2018年以來，朝鮮半島形勢明顯緩和，各方對話恢復，實現半島無核化和建立和平機制重現曙光。然而，美朝對話在2018年下半年陷入僵局又給半島無核化前景蒙上了陰影。應當如何看待當前的半島形勢？即將召開的第二次美朝峰會能否打破僵局取得突破？如果對話再次陷入困境，凍結現狀是否應成為一項政策選擇？下面圍繞這些問題談一些自己的看法。

一、當前的半島形勢既有挑戰又有機遇

2018年6月的首次美朝峰會取得積極進展，雙方達成四項協議，有力地促進了半島形勢的緩和。但在此之後，半島形勢卻出現了複雜的變化。一方面美朝後續對話在無核化時間表、路線圖上分歧巨大，陷入僵局。另一方面南北之間的和解與交流繼續快速發展，雙方第三次峰會在降低軍事風險和開展未來經濟合作方面取得重大進展。此外，朝鮮與中俄的關係也繼續改善發展。

然而，如果美朝對話的僵局不能儘快打破，半島無核化進程停滯不前，南北關係再向前走將十分困難，中朝關係進一步發展也將面臨障礙。

令人鼓舞的是，進入2019年後，半島形勢又有新發展。金正恩的新年賀辭及其第四次訪華髮出了堅持戰略轉型、堅持半島完全無核化的信號。美朝雙方也恢復了新的互動。通過雙方官員在華府會面，在瑞典對話，特別是元首互致親筆信，雙方已確定第二次美朝峰會將於2月底在越南舉行。兩國工作層的板門店磋商則是最新進展。

此外，在未來一段時間裡，中美韓朝俄等國將舉行一系列峰會，圍繞半島問題的新一輪外交互動即將全面展開。在此形勢下，雖然有關各方對於實現半島無核化的前景仍然存在樂觀與悲觀兩種聲音，但樂觀的聲音開始升高，認為美朝峰會可能打破僵局的意見逐漸佔了上風。

當前，有利於美朝第二次峰會取得進展的因素主要包括：

1、兩國最高領導人（彼此相互信任）都希望會談取得成功。金正恩急需減緩國際制裁，為戰略轉型增添動力。特朗普在國內難有作為，希望以外交成果鞏固權力。

2、南北關係、中朝關係的快速發展使美國感到必須有所行動，否則可能失去對半島的主導權。

3、中美貿易談判取得進展，有助於兩國在半島開展合作而非對抗。

4、國際社會普遍期望美朝兩國能抓住難得的歷史機遇，鞏固、發展半島緩和成果，推動半島無核化進程向前發展。

二、第二次朝美峰會可能取得新進展

從現在看，美朝第二次峰會有可能就無核化與建立和平機制的路線圖達成一定協議，從而打破雙方持續大半年的僵局。首次美朝峰會只是就建立新型美朝關係、建立半島持久和平、實現半島無核化達成了原則協議，但對如何實現這三大目標既無時間表也無路線圖。此後，雙方後續談判在這兩個問題上嚴重對立，很快陷入僵局。朝美第二次峰會如要取得成功，必須在這兩個問題上取得突破。從目前看，由於去年7月特朗普已明確表示美國在朝鮮棄核問題上不設時限，不急於求成，金正恩則在去年9月表示願意加快無核化步伐（在特朗普任期結束前實現無核化，結束朝美敵對狀態），美朝在時間表上的分歧已經有所緩和。這次美朝峰會只要能在路線圖上達成一定共識，雙方就能打破僵局，取得突破。為此，美朝須首先就“分階段、同步走”達成共識。其次，雙方須以此為指導，制訂一個一攬子、分階段實施的路線圖（或談判路線圖）。從現在看，此次峰會就“分階段、同步走”的原則達成共識應不是大問題，但要制訂一個全面、詳細的路線圖仍難度較大，雙方較可能的做法是先制訂一個只包括近期具體步驟、具體措施的路線圖。根據此前美朝雙方多次對對方提出的要求與建議，雙方將採取的措施可能包括以下內容：

朝鮮

 朝鮮歡迎對其已銷毀或撤除的核、導試驗場進行國際核查；

 朝鮮宣布凍結寧邊核設施並允許對其進行必要的核查；

 朝鮮對其核設施或核計劃進行部分申報；

 朝鮮就首先銷毀ICBM做出承諾；

美國

 美國承諾進一步降低聯合軍演的數量、規模和對朝威脅；

 美國承諾恢復和加強對朝提供人道主義援助；

 美國同意與朝鮮及有關方共同發表終戰宣言；

 美國承諾將逐步放鬆對朝制裁，如同意韓國取消某些單邊制裁或放鬆安理會的某些制裁措施；

 雙方籌備建立聯絡處並啟動某些人文交流項目。

美朝峰會如果能就上述措施中的一些達成協議，將打破大半年來雙方對話的僵局，在落實新加坡峰會前三項協議上取得初步但卻積極的成果。這不僅將增加雙方互信，為半島無核化進程向前發展打開通路，而且將增加有關各方對實現無核化和建立半島和平機制的信心。

美朝峰會的成功還將給隨後舉行的諸多雙邊峰會帶來積極影響，而後者的進展又會推動下一步的美朝對話。從長遠看，這些雙邊對話將為重啟朝核問題多邊對話特別是六方會談打下重要的基礎。

三、美朝對話仍可能停滯不前

儘管當前我們有理由對美朝第二次峰會持較樂觀的態度，但由於美朝之間極度缺乏互信，如果出現下述情況，朝美對話仍可能再次陷入僵局。這些情況包括：

 朝鮮拒絕在現階段做任何形式的核申報或不接受對申報內容進行核查；

 美國國會堅決反對政府採取任何逐步放鬆對朝制裁的措施，堅持要求朝鮮須首先全面棄核或首先進行全面核申報；

 峰會達成的協議在細化和落實過程中遇到種種難題或受到來自兩國強力部門的阻礙；

 美朝、朝鮮南北之間發生重大突發事件（這在歷史上不乏先例）；

 特朗普的領導力因國內政治受到嚴重削弱，雙方自上而下的做法難以為繼。

四、凍結現狀決不應成為政策選擇

如果新一輪美朝對話再次陷入僵局，在未來較長一段時間裡，雖然也可能有其他發展前景，但最可能出現的前景將是朝美對話再次長期停滯和半島現狀的固化。屆時，朝鮮將繼續停止核導試驗，但卻保持核武器、核能力；美國將保持其在半島的軍事同盟與軍事存在；朝韓之間的和解交流難以為繼甚至有所倒退；中俄日的安全關切居高不下；朝鮮戰略轉型舉步維艱。這種前景雖然略好於衝突與戰爭，但由於半島無核化、建立半島和平機制、建立新型朝美關係三大目標均未實現，朝核問題“印巴化”的趨勢將加強，凍結現狀的朝鮮半島仍將充滿安全風險，對地區與國際安全構成嚴重威脅。

毫無疑問，這樣的發展前景決不應成為半島有關各方的政策選擇與目標。為了半島的持久和平，衝突戰爭不可取，凍結現狀也不可取，共同為實現半島完全無核化和建立半島和平機製做出長期不懈的努力才是我們唯一正確的選擇。

（以上為2019年2月14-15日在韓國崔鍾賢學術院舉辦的“美中韓三邊會議：東北亞轉型期”上的發言）

The situation on the Korean Peninsula has obviously relaxed since 2018. Various parties have resumed dialogue and the dawn of denuclearization and peace seems to have come. However, the stalemate in the US-DPRK dialogue in the second half of the year has cast a shadow. Will the upcoming second US-DPRK summit break the stalemate and achieve a breakthrough? If the dialogue lands into difficulties again, should freezing the status quo be a policy option?

First, the current situation on the Peninsula presents both challenges and opportunities.

The first US-DPRK summit in June 2018 produced positive results. The four agreements greatly contributed to relaxation on the Peninsula. But complex changes have taken place since then. On the one hand, the US-DPRK dialogue stagnated due to the huge differences between the two with regard to the schedule and roadmap of denuclearization. On the other hand, South-North reconciliation and exchanges have continued and developed rapidly. Their third summit produced major progress in reducing military risks and developing future economic cooperation. Besides, the DPRK's relations with China and Russia have also improved and developed.

However, if the US-DPRK stalemate remains and the denuclearization process stagnates, it will be extremely difficult for South-North and China-DPRK relations to move further forward.

It is encouraging that there have been new developments since the beginning of 2019. Kim Jong-un's New Year message and his fourth visit to China both sent signals for strategic transition and full denuclearization of the Peninsula. The US and DPRK have resumed interactions. Through meetings in Washington DC and Sweden and by exchanging letters between heads of state, the two sides have decided to have the second summit in Vietnam at the end of February.

A series of summits will be held among China, US, the ROK, the DPRK, and Russia. A new round of diplomatic interactions will unfold.Optimism has increased and more people now seem to believe that the US-DPRK summit will help break the current stalemate.

There are some positive factors:

A. The top leaders of the two countries trust each other and hope to see a successful summit. Kim urgently needs relaxation of international sanctions to aid the DPRK's strategic transition while Trump, facing great difficulties at home, hopes to consolidate his position with diplomatic achievements.

B. Rapid development of North Korea-South Korea and China-DPRK ties gives the US a sense of urgency in taking action instead of losing its dominance in Peninsular affairs.

C. Progress in China-US trade negotiations enables the two to develop cooperation instead of engaging in confrontation on the Peninsula.

D. The international community has a shared hope that the US and the DPRK will seize the rare historical opportunity to advance the denuclearization process.

Second, the second US-DPRK summit may well produce new progress.

Some agreement may be reached on the roadmap for denuclearization and peace at the summit, thus breaking the half-year-plus stalemate.The first US-DPRK summit only reached an agreement on establishing a new type of relations in principle, creating lasting peace on the Peninsula, and working towards denuclearization. But there was neither a timetable nor a roadmap for the three objectives. Then the follow-up negotiation went into stalemate very soon due to opposing positions on the last two issues. For the second summit to be successful, breakthroughs must be made. Trump made it clear last July that the US does not have a deadline for the DPRK to abandon its nuclear program and is not anxious for quick results. Kim in September expressed willingness to speed up denuclearization and the end of hostilities with the US before the end of Trump's term. These have helped reduce US-DPRK differences on the timetable. So long as the two sides reach certain common understandings on a roadmap, they will surely break the stalemate and realize a breakthrough. To this end, the US and the DPRK must first agree on 'phased and parallel' implementation and on that basis produce a roadmap for it. Features of that roadmap may include the following:

The DPRK

• Welcomes international verification of its destroyed or dismantled nuclear and missile test sites;

• Freezes the Yongbyon nuclear facility and allows necessary verification;

• Partially declares its nuclear facilities or nuclear program;

• Undertakes to first destroy its ICBMs;

The US

• Undertakes to further reduce the number and scale of joint military exercises;

• Undertakes to resume and strengthen humanitarian assistance to the DPRK;

• Agrees to issue an end-of-war declaration jointly with the DPRK and other relevant parties;

• Undertakes to gradually lift sanctions over the DPRK and agrees to the ROK removing some unilateral sanctions; and

• The two sides make preparations for the creation of liaison offices and launch some cultural exchange projects.

Such a step at the US-DPRK summit will help break the stalemate of the past half year. It will not only enhance mutual trust but also increase the confidence of all relevant parties.

The success of the US-DPRK summit will have a positive influence on future bilateral summits. In the long run, these bilateral dialogues will lay down an important foundation for restarting multilateral dialogue on the DPRK nuclear issue, and the Six Party Talk in particular.

Third, there is still a possibility for continued stagnation.

Although there are reasons for optimism, due to the extreme shortage of mutual trust, it is still possible for the US-DPRK dialogue to end in a stalemate again with the following scenarios:

• The DPRK refuses to make a nuclear declaration in any form or does not accept verification of its declaration;

• The US Congress refuses to approve any agreement involving gradually lifting sanctions over the DPRK and insists on DPRK first comprehensively abandoning its nuclear program or making a comprehensive declaration;

• Serious obstacles or difficulties in detailing and implementing any agreement reached at the summit;

• A major emergency between the DPRK and the US or South Korea;

• Trump's leadership is seriously undermined domestically and results in a top-down approach no longer being viable.

Fourth, freezing the status quo must not be a policy option.

If the new round of US-DPRK dialogue is stalemated again, the most likely prospect will be another long stagnation plus fixation of the Peninsular status quo. Then the DPRK may continue its moratorium on nuclear and missile testing while keeping its nuclear weapons and capabilities. The US will maintain its military alliance and presence on the Peninsula. It will be difficult to sustain North-South reconciliation and exchanges, which may experience setbacks. China, Russia, and Japan will continue having serious security concerns. And the DPRK will have difficulty pursuing its strategic transition. Admittedly the prospect is slightly better than conflict or war. But as none of the three major objectives (denuclearization, peace, and a new type of US-DPRK relations) is anywhere closer to realization, the DPRK seems increasingly like India and Pakistan. The Korean Peninsula with a frozen status quo will still be full of security risks and pose a serious threat to regional and international security.

Undoubtedly such a prospect must not be a policy option or objective for the relevant parties. To realize lasting peace, conflict or war is not advisable, nor is freezing the status quo. Our only correct choice is to jointly make long-term efforts for full denuclearization of the Peninsula and the establishment of a peace mechanism.