehensive national power and industrial capacity are still a long way from actually threatening the U.S. mainland. For this reason, the U.S. has turned a blind eye to the DPRK's hypersonic missile and submarine-launched missile tests over the past two years.However, the U.S. has recently taken the DPRK nuclear issue more seriously. American defense and intelligence authorities have announced in detail that the DPRK will resume long-range missile and nuclear tests, but instead of rushing to launch proposals to avert a crisis — such as resuming negotiations as soon as possible and showing goodwill toward the DPRK — the U.S. has imposed new sanctions and strengthened military and diplomatic communication with Japan and the ROK.

The U.S. is currently not willing to seek a pragmatic deal with the DPRK on the nuclear issue, nor is it likely to use force; it is more likely to take the opportunity to use the nuclear issue to increase pressure on China. With the newly elected conservative government in the ROK being more pro-U.S. and tougher on the DPRK, the U.S. is likely to use the DPRK nuclear issue to strengthen U.S.-Japan-South Korea cooperation and the U.S.-ROK alliance — and even increase its military deployments, such as SAD, in the peninsula and push the ROK to join the four-nation mechanism or the Five Eyes alliance. If this happens, it will certainly degrade the prosperity and stability of Northeast Asia and intensify the confrontation between camps.At present, compared with other regions of the world, stability and prosperity are the biggest advantages of the East Asia region and the greatest common interest of East Asian countries. The DPRK nuclear issue should be resolved by peaceful dialogue.

The U.S. and other countries should consider the security and development needs of the DPRK, and the DPRK should adhere to the line of economic development established at the Third Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee, continuously improve its composite national strength and make a positive gesture on denuclearization. Continued opposition and confrontation are something that most countries in East Asia do not want to see.