在習近平主席的果斷領導下，中國人民解放軍推出了迄今為止最全面的改革計劃。所建議的措施將改變解放軍的規模、結構和技術。這些改革有望達到他們所渴望的目標，即提高軍隊的戰鬥力、管理效率，並服從黨的領導。

2016年2月1日，中國國家主席，中國共產黨中央委員會總書記，中央軍事委員會主席習近平（左前），在首都北京將軍旗授予東部戰區司令部指揮官劉粵軍和政委鄭衛平。習主席在星期一將軍旗授予了新成立的五個解放軍戰區司令部。（圖片/新華社）

一個突出步驟是減少現役軍人數量，這並非意料之外的改革。多年來，解放軍和其他武裝已經削減了部隊規模，以節省資金，把錢用於精減人力資源的現代國防技術。就算完成新的30萬裁軍，以人數來說，中國仍將擁有世界上最龐大的軍隊——約200萬現役軍人和眾多預備役。

中國正在模仿其他國家的軍隊，將其作戰架構重組為五個常設作戰司令部，設立固定人員執行中國及周邊地區和平時期與戰時的任務。這一架構不如美國的指揮體系那樣雄心勃勃，但目的同樣是打破同級指揮官之間的隔閡。這種結構要求軍隊指揮官作為一個整體團隊專註於作戰，而不論他們的軍種或他們的指揮平台是什麼。

建立單獨地面部隊司令部的決定強化了各軍種的再平衡，鼓勵一體化聯合作戰。當可能的對手（日本、美國和在南海對抗北京島嶼聲索的東南亞國家）更有可能與中國在空中或海上交戰時，解放軍傳統的陸軍主導結構確實已經意義不大。

從美國軍方的角度看，可能最重要的變化在於解放軍建立了兩個新的體系：解放軍戰略支援部隊和解放軍火箭軍，此外還有中央軍事委員會的重組。

儘管名字如此，但解放軍戰略支援部隊並非僅僅是支援，它有着與解放軍火箭軍一樣的獨立作戰能力。值得注意的是，解放軍戰略支援部隊將包括“新型力量”，如網絡、太空和電磁能力。除了會將資源集中於網絡防禦和信息與心理戰，此舉也支持解放軍關注的建立反介入和區域封鎖（A2/AD）。這些進展將使解放軍有能力攻擊美國的指揮、控制、通訊、電腦、情報、監視和偵察系統，其目的是利用美國的非對稱漏洞，如對信息技術、外層空間系統和其他使能網絡的依賴，讓解放軍得以對抗美國仍具優勢的常規軍力。

新的解放軍火箭軍將通過阻止或催毀靠近中國的敵方軍力，同時威脅對敵方國土實施核打擊，來支持A2/AD戰略。這個組織的新名字是從過去的“第二炮兵”演化而來，但它仍然有一些誤導，因為火箭軍不僅控制裝備常規彈頭和核彈頭的遠程導彈，同時也指揮海軍新興的戰略潛艇部隊和所有空軍核轟炸機。

至於國防部、諸多解放軍下屬機構、預備役、武警以及民兵一下步會怎樣，目前還是疑問。負責掌控整個解放軍的中央軍委的重組有何影響也是未知數。據今年早些時候宣布的新安排，四個現有主要機構將被取消，它們是總參謀部、總政治部、總後勤部和總裝備部。

相反，新軍委領導下的十幾個新管理機構將開始運作。同時，他們將更明確地建立起從中央軍委到各軍種的“軍力供應”指揮鏈，以及從中央軍委到新戰區司令的“軍力使用”作戰指揮系統。

重要的是應該注意到，最近的改革並非代表中國對威脅判斷的改變。至少十年來，解放軍的規劃者並不怎麼關注在一場地面戰爭中戰勝俄羅斯，以及打敗美國的海軍空軍。

這一改革並不意味着要採用新的外交政策或國家安全戰略，他們的意圖似乎是使解放軍更有效地行使現有使命。這些舉措將提高軍隊的一體化和靈活性，而不是讓軍隊進行新的冒險。

對黨的控制的焦慮，就像在國防改革中見到的，在過去幾年裡一直很突出。由黨的真正信仰者來領導軍隊，也許不如推行更傳統的中國民族主義更能讓解放軍指揮官們產生積極性。如果在作晉陞決定時，對黨的忠誠度比專業才能更有份量，那麼這可能降低解放軍的作戰能力。

打擊腐敗無疑將提高解放軍的士氣，改進對資源的利用，這在當下尤其重要，因為中國官方（可能也是實際）國防開支的增長正在減速。此外，隨着解放軍戰略支援部隊的成立，以及採取其他加強黨的文職領導的措施，中央軍委現在可以更清楚地控制並對解放軍任性的網絡活動負責。

從根本上說，對中國軍事冒險主義最大的制約仍然是解放軍有限的作戰效能。中國打的最後幾場大仗，是1979年對越南，以及1950-53年在朝鮮對美軍，解放軍都表現平庸。很可能，自那時開始對裝備、技術和結構的改進，使解放軍在未來的衝突中成為一個強大對手，但在北京或華盛頓，沒有人能夠預測。

Under the decisive leadership of President Xi Jinping, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has launched its most comprehensive reform program to date. The proposed measures will change the PLA's size, structure, and techniques. These reforms are expected to yield their desired goals of improving the military's combat effectiveness, administrative efficiency, and deference to Communist Party leadership.

Chinese President Xi Jinping (L, front), also general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and chairman of the Central Military Commission, confers a military flag to Commander Liu Yuejun and Political Commissar Zheng Weiping of the Eastern Theater Command in Beijing, capital of China, Feb. 1, 2016. Xi on Monday conferred military flags on the five newly-established theater commands of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). [Photo/Xinhua]

One prominent step, reducing the number of active duty personnel, is an unsurprising reform. The PLA and other armies have been decreasing their troop size for years to save money and to pay for manpower-saving modern defense technologies. Even after the new 300,000 personnel cut is completed, China will still have the world's largest armed forces in terms of numbers—about two million active duty personnel and many reservists.

China is mimicking other militaries by reorganizing its operational structure to create five standing combatant commands, with permanent staff responsible for both peacetime and wartime missions in China and neighboring regions. This measure is less ambitious than the U.S. command structure, but likewise aims to break down barriers between rival commanders. This structure necessitates that military leaders focus on fighting as an integrated team regardless of their military service or the platforms they have under their command.

The decision to create a separate ground forces command reinforces the rebalancing among the military services and encouraging of integrated joint operations. The PLA's traditionally Army-dominated structure makes less sense when the probable opponents (Japan, the United States, and the Southeast Asian states contesting Beijing's claims in the South China Sea) will most likely engage China on the air or sea rather than on land.

From the point of view of the U.S. military, perhaps the most important change has been the establishment of two new structures, the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) and the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), as well the restructuring of the Central Military Commission (CMC).

Despite its name, the PLASSF is more than a simple support force—it will have the same capacity of independent operations as the PLARF. This is notable as the PLASSF will include “new type forces” such as cyber, space, and electromagnetic capabilities. In addition to likely concentrating resources on cyber network defense and information and psychological operations, this step sustains the PLA's focus on building anti-access, area-denial (A2/AD). These advances will make the PLA capable of attacking U.S. Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance systems. The aim is to exploit U.S. asymmetrical vulnerabilities such as dependence on information technology, outer space systems, and other enabling networks to allow the PLA to resist what are still superior U.S. conventional military forces.

The new PLA Rocket Forces will support this A2/AD strategy through their ability to deter or destroy enemy forces that approach China as well as threaten nuclear strikes against an adversary's homeland. The organization's new name, while an improvement on the former title of “Second Artillery,” is still a bit misleading since the PLARF will not only control long-range missiles, having both conventional and nuclear warheads, but also command the Navy's burgeoning strategic submarine fleet and any Air Force nuclear bombers.

There are unresolved questions regarding what will happen to the Ministry of National Defense, many PLA subordinate bodies, the reserves, the People's Armed Police, and the militia. The impact of the restructured CMC, which oversees the entire PLA, also remains unknown. The new arrangement announced earlier this year will eliminate the four main existing organs: the General Staff Department, the General Political Department, the General Logistics Department, and the General Armaments Department.

Instead, more than a dozen new administrative bodies will function under the new CMC. Together, they will more clearly create a “force provider” chain of command that flows from the CMC to the military services and a “force user” operational command that proceeds from the CMC to the new theater commands.

It is important to note that the recent reforms do not necessarily signify a change in Chinese threat perception—PLA planners have been focusing less on winning a ground war against Russia and defeating the U.S. Navy and Air Force for at least a decade.

The reforms do not suggest a new foreign policy or national security strategy, their intent appears to be to empower the PLA to conduct its existing missions more effectively. These advances will lead to improved integration and flexibility rather than applying the military to new ventures.

The anxiety that has resulted from Party control, as seen in the defense reforms, has been prominent during the last few years. Having the PLA led by true Party believers may not make PLA commanders more aggressive than the promotion of more traditional Chinese nationalism. If Party loyalty carries more weight than professional competence in promotion decisions this could degrade the PLA's combat effectiveness.

Cracking down on corruption will more clearly improve the PLA's morale and use of resources, which is especially important now that China's official (and probably real) rate of growth of defense spending is decreasing. Furthermore, with the standing up of the PLASSF and other measures to bolster civilian Party leadership, the CMC can now more clearly control, and answer for, the PLA's wayward cyber activities.

Fundamentally, the most important constraint on Chinese military adventurism remains the PLA's limited combat effectiveness. The last time China fought major wars, in 1979 against Vietnam and even more extensively in 1950-53 against the U.S. military in Korea, the PLA's performance was mediocre. Most likely the improved equipment, technology, and structures since then will make the PLA a much more formidable opponent in a future conflict, but nobody in Beijing or Washington can predict.