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| 2025 Liberal Democratic Party of Japan Presidential Election |
The resignation of Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba has set the stage for an emergency leadership election within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), a political machine that has dominated Japan's parliament for nearly a century. This internal party contest has become a high-stakes referendum on the country's future, particularly in its foreign and security policies.
In a rapidly changing geopolitical environment, the visions put forward by the three leading candidates — Sanae Takaichi, Shinjiro Koizumi and Takayuki Kobayashi — could not be more critical. While each shares a fundamental understanding of the need to strengthen Japan's position, their proposed strategies represent three distinct and consequential paths forward. The debate is not over the “what” but the “how” — and the ultimate decision will shape Japan's role in the world for years to come.
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| Sanae Takaichi |
Takaichi: Hawkish autonomy
Sanae Takaichi's political identity is defined by a hawkish, security-focused and deeply conservative worldview. Of the three candidates, she is the most assertive in framing China not merely as a competitor but as a fundamental “economic and strategic threat.”
From her time as minister for economic security, she emphasized the need to “monitor Japan's neighboring countries, especially China, to protect Japan from danger” — suggesting a readiness to adopt more confrontational measures to strengthen deterrence against Beijing.
Her foreign policy vision is most clearly revealed in her approach to the Japan-U.S. alliance, the postwar bedrock of Japanese security. Unlike her rivals, Takaichi has expressed skepticism about the long-term reliability of Washington, citing what she views as fluctuating U.S. resolve in global conflicts. As a hedge, she has advanced the idea of a quasi-alliance of Japan with Europe, Australia, India and Taiwan to reduce overreliance on the United States and to expand Japan's strategic autonomy.
In essence, her strategy combines assertive economic-security measures — such as supply-chain diversification, export controls and tighter investment screening — with a bid to elevate Japan's role in multilateral groupings. While this may reinforce Japan's self-reliance, it also risks provoking Beijing and accelerating regional polarization.
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| Farm minister Shinjiro Koizumi holds a press conference on Sept. 12, 2025. (Kyodo) |
Koizumi: Alliance-based engagement
Shinjiro Koizumi offers a more pragmatic and less ideological approach. He interprets the challenge from China not as a clash of civilizations but as an issue of “economic competition, industrial resilience and alliance friction.”
His method favors calibrated engagement: working closely with Washington to address “unfair trade practices” and industrial overcapacity while maintaining dialogue channels with Beijing. This reflects his belief that deterrence is better exercised through steady alliance coordination and economic-security cooperation than through overt confrontation.
Koizumi's foreign policy outlook is anchored by the Japan-U.S. alliance, which he calls the unshakable “cornerstone” of Japan's security. Yet he goes further by seeking to broaden the alliance into new areas such as clean energy, technology and trade, effectively transforming it into a platform for economic competitiveness.
On the Taiwan question, Koizumi avoids direct commitments, maintaining a moderate and evasive stance. His action — including his delegation's visit to Taiwan in 2013 — suggest quiet support for stronger bilateral ties, but he stops short of explicit recognition or military signaling. This low-profile approach may reduce the risk of escalation, but it also leaves him vulnerable to criticism from conservatives who demand firmer positions.
Overall, Koizumi's strategy represents an effort to blend economic pragmatism with alliance solidarity, allowing Japan to compete with China while avoiding unnecessary provocation.
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| Takayuki Kobayashi announces that he will run in the LDP’s presidential race at a news conference held in the Diet building in Tokyo's Chiyoda Ward on Aug. 19, 2025. |
Kobayashi: Technocratic resilience
Takayuki Kobayashi, Japan's first minister of state for economic security, has shaped his candidacy around the very doctrine he helped establish. Portraying himself as a “technocratic reformer,” he sees foreign policy challenges through the prism of supply chains, trade and technology.
His stance on China is “firm but policy-driven,” marked by warnings against dependence on “red supply chains” and promotion of “non-red” alternatives with trusted partners. Unlike Takaichi, he avoids inflammatory rhetoric, instead framing Beijing as a “systemic risk” to Japan's national resilience that must be managed with institutional safeguards.
Kobayashi views the U.S. alliance as indispensable for Japan's economic security agenda, particularly in high-tech sectors such as semiconductors and clean energy. He has frequently argued for trilateral frameworks linking Japan, the U.S. and Taiwan, underscoring his belief that economic and security policy are inseparable.
Unlike Takaichi, he does not question U.S. credibility outright, but he emphasizes that Japan must assume greater initiative in shaping resilient economic architectures. His Taiwan policy illustrates this approach: During a visit to Taipei in June, he pledged that Taiwan “must never be left alone” and urged deeper cooperation in trade, supply-chain resilience and integration into frameworks such as the CPTPP.
Although he avoids explicit military commitments or recognition of sovereignty, his rhetoric and proposals point to a willingness to embed Taiwan more firmly into Japan's economic and diplomatic orbit.
Kobayashi's emphasis on long-term institutional design — laws, subsidies and cross-agency coordination — positions him as the candidate most focused on embedding resilience structurally. Yet this technocratic vision come with high costs and may lack the symbolic power needed to satisfy voters who expect immediate, visible leadership in foreign policy.
The strategic choice ahead
The LDP leadership election is not merely about replacing Shigeru Ishiba. It reflects the deeper trajectory of Japanese politics toward securitization and an unmistakable rightward drift. Although Takaichi, Koizumi and Kobayashi propose different tactics, ranging from hawkish autonomy to pragmatic alliance engagement and technocratic resilience, they converge on elevating economic security as the new foundation of foreign policy and intensifying strategic competition with China. This convergence signals a broader departure from the postwar commitment to peaceful development, replacing it with policies that emphasize deterrence, supply-chain protection and heightened security rhetoric.
Equally significant are the candidates' positions on Taiwan and their individual symbolic acts, such as visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine. Both demonstrate how historical revisionism and conservative ideology continue to shape Japan's diplomatic outlook, sending signals that complicate trust-building with its neighbors. The Taiwan question is not treated merely as an economic-security concern but as a litmus test of Japan's willingness to align more openly with U.S. and Western strategies of containment — a posture that risks inflaming cross-Strait tensions. Meanwhile, the recurring visits to Yasukuni send a troubling message that undermines reconciliation and revives memories of Japan's militarist past.
Whoever emerges as leader will therefore inherit responsibilities that go far beyond domestic party politics. The next prime minister must decide whether Japan takes a path of constructive regional engagement — supporting stability through dialogue, cooperation and economic integration — or a path that further entrenches antagonism, heightens the risk of confrontation and edges closer to reviving the dangerous tendencies of militarism that once brought immense suffering to Asia.
