美國總統唐納德·特朗普和巴西總統米歇爾·特梅爾。

美國國務卿雷克斯·蒂勒森今年2月初對拉美和加勒比地區的出訪，其野心和範圍令人印象深刻。這次訪問始於墨西哥，途經阿根廷、秘魯、哥倫比亞和牙買加。蒂勒森明確表示，美國願意與該地區的夥伴和朋友開展長期不懈的合作，以增強民主並為該地區可持續的經濟增長提供支持。

本次訪問的頭條新聞是地區各國強化了必須應對委內瑞拉日益加深的人道主義危機的共識。隨着大批難民逃離委內瑞拉崩潰的經濟和社會，這場危機已經開始影響包括巴西、哥倫比亞、圭亞那和加勒比國家等鄰國。事實上，就在蒂勒森返回華盛頓不久，將於4月召開的美洲峰會輪值主席秘魯總統佩德羅·巴勃羅·庫琴斯基就正式取消了對委內瑞拉總統尼古拉斯·馬杜羅參加峰會的邀請。地區各國正在加緊努力敦促委內瑞拉政府改弦更張，其他措施，包括對委內瑞拉實施進一步制裁，預計也將很快公布。

就在即將啟程奔赴墨西哥之前，蒂勒森在德克薩斯州大學發表了一次演講。在這次演講中他提及了一個關注度不高的議題，即中國正在西半球持續展開活動，而這無助於地區發展，因此需要美國更加勤勉地參與該地區事務。美國國務卿同時暗示，中國在海外的行為方式喚醒了新帝國主義的幽靈，而這正是該地區長期以來一直反對的。例如，他暗示“拉美不需要只想為本國人民謀福利的新帝國主義勢力”。

中國官方媒體憤怒地對此予以否認。《環球時報》寫道，“中國人民或許會驚訝地發現，他們的國家居然被貼上了新帝國主義勢力的標籤……中國對拉丁美洲做過什麼？”新華通訊社則稱，美國“反對任何形式的多邊主義”，它同時通過援引對學界的採訪來反擊蒂勒森的言論。其他媒體也表達了相似觀點。

然而，這份德州大學演講明確指明了美國新的拉美和加勒比政策，其重點是阻止中國在該地區的野心，這與特朗普政府在全球範圍內對抗中國的戰略一致。這是一個政策轉向。在拉美地區問題上，奧巴馬政府安於採取放任自流的態度，有意識地縮減了美國在該地區扮演的角色，同時特地為該地區培養自己的領導者創造空間。從抽象意義上來看，對於構建地區能力、降低對美國的傳統依賴，這的確是有益之舉。然而，奧巴馬政府未能將中國日益增長的影響力以及北京為填補空白而日益膨脹的機會主義野心納入考慮範圍。並不是美國將拉美和加勒比地區推入中國的懷抱，而是當美國後撤時，這種撤退為他人留下了可供填補的空間。就在特朗普上任剛滿一年之際，美國就出台了多項措施，包括退出TPP及聲稱要對北美自貿協定進行重新談判，而這一趨勢現在正在加速。

眼下，美國似乎正在尋求修正這種做法，並試圖積極奪回這個一直以來傾向於對華盛頓言聽計從的地區。現在的問題是，美國採取的措施是否太過無力，又或者是否已經太遲，抑或是華盛頓是否還有能力重新奪回地區事務主動權。

近期，中國國家主席習近平和中國外交部長王毅都宣布，歡迎拉美和加勒比地區加入“一帶一路”倡議。這將正式把一些國家拉入中國全球基建軌道。這給美國敲響了警鐘，同時也令美國重新奪回該地區的努力進一步複雜化。毫無疑問，拉美和加勒比地區亟需大規模的基礎設施建設投資，而該地區像歡迎其他人一樣歡迎中國參與發展地區基建項目。但令美國格外擔憂的是，中國的投資模式為國家主導，因此受制於來自北京的政府利益，這就有可能強化中國政府在該地區的影響力。事實上，中國已經開始時不時地行使這種影響力。

此外，華盛頓也越來越感覺中國人的慷慨援助加速了委內瑞拉的崩潰。雖然具體數字或許各不相同，但中國向委內瑞拉發放了上百億美元的貸款，部分估算這一數字或許高達700多億。這些貸款令委內瑞拉政府得以鞏固統治，向全面威權主義推進，同時追求不可持續的經濟發展路線，從而造成了一場全面爆發的人道主義危機。這並不是說中國希望委內瑞拉變成一個失敗國家或一個威權國家，但中國對於委內瑞拉巨額的無條件經濟援助的確帶來了這些意想不到的後果。

彌合分歧需要雙方展示戰略智慧，同時也應意識到當前的道路只會加劇不必要的緊張局勢。華盛頓和北京都在西半球擁有利益，雙方都不可能放棄這些利益。令當下情勢充滿挑戰的是這些利益無法完美匹配。因此，探索那些可以達成妥協的領域至關重要。

一個崩潰的委內瑞拉不符合任何人的利益。委內瑞拉能夠持續出口石油符合中美雙方利益。事實上，如果可以幫助該國石油產業扭轉快速下滑的趨勢並改善管理不善的現狀，石油產量有望得到顯著增長。不可否認的是，當下的委內瑞拉政府無法做到這些。因此，如果委內瑞拉能夠建立一個更民主、更具代表性、可持續性的政府，這符合中美兩國利益。

正如華盛頓和莫斯科於上世紀80年代通過不懈的雙邊外交努力幫助中美洲結束了殘酷戰爭一樣，華盛頓和北京可以考慮採取類似方式解決眼下的問題。通過在雙邊層面以及通過聯合國展開有意義的對話，中國可以迅速改變美洲國家對其意圖的認知。如果北京這樣做，成果將極其顯著。事實上，競爭雖然無可避免，但合作必然會帶來更好、互惠互利的結果。

Donald Trump and Brazillian President Michel Temer

Secretary of State Rex Tillerson's early February visit to Latin America and the Caribbean was impressive in ambition and scope. Beginning in Mexico and continuing on to Argentina, Peru, Colombia, and Jamaica, he made clear the United States' long and abiding interest in working with regional partners and friends to strengthen democracy and support sustainable economic growth.

The headline from the visit was a tightened regional consensus on the need to address Venezuela's growing humanitarian crisis, which is now affecting neighbors including Brazil, Colombia, and Guyana, and islands in the Caribbean, as refugees flee economic and social collapse. Indeed, shortly after Tillerson returned to Washington, the host of the April Summit of the Americas, Peruvian President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, formally rescinded the invitation for Venezuela's Nicolas Maduro to attend. Other regional steps including further sanctions may soon be announced as the effort intensifies to encourage the Government of Venezuela to change its destructive course.

Much less noticed, however, was the implication laid out in the Secretary's speech at the University of Texas, just prior to departing for Mexico, that China's continued inroads in the hemisphere are unhelpful for regional development and require that the United States become more diligent in its engagement with the region. The Secretary also hinted that China's approach created the specter of new imperialism, which the region has long rejected, suggesting, for example, that, “Latin America does not need new imperial powers that seek only to benefit their own people.”

Official Chinese media angrily rejected these comments. Global Times wrote that, “Chinese people might be surprised to find out that their country is labeled a new imperial power…What did China do in Latin America?” Xinhua claimed the United States is “against any kind of multilateralism,” and highlighted interviews with academics and journalists dismissing the Secretary's comments. Others expressed similar views.

Nonetheless, the Texas speech clearly identified a new U.S. approach to Latin America and the Caribbean, with a heighted focus on slowing China's regional ambitions, consistent with the Trump Administration's efforts to counter China globally. This is a shift. The Obama Administration was content with a laissez faire approach to regional issues, consciously diminishing the U.S. role in Latin America and the Caribbean while intentionally opening space for leadership to emerge from within the region itself. In the abstract, this was a worthwhile effort to build regional capacity and reduce historical dependence on the United States. However, the Obama Administration did not factor in the emerging role of China and Beijing's increasingly opportunistic efforts to fill the resulting vacuum. The United States did not push Latin America and the Caribbean into China's arms, but by pulling back, it created space for others to fill. This trend has now accelerated with the withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and strident efforts to renegotiate NAFTA, among other steps that the Trump Administration has taken after just one year in office.

Now, it appears that the United States seeks a course correction, and intends to compete more actively for a region that has tended to defer by default to Washington. The question is whether U.S. steps will be too little, too late, or whether Washington will be able to recapture the initiative in regional affairs.

The effort may be complicated by recent announcements by President Xi and also by Foreign Minister Wang that Latin American and Caribbean nations would be welcomed into the Belt and Road Initiative, more formally bringing some nations into China's global infrastructure orbit, a development that has begun to ring alarm bells in the United States. There is no question that Latin America and the Caribbean require massive infrastructure investments, and China is as welcome to participate in developing regional infrastructure projects as anyone else. But the United States is particularly concerned that the Chinese investment model is state-led and therefore directed by government interests from Beijing, with the potential to increase Chinese government leverage within the region. Indeed, China has exercised such leverage from time to time already.

There is also a growing impression in Washington that Chinese largesse has facilitated the Venezuelan collapse. Although estimates vary as to the specific amount, Chinese loans to Venezuela in the 10s of billions of dollars—some estimates go to the $70 billion range—have allowed the regime to solidify its rule and push toward full authoritarianism while pursuing an unsustainable economic course, creating a full-blown humanitarian crisis. This is not to suggest that China desires Venezuela to be a failed state or even an authoritarian state, but rather that as a practical matter, China's significant unqualified economic support has enabled these unintended results.

Bridging these gaps will require strategic enlightenment from both sides, and also a recognition that the current path could create unnecessary tensions. Washington and Beijing both have interests in the Western Hemisphere that neither is likely to abandon. What makes this a challenging moment is that these interests do not perfectly coincide. Therefore it will be important to identify those areas where accommodation can be reached.

It is in nobody's interest that Venezuela collapse. It is in both U.S. and Chinese interests that Venezuelan oil continue to flow; indeed, that the rapid decline and mismanagement of the oil sector be reversed and output significantly increased. It is undeniable that this will not occur under Venezuela's current government. It is therefore in both Washington's and Beijing's interests that there be a political transition in Venezuela to a more democratic, representative, sustainable government.

Much like the resolution of the brutal Central American wars from the 1980's was facilitated by diligent bilateral diplomacy between Washington and Moscow, a similar approach today between Washington and Beijing could be considered. And by engaging meaningfully in such a dialogue, both bilaterally and at the United Nations, China will immediately change perceptions about its intentions in the Americas. Were it to do so, the payoff would be enormous. Indeed, competition is inevitable, but cooperation wherever possible will lead to even better, mutually rewarding results.