Last month, the Council on Foreign Relations published a special report, “No Limits?: The China-Russia Relationship and U.S. Foreign Policy. The lead authors are Robert D. Blackwill and Richard Fontaine. They have dealt with China and Russia for decades, held prominent positions in earlier Republican administrations, and enjoy Democratic foreign-policy experts' respect.
Their “No Limits?” monograph is well-written, comprehensive in scope, and extensively sourced, with many up-to-date examples. The text adroitly presents views that have become dominant in recent years within the U.S. foreign policy establishment, including the departing Biden administration, regarding the Sino-Russian challenge. However, their recommendations likely diverge from the new U.S. President's preferences.
The report affirms that, “The growing quasi-alliance between China and Russia poses the greatest threat to vital U.S. national interests in sixty years.” Though others might worry more about transnational threats such as nuclear proliferation and terrorism, the authors believe the Sino-Russian alignment has already substantially harmed U.S. interests by encouraging global opposition to the Western-favored international order, shifting the Indo-Pacific balance against the United States and its allies, and making the Ukraine conflict “longer and more brutal.”
The authors believe that China and Russia share the fundamental strategic objective of displacing the United States as the leading world actor by weakening U.S. alliances, power, and influence. They pursue this objective both directly and by sapping global confidence in U.S. credibility and staying power. Since Moscow “erased any last vestiges of the post-Cold War era and ushered in a new, more dangerous” time by invading Ukraine in February 2022, Sino-Russian ties have substantially strengthened, making them bolder in confronting the United States.
The report highlights suspected PRC concerns regarding certain geographic regions such as North Korea and regarding Moscow's penchant for risk-taking and nuclear saber-rattling. But Beijing calculates that China gains more by obtaining Russia's support for the PRC's sovereignty claims regarding Taiwan and the South China Sea, opposition to U.S.-favored international rules and democratic values, augmentation of Beijing's diplomatic ambitions, and sharing of military technology and experience. The authors point out that, though asymmetric, Sino-Russian economic ties are mutually beneficial. The PRC receives discounted Russian hydrocarbons, enhanced energy supply security, and greater access to the Arctic. Conversely, if China confronts Russia directly, the PRC risks alienating Moscow or precipitating Beijing's “ultimate strategic nightmare” of a new post-Putin regime siding with the West against China.
The monograph dismisses as “fanciful” proposals that Washington could divide Beijing and Moscow. The authors assess that even if such a realignment were possible, the price would be unacceptable: recognizing Chinese primacy in Asia or Russian hegemony of Europe. “More modest hopes of driving wedges between the two are equally unrealistic” since neither Beijing nor Moscow would allow their differences over any specific regional or functional issues to disrupt their structural alignment against the United States.
Instead, they advocate policies that arguably build on those of the current U.S. administration: strengthen U.S. alliances and connections with new partners; spend more on defense, foreign assistance, and domestic innovation; and prepare for concurrent military confrontations with China and Russia. They further recommend concentrating on weakening Russia first before Beijing follows Russia's precedent and employs overt military force to achieve its regional objectives. Nonetheless, they want to accelerate arms transfers to Taiwan and substantially augment U.S. military forces in Northeast Asia. They additionally favor employing strong measures against China to penalize Beijing for assisting Russia's aggression against Ukraine, violating international trade and intellectual property rules, and other misbehavior—as well as to deter China from resolving its sovereignty disputes by force or helping to reconstitute the Russian military.
One praiseworthy element is how the report explicitly warns against treating all Chinese and Russian global activities as equally threatening. If all regions and issues are priorities, then none is. They contend that the most serious functional threats would be actions that challenge fundamental world order principles, constrain U.S. freedom of action, or subvert countries' “domestic functioning.” They would prioritize competing with China in the western Pacific, Russia in Europe, and with both in the “global swing states” of Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey.
The new Trump administration will welcome the report's call for other NATO countries to increase military spending. But the new administration's enthusiasm for substantially boosting U.S. defense and public diplomacy expenditures is unclear given budgetary constraints and competing objectives such as cutting taxes and curbing immigration. And the prospects for the United States soon joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership or undertaking a dynamic U.S. trade policy in Asia are negligible.
Trump seems inclined to follow the recommendation to engage in bilateral diplomacy with China and Russia to manage risks. Despite the report's arguments, he may try to weaken Sino-Russian ties through personal diplomacy with Xi and Putin. After all, both governments do have highly centralized power structures. Their leaders cannot decide everything but they can decide anything. And they would likely insist on determining policy toward the United States.
During his previous term, Trump seemed interested in reducing tensions with Moscow in order to give Russia an alternative to partnering with China. Though he proved unable to execute this approach, Trump now faces fewer internal constraints in engaging with Russia than during his first term. His cabinet, bureaucracy, and the Congress should prove more compliant than eight years ago. Furthermore, Trump is now less concerned by potential allied objections to his policies. Yet, Xi and Putin are more invested in each other's success than during Trump's term. They also know that the American President is term-limited while they can rule indefinitely.
